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This thesis offers a briny counterpoint to the sugar-centred focus of Caribbean 
historiography, finding encouragement in research that looks beyond the 
plantation and towards the Atlantic’s maritime and migratory populations. It 
argues that the model of plantation-driven development cannot adequately 
explain the diverse array of socioeconomic and political processes that occurred 
within the Caribbean.  
It uses the principal salt islands of the British Caribbean – Turks Islands – 
as a case study and follows a sinew population of Bermudian salt gatherers, 
merchants and enslaved salt rakers into an alternative space of slavery. Its 
chronological scope begins with these islands’ discovery by seafaring 
Bermudians in the 1660s and extends to a generation beyond emancipation. It 
takes a cis-Atlantic approach, exploring different historical themes at different 
analytical scales, in order to demonstrate that the history of Turks Islands, and 
their position within the British Atlantic world, cannot be fully understood 
without salt taking centre stage. However, while this thesis diversifies our 
understanding of Caribbean processes, it does not intend to fragment the region’s 
history further. Here the salt industry did not compete with the sugar industry. It 
complemented, supported and literally fed into it, as salted rations reinforced 
plantation provisioning. In delving into the history of salt’s production and trade, 
this thesis shines a light on an ancillary industry of the sugar plantation complex. 
In the process, a rich inter-island history between Turks Islands and 
Bermuda is revealed that raises a question about transplantation between colonial 
societies. This thesis finds that while Turks Islands were, in many ways, an 
extension of Bermuda’s maritime economy, salt’s materiality and its saline 
environment also spoke with its own vernacular. This shaped an unusual 
trajectory for Turks Islands, as they were drawn away from the margins and into 
the British Atlantic world. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Born in mid-eighteenth-century Bermuda, Captain John Lightbourn was the first 
of five children and grew up in a colony that was overcrowded.1 Like many of 
his contemporaries facing bleak economic prospects on land, Lightbourn took to 
the sea entering Bermuda’s merchant fleet as a mariner and later becoming a 
merchant in his own right. As Lightbourn navigated the Atlantic littoral, serving 
on board the Experiment and later as captain of the Adriana, Cherub and 
Hummingbird, it is likely he would have called in at Turks Islands (see Figure 
1.1). There, Bermudian salt gatherers and their enslaved salt rakers were to be 
found in the islands’ saltwater lagoons. Under a scorching sun and knee-deep in 
brine, they worked to harvest the ‘other white gold’ of the British Caribbean for 
markets across North America.2 Whether the result of his own observation or 
second-hand deductions, Lightbourn decided to try his hand at this salt industry. 
By 1806, he was living at Turks Islands, while his wife and three children 
remained in Bermuda.  
Over the next six years, Lightbourn’s experiences of Turks Islands were 
recorded in a varied correspondence with his nephew, William Astwood, who 
was a member of the Bermuda House of Assembly, a partner of the merchant 
house Wadson & Astwood and a devoted relative.3 Their letters repeatedly 
disclosed their strong socioeconomic connections. A host of family matters were 
attended to. This included passing on joyful news of family births as well as 
regrettable accounts of death and illness. For example, in 1806, Astwood 
informed his uncle, ‘I am sorry to tell you that your poor sister Martha is very 
near making her Exit’, while on several occasions he warned Lightbourn of the 
growing ill-health of his wife, recommending that ‘as soon as you can anyway, 
make it convenient to come home, as I consider your presence would be [of] 
more service to her than any medical assistance’.4 To thicken their social ties, 
																																																								
1 Adrienne Antoinette Lightbourn Butz, The Letterbook of Captain John Lightbourn Sr 
and William Astwood (Bermuda: White Lodge Press, 2013), p. 76. 
2 Cynthia Kennedy, ‘The Other White Gold: Salt, Slaves, the Turks and Caicos Islands, 
and British Colonialism’, The Historian, Vol. 69. No. 2 (Summer, 2007), pp. 215-230. 
3 Butz, The Letterbook (Bermuda: White Lodge Press, 2013), p. 86. 
4 ‘Letter from William Astwood to John Lightbourn’, 21 August 1806, in Adrienne 
Antoinette Lightbourn Butz, The Letterbook of Captain John Lightbourn Sr and William 
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gifts of turtles, ambergris and cashmere were passed between these relatives with 
complements and affection. Provision scares and price spikes in both places were 
discussed in detail, as intermittent embargoes on the American trade threatened 
to hurt Turks Islands and Bermuda alike. Epidemics of influenza that started in 
Bermuda were reportedly carried by ship to Turks Islands as unwanted 
passengers. All of these topics, often ones of real sentiment, frequently sat 
alongside seemingly more impersonal business matters. 
At Turks Islands, Lightbourn was a salt gatherer and merchant. The 
commodity that originally brought him to Turks Islands – salt – was omnipresent 
in his writing. Time and again Lightbourn reported on the sale of salt, the health 
of the salt season, the checks of rain from above and the impacts embargoes and 
war with America might have on his economic prospects. As a dutiful 
correspondent, Astwood paid attention to the latest trans-Atlantic news arriving 
at Bermuda to relay to his uncle. In 1810, he predicted, ‘there being a free 
intercourse again with America, I expect salt will be a brisk sale with you and of 
course Provisions cheap’, to which Lightbourn cheerfully replied, ‘we all enjoy 
good health here, and the sale of salt seems very brisk’.5 But the economic 
activities of these men were more interconnected than the foregoing suggests. 
Lightbourn was also a debt collector for Astwood, whose merchant house had 
business interests at Turks Islands that included the hiring-out of enslaved 
labourers. Lighbourn would call around the local houses to collect Astwood’s 
fees or settle debts in the local inferior court when these were not forthcoming. In 
Bermuda, Astwood repaid the favour, granting Lightbourn a small share of the 
monies, securing salt sales for him when he could, and sending Lightbourn 
provisions as trade allowed. Furthermore, the extended family’s enslaved persons 
were often sent between these islands, revealing both the prevalence of, and 
connections between, slavery in Turks Islands and Bermuda. By 1812, the year 
																																																																																																																																																					
Astwood (Bermuda: White Lodge Press, 2013), pp. 15-16. ‘Letter from William 
Astwood to John Lightbourn’, undated, in Adrienne Antoinette Lightbourn Butz, The 
Letterbook of Captain John Lightbourn Sr and William Astwood (Bermuda: White 
Lodge Press, 2013), p. 36. 
5 ‘Letter from William Astwood to John Lightbourn’, 23 May 1810, in Adrienne 
Antoinette Lightbourn Butz, The Letterbook of Captain John Lightbourn Sr and William 
Astwood (Bermuda: White Lodge Press, 2013), p. 52. ‘Letter from John Lightbourn to 
William Astwood’, 20 December 1810, in Adrienne Antoinette Lightbourn Butz, The 
Letterbook of Captain John Lightbourn Sr and William Astwood (Bermuda: White 
Lodge Press, 2013), p. 64. 
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the surviving records end, the Lightbourns and Astwoods represented a typical 




















Salt in the Atlantic World 
 
In Lightbourn’s time, salt was much rarer and more coveted than it is today. In 
the pre-industrial age, before the rise of modern geology and advanced drilling 
technologies, extracting salt in quantity was a difficult task. While today salt is 
found in abundance beneath most continents, during the eighteenth century these 
deposits were unknown and inaccessible.6 Instead, salt producers relied on three 
																																																								
6 Mark Kurlansky, Salt: A World History (London: Vintage, 2013), p. 12. 
Figure 1.1: A modern map of the Caribbean highlighting the geographical location of 
Bermuda, the Turks and Caicos Islands (formerly Turks Islands) and the Bahamas. 
From The National Archives, ‘Map of the Caribbean’, Caribbean Histories Revealed. 




methods of production: if it existed close to the surface, rock salt was mined 
directly from the ground; if environmental conditions were right, bay-salt was 
produced through solar evaporation in saltpans and lakes; and if an abundance of 
fuel was available, boiled or brine-salt was produced through boiling seawater or 
brine in vats. While today there are over 14,000 different industrial uses for 
sodium chloride, in the eighteenth century salt was prized for two: food 
seasoning as a flavouring or condiment and food preservation as a brine pickle or 
cure.7 As a food seasoning, salt was ubiquitous.8 William Brownrigg, a natural 
philosopher from the eighteenth century, wrote in The Art of Making Common 
Salt that ‘salt has been used by mankind as a seasoning to their food, in all ages, 
and by all nations’.9 The type of salt used as a condiment varied, depending on 
the resources that were available. If a country had a plentiful, easily accessible 
and pure rock salt, the largest lumps were washed and ground into a fine powder. 
Those with a more discerning palate, and who could afford it, likely preferred the 
delicate and status-enhancing fleur de sel – the first flakes that formed on the 
surface of saltpans during the process of making bay-salt. In general, the salt that 
was driest, whitest and finest tended to be used. In England, this was often a high 
quality boiled salt. 
 However, while salt as a seasoning was important, salt’s main role in the 
pre-industrial era was in food preservation.10 As salt drew out moisture, killed 
bacteria and created a barrier to the air, it prevented putrefaction in formerly 
living plants and animals. In the era before canning and refrigeration, this was 
the most effective way to ensure food lasted throughout the year, particularly 
during the winter. Indeed, salt had been used to preserve vegetables in brine 
pickles for centuries. The Romans, for instance, ‘preserved many vegetables in 
brine, sometimes with the addition of vinegar, including fennel, asparagus and 
cabbage’.11 More importantly, meats were preserved through salt curing. The 
Church classified almost half the year as ‘lean’, when the consumption of meat 
																																																								
7 Ibid, p. 5.  
8 William Brownrigg, The Art of Making Common Salt...as now practiced in Most Parts 
of the World; with several improvements proposed in that art for the use of the British 
Dominions (London: C Davis, A Millar and R Dosley, 1748), pp. 157-161. 
9 Ibid, p. 157. 
10 Ibid, pp. 161-170. 
11 Kurlansky, Salt, p. 67. 
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was expressly forbidden.12 As such, salted fish was at the heart of Christian 
Roman cuisine.13 While salted herring was the preferred meat substitute during 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the discovery of Atlantic cod in the 
fifteenth century soon flooded the European market.14 By the eighteenth century, 
60 per cent of the fish eaten in Europe was salted cod.15   
 Furthermore, the expansion of Europe’s maritime empires from the late 
fifteenth century created unprecedented demands for salt within and across the 
Atlantic. Salted fish and meats became essential to provisioning the navies of 
Europe over these new ocean-going voyages. Cod and herring became so hard 
when salted and dried they could be ‘stacked’ easily on ship and transported with 
little risk of damage.16 Maritime imperial expansion also saw the rise of enslaved 
and free colonial populations within the Caribbean. As monoculture agribusiness 
took root, the sugar islands lost food sovereignty. Those who lived on the 
plantations increasingly relied on imported salted meats and fish for their protein 
supplements. Without salt’s adequate supply, the bodies of enslaved persons, free 
colonists, merchants and sailors simply would have ceased to function properly, 
as foodstuffs putrefied in transit or on the spot. 
 As such, salt’s importance to the provisioning regimes of the Atlantic 
should not be underestimated. In colonial times, salt was highly sought after. In 
the Caribbean, seizures of ‘salt islands’ took place from as early as the late 
seventeenth century as the Dutch took control of Bonaire, the French and Dutch 
of St Martin/St Maarten, and the British of Turks Islands. In the British 
Caribbean, salt production became part of a transatlantic commerce where salt 
was delivered to North American markets, fashioned into salt cod, beef and pork 
and shipped back to Caribbean plantations to supplement dietary regimes. This 
trading cycle was profitable, but it required a particular type of salt. Brownrigg 
was adamant that salted provisions intended for tropical climates or for ocean 
crossings needed the strongest salt or most careful pickling to prevent 
putrefaction.17 A hard, coarse and strong solar-evaporated bay-salt was the 
																																																								
12 Ibid, p. 110.  
13 Ibid, p. 68. 
14 Ibid, p. 113.  
15 Ibid, p. 132. 
16 Ibid, p. 114. 
17 Brownrigg, The Art of Making Common Salt, pp. 165-166. 
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preferred choice, explaining why the salt of Turks Islands became so prized. The 
volume of salt produced there would become truly impressive. By the time of the 
American Revolution, Turks Islands were producing one fifth of British North 
America’s salt requirements, engaging mercantile networks and colonial 
societies across the Atlantic littoral.18  
Salt, then, was by no means exotic or luxury. It was essential in the 
preservation of large and important Atlantic food chains. Moreover, this 
commodity chain was driven by the needs of colonists, reminding us that the 
Atlantic economy was sustained not only through sugar exports satiating the 
European sweet tooth but also with salted rations filling the bellies of colonial 
inhabitants. Consequently, Turks Island salt is a commodity of local, regional 
and Atlantic interest, worthy of further historical investigation. 
 
The dominance of sugar 
 
Other Caribbean commodities, including coffee, chocolate, tobacco and rum, 
have received more attention than salt. According to Michele Speitz, these 
commodities represent ‘the sweet, the smokey, the exotic and the luxury’.19 
There seems to be something in their pleasurable, exotic, illicit or luxury appeal 
that prompts continuing interest when counterpoised against the ‘common’ and 
‘localised’ item of salt. And if any commodity is to be connected with the 
Caribbean in our mental imageries, undoubtedly sugar bears the immediate 
association.20 With good reason, many Caribbean historians have used the sugar 
plantation to explain significant Caribbean socioeconomic processes.  
																																																								
18 Michael Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime 
Atlantic World, 1680-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), p. 
397. 
19 Michele Speitz, ‘Blood Sugar and Salt Licks: Corroding Bodies and Preserving 
Nations in The History of Mary Prince, a West Indian Slave, Related by Herself’, 
Circulations: Romanticism and the Black Atlantic, October 2011. <https://romantic-
circles.org/praxis/circulations/HTML/praxis.2011.speitz.html> (10 June 2019). 
20 A small selection includes Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in 
Modern History (New York: Penguin, 1986); Stuart B Schwartz (ed.), Tropical 
Babylons: Sugar and the Making of the Atlantic World, 1450-1680 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Carl Plasa, Slaves to Sweetness: British and 
Caribbean literatures of Sugar (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009); Keith 
Sandiford, The cultural politics of sugar: Caribbean slavery and narratives of 
colonialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Michelle Harrison, 
	 7 
For instance, Sidney Mintz’s conception of the Caribbean as one socio-
cultural area is based on the fact the region shared a common history of 
plantations.21 For Mintz, though the Caribbean lacks a unifying culture, 
nonetheless ‘the societies of the Caribbean…exhibit similarities that cannot 
possibly be attributed to mere coincidence’.22 These pan-Caribbean similarities 
‘consist largely of parallels of economic and social structure and organisation’ 
derived from a similar ecology, the rapid annihilation of indigenous populations 
and, critically, ‘the early definition of the islands as a sphere of European 
overseas agricultural capitalism, based primarily on the sugar-cane, African 
slaves and the plantation system’.23 For Mintz, the rise of the sugar plantation 
complex had significant implications. It saw a type of bipolar social structure 
mature throughout the Caribbean. It initiated the dynamic interplay of plantations 
and yeoman agriculture that persists to this day. And, in the wake of 
emancipation, it prompted the significant importation of foreign labourers from 
India and China who entered ‘the lower sectors of [these] insular social 
structures, under conditions of extremely restricted opportunities for upward 
economic, social or political mobility’.24 These shared historical experiences 
shaped the societal structures of the sugar islands in similar ways, lending the 
whole an amount of cohesion.  
 This classification represents an effort to move away from the idea that 
the Caribbean was, and remains, a highly fragmented region – culturally, 
politically, socially and linguistically. However, while Mintz admits ‘no attempt 
to generalise about the entire area can deal adequately with the distinctive 
features of any single component society’, this classification knowingly leaves 
out those places that never experienced plantation agriculture at all.25 Those 
histories have been overlooked and their contributions to Caribbean and Atlantic 
processes have been marginalised. Moreover, as this thesis will show, studying 
places that did not experience plantation agriculture need not fragment Caribbean 
																																																																																																																																																					
King Sugar: Jamaica, the Caribbean and the world sugar economy (London: Latin 
America Bureau, 2001). 
21 Sidney Mintz, ‘The Caribbean as a Socio-Cultural Area’, Journal of World History, 
Vol. 9 No. 1 (Jan., 1965), pp. 912-937. 
22 Ibid, p. 915. 
23 Ibid. Italics added for emphasis. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, p. 914.  
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history further. It nuances our understanding of how different societies, with 
different economies, related to and relied on one another. Salt drew thousands of 
enslaved and free colonial inhabitants to Turks Islands, but their history remains 
somewhat hidden. This thesis makes a case for their inclusion. 
 
A challenge to sugar 
 
This thesis aims to demonstrate that the sucro-centric model of Caribbean 
historiography cannot, by itself, explain the diversity of social, political and 
economic processes that occurred within the British Caribbean. It will use the 
principal salt islands of the British Caribbean – Turks Islands – as a case study 
and counterpoint. Throughout the chapters, there is an effort to compare and 
contrast processes that occurred in the salt islands with those that occurred in the 
sugar islands as well as a demonstration of how these islands inflected each 
other’s development. While colonial societies in the salt islands departed in 
notable ways from those in the sugar islands, salt also acted as a link between the 
two by preserving the latter’s food. Salt therefore offers a view into a more 
diverse Caribbean without implying regional disaggregation. 
It follows that the history of Turks Islands, and their importance to the 
British Atlantic world, cannot be understood without recourse to the commodity 
these islands produced. The discovery and use of the saltpans at Turks Islands set 
in motion a series of socioeconomic developments that had ramifications not just 
for the islands in question, but also for Bermuda, the Bahamas and the North 
American colonies; while concern for protecting and governing these salt islands 
at times prompted British imperial actors to take a disproportionate interest in 
their affairs. Without recourse to salt, these histories would not be told. This 
thesis therefore poses a variety of questions around salt in order to understand the 
society that matured at Turks Islands: How and why did settlement patterns 
develop differently around the extraction of salt, in comparison with sugar? Why 
did Bermuda and the Bahamas engage in a fraught diplomatic dispute over Turks 
Islands’ jurisdiction during the eighteenth century and how was that resolved? 
What form of political economy developed around salt at Turks Islands, and how 
and why did it differ from the sugar islands? What distinctive challenges did salt 
island slavery present to an enslaved salt raker? How and why did these systems 
	 9 
of domination change in the ponds from slavery to freedom? Why did Turks 
Islands become a watery enclave of empire, better defended than their Out Island 
neighbours in the Bahamas? And finally, in a period of great food scarcity, why 
were Turks Islands able to secure more food during the American Revolution 
compared to their sugar island neighbours, thus averting demographic disaster?   
 
Geography of Turks Islands 
 
Geographically, Turks Islands lie at the very end of the Bahamian archipelago, to 
the north of Hispaniola, northeast of Cuba, and southeast of Caicos Islands (See 
Figures 1.2 and 1.2a). In the eighteenth century, they consisted of two inhabited 
islands, Grand Turk and Salt Key, and a number of smaller, uninhabited keys, 
sand banks and rocky outcrops. Grand Turk and Salt Key were small, flat, barren 
and wind-swept islands, but they had natural salinas that rendered them 
economically attractive. Being of coralline and limestone formation, they were 
ringed by hazardous reefs and lacked fresh water. Larger vessels interested in 


















Figure 1.2: A map of Saint Domingue, 1780. From the David Rumsey Map 














A short chronology of Turks Islands 
 
While Appendix A provides a timeline for reference, a short description of major 
events discussed within this thesis is presented here. Its chronological scope 
begins in the 1660s, when Bermudian seafarers first landed at Turks Islands and 
began to rake salt for trade on an ad-hoc basis. However, as Bermuda’s economy 
took its maritime turn during the late seventeenth century, salt gathering became 
increasingly important. A form of secondary settlement took place that involved 
annual and maritime migrations between Bermuda and Turks Islands. While this 
activity began in a period before Turks Islands were officially claimed, following 
a French attack in 1764 the British Crown asserted sovereignty over these saline 
spaces and appointed a new position in the empire: the Turks Islands King’s 
Agent. He was instructed to protect and promote the trade of Turks Islands and 
he immediately encoded its economic system, the Head Rights System, within 
regulations. The salt industry subsequently became more structured and stable, 
and labour passed from free into enslaved hands. During the American 
Revolution and French Revolutionary Wars, a period of constitutional 
uncertainty surrounding the status of Turks Islands arose between Bermuda and 
the Bahamas. In 1803, the British Government ruled in favour of the Bahamas 
Figure 1.2a. Detail of Turks Islands from a map of Saint Domingue, 1780. From the 
David Rumsey Map Collection, G T Raynal, ‘Carte de L’Isle de St. Domingue’ 
(Geneva, 1780). 
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and Turks Islands entered a period of formal Bahamian rule. The salt industry 
continued to be profitable, but its white participants were now more likely to 
permanently reside on Turks Islands and exploit enslaved labour. Following 
emancipation in 1838, the Head Rights System gave freedmen access to the 
ponds on the same terms as their former masters, but in 1845 the Head Rights 
System was purposefully dismantled. New systems of domination emerged in the 
1850s. This thesis therefore begins its investigation at the beginning of Turks 
Islands’ settlement and extends to a generation beyond emancipation. However, 
it most comprehensively covers the second half of the eighteenth century – a 
period when the salt industry matured and Bermuda’s influence over Turks 




This thesis aims to challenge the explanatory power of sugar in Caribbean 
historiography by using salt as a lens to explore different historical themes at 
different analytical scales. There are six thematic chapters arranged into pairs. 
Each pair approaches Turks Islands’ shores from a different spatial scale – 
regional, local or Atlantic – to track a significant change over time. Chapters 3 
and 4 begin by examining issues of Turks Islands’ settlement and sovereignty. 
When Bermudian seafarers initially discovered uninhabited Turks Islands, they 
set in motion a distinctive maritime, transient and mobile settlement pattern that 
had few parallels in the British Caribbean. Over time, this created significant 
inter-island tensions in the region, as both Bermuda and the Bahamas jostled for 
Turks Islands’ jurisdiction. This constitutional crisis festered in the colonies, but 
in 1803 London reactively intervened. Turks Islands were declared a part of the 
Bahamas and more traditional settlement patterns took place. While Chapter 3 
charts that change through an investigation of the geographical arguments that 
Bermudians and Bahamians used to support their claims, Chapter 4 delves into 
the colonial petitions that were sent to London, in order to better understand why 
the Bermuda Government failed to convince those at the heart of power of its 
right to Turks Islands. The first pair of chapters therefore charts the emergence, 
maturation and eventual subsiding of a unique settlement pattern within the 
	 12 
British Caribbean, which owed much of its character to the self-organisation of 
Bermudian salt gatherers and the commodity they produced. 
Having analysed the settlement and jurisdiction of Turks Islands from an 
inter-island, regional perspective, Chapters 5 and 6 zoom in at a local level to 
investigate the nature of Turks Islands’ political economy and labour system. At 
a time when a drift towards privatisation might have been expected throughout 
the British Atlantic world, a curious shared resource system developed around 
salt at Turks Islands. Chapter 5 seeks to compare the main features of this 
economic system with that of the sugar islands, while investigating why it 
emerged and how it was sustained for so long. However, in 1845, the Head 
Rights System was deliberately dismantled. Chapter 6 charts that change while it 
strives to tell a story about those who laboured within the companies of the 
Bermudian salt gatherers: the enslaved salt rakers. Like the sugar plantations, 
Chapter 6 will argue that the salt industry at Turks Islands always involved 
unfree labour in some way, but that there were distinct aspects of salt production 
which defined that labour. This pair of chapters therefore plots the rise and fall of 
the Head Rights System in order to understand how local systems of domination 
that existed in slavery persisted in freedom. 
Finally, Chapters 7 and 8 pan out to assess the defence and provisioning 
of Turks Islands within the Britain Atlantic world. Chapter 7 explores the 
spatiality of British mercantilism to explain how, in the aftermath of a French 
attack in 1764, imperial and colonial actors reassessed the geopolitical 
importance of Turks Islands and acted accordingly. From being the most 
vulnerable ‘out’ of Out Islands, Turks Islands were transformed into a watery 
enclave of empire with a King’s Agent, capable of defending the islands’ salt 
trade and projecting a ‘force-field’ over the Windward Passage – a prized route 
for Jamaica’s sugar trade. Chapter 7 therefore traces the emerging importance of 
Turks Islands to British mercantilism, revealing a socially constructed Caribbean 
Sea in which specific ocean corridors were coveted. However, British 
mercantilism was not always successful at Turks Islands. Chapter 8 will question 
the long-term efficacy of this economic strategy during a period of instability: 
the American Revolution. Prior to the American Revolution, the salt islands 
relied heavily on the mainland colonies for food, as did the sugar islands. This 
dependency did not disappear in the war. But while the American Revolution 
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proved a disaster for the sugar islands, it did not unfurl in the same way for the 
salt islands. The salt-provisions trade that existed prior to the American 
Revolution largely endured. Chapter 8 seeks to explain that endurance and this 
breach of mercantilism. This last pair of chapters therefore tells a story about the 
consolidation and subsequent failure of British mercantilism at Turks Islands. 
In examining the rise and fall of an unusual settlement pattern, the 
emergence and dismantling of a unique economic system, and the success and 
failure of British mercantilism, this thesis pieces together a cis-Atlantic history of 
Turks Islands that argues salt was central to their settlement, development and 
position within the British Atlantic world. In the end, all these analytical scales 
and thematic investigations are necessary to prove that point. All shed light on 
islands whose economy and society did not rely on sugar and whose history 
cannot be told through sugar. Salt must take centre stage, not only in explicating 
the history of Turks Islands, but also in demonstrating that Atlantic littoral 
societies could be connected in many different ways.  
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This thesis sits at the intersection of three fields of historiography: Caribbean 
history, oceanic history and commodity history. In broad terms, it seeks to 
further research within subfields of Caribbean historiography that look beyond 
the sugar plantation and to island territories that are often marginalised. Like 
other commodity histories, it focuses on one item of exchange – salt – as a means 
to tell multiple, overlapping and trans-local stories of a political, socioeconomic 
and environmental nature. In doing so, it connects Turks Islands, Bermuda and 
the Bahamas together with North America, and to a lesser extent Europe, over a 
‘terraqueous’ zone that undeniably draws on aspects of Atlantic and oceanic 
history.1 To analyse these influences in depth, this chapter follows a structure 
loosely based around these three historiographical fields, noting their main 





Caribbean historiography has undergone several significant shifts in its 
methodological and theoretical ambitions. Beginning in the late nineteenth 
century, but notable from the 1930s, there was a growth in the number of 
professionally-trained historians from within the region that began to 
complement as well as challenge the imperial and Eurocentric focus of 
metropolitan scholarship, which had long dominated the field. This metropolitan 
scholarship had almost exclusively focused on the Caribbean’s white 
slaveholding and merchant classes and valued studying the Caribbean in so far as 
it contributed to European affairs. The masses of the region’s history – the 
enslaved population – were rarely addressed. However, with the rise of organised 
labour movements in the Caribbean seeking greater self-government, if not 
																																																								
1 Alison Bashford, ‘Terraqueous histories’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 60 No. 2 (Jun., 
2017), pp. 253-272. 
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independence, this began to change. A ‘creolisation of Caribbean history’ 
occurred as Caribbean historians responded to the call of activists for an 
alternative and useable social past for their nationalist aspirations.2  
The work of C L R James was significant in this regard. A ‘Trinidadian 
nationalist, member of the Pan-African movement, and Marxist’, James’ history 
writing fused these elements together.3 His path-breaking The Black Jacobins 
(1938) complemented his earlier work, The Case for West Indian Self-
Government (1933), and argued that the masses of Caribbean history were 
worthy of historical study, agents of their history, and capable of declaring 
immediate independence if they chose, as the enslaved had done during the 
Haitian Revolution.4  
Eric Williams, a fellow Trinidadian and contemporary of James, extended 
this work and has since become a towering figure within modern Caribbean 
historiography. Graduating with a doctorate from Oxford University in 1938, this 
historian and politician was one of the first persons of the Caribbean to obtain a 
doctoral thesis in Caribbean history. His book, Capitalism & Slavery (1944), 
radically challenged the imperialist tradition by arguing the Caribbean should be 
placed at the centre of narratives on the emergence of the Atlantic system and not 
at their edge.5 Like James, Williams wanted to nurture the Afro-Caribbean’s 
‘psychological esteem and self worth’, asking him or her to take pride in their 
history of slavery by pointing out it was enslaved persons who had contributed 
most to Europe’s economic prowess.6 
																																																								
2 Bridget Brereton, ‘Regional Histories’, in B W Higman (ed.), General History of the 
Caribbean, Volume VI: Methodology and Historiography of the Caribbean (6 vols, 
London: UNESCO Publishing and Macmillan Education Ltd, 1999), 6, p. 331. 
3 Francisco A Scarano, ‘Slavery and Emancipation in Caribbean History’, in B W 
Higman (ed.), General History of the Caribbean, Volume VI: Methodology and 
Historiography of the Caribbean (6 vols, London: UNESCO Publishing and Macmillan 
Education Ltd, 1999), 6, p. 250.  
4 C L R James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’ouverture and the San Domingo 
revolution (with a new introduction by James Walvin, London: Penguin, 2001). C L R 
James, The case of West-Indian self government (New York: University Place Book 
Shop, 1967).  
5 Eric Williams, Capitalism & Slavery (with a new introduction by Colin A Palmer, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).  
6 James Millette, ‘Nationalism and Imperialism in Caribbean History’, in B W Higman 
(ed.), General History of the Caribbean, Volume VI: Methodology and Historiography 
of the Caribbean (6 vols, London: UNESCO Publishing and Macmillan Education Ltd, 
1999), 6, p. 191.  
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 Together, these and other scholars inaugurated a new phase of Caribbean 
history that emphasised prioritising the history of the majority – the enslaved 
population – over the minority – the white slaveholding and merchant elite. This 
shift in focus accelerated with the rise of Black Power movements in the 1960s 
and 1970s and once island territories began to achieve independence. It also 
gained impetus from changes occurring within metropolitan scholarship. From 
within western universities came the rise of the new social history and its 
attendant ambition to write for the ‘people without history’ or ‘history from 
below’. Consequently, a combination of internal developments and external 
influence saw the direction of Caribbean historiography change. At root grew the 
radical idea, captured in Franklin Knight’s The Caribbean (1978), that the 
Caribbean was worthy of study for its own sake and not necessarily because of 
its place within other European countries’ histories.7 This was a concerted act to 
de-centre Europe and centre the Caribbean in its history-telling. It would have a 
lasting effect. 
Elsa Goveia’s history of slave society in the British Leeward Islands was 
an early and impressive example of this new type of scholarship.8 Goveia argued 
that the structure of slave society was upheld by a pervasive regime of violence 
and coercion that permeated all social interactions and institutions. Not only did 
she perceive race as the preeminent marker of difference within Caribbean 
society, she was also one of the first Caribbean historians to utilise the concept of 
hegemony in order to explain the longevity of a social structure that had, over 
time, made the separation of the races appear ‘natural’ to contemporaries.9 At a 
similar time, Philip Curtin’s Two Jamaicas (1955) posited a dualist interpretation 
of Caribbean society on the eve of emancipation, which described the dominant 
cultural group – the white Europeans – as holding ideas and beliefs about a 
future free Jamaica that contrasted irreconcilably with those of the subordinate 
cultural group consisting of the enslaved (pre-1834), apprenticed (from 1834) 
																																																								
7 Franklin W Knight, The Caribbean, the genesis of a fragmented nationalism (3rd edn, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
8 Elsa Goveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the End of the Eighteenth 
Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).  
9 Scarano, ‘Slavery and Emancipation’, p. 261. 
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and freed black masses (from 1838).10 However, this dualist interpretation 
increasingly came under scholarly criticism for failing to explain adequately how 
new societies form in areas of cross-cultural encounter.11 Edward Braithwaite 
subsequently introduced his idea of ‘creolisation’, urging scholars to understand 
the different sectors of Caribbean society as consistently reframing each other, 
forming a new society out of their encounter that was neither European nor 
African, but a creative new synthesis.12 While their arguments and research foci 
differed, Goveia, Curtin and Braithwaite all shared a desire to unpack the history 
of Caribbean society for its own sake.  
Caribbean historiography therefore shifted from a traditional emphasis on 
the governance, political and institutional history of the elites to focusing more 
on economic and social histories of the actual structure and inner workings of 
colonial society, the agency of the enslaved and, since the 1960s, the wider 
importance of the plantation as a production system. Indeed, the plantation as a 
social and economic organising principle for understanding Caribbean society 
has acquired a distinguished position within its historiography. For many 
scholars, such as Gordon K Lewis and Sidney Mintz, the unity of the region is 
predicated upon its sharing common historical experiences that have created 
uniformity in the structural organisation of society.13 In this, the experience of 
plantation monoculture – specifically sugar – has often been considered 
paramount. This research agenda was pushed in the 1960s and 1970s by the 
Plantation Economy School, which sought to support the nationalist, anticolonial 
movements and ‘facilitate structural change’ by establishing an ‘indigenous 
political economy’ for the Caribbean based around the plantation.14 Indeed, as 
Hilary Beckles argues, ‘modern Caribbean economic history begins with the 
																																																								
10	Philip D Curtin, Two Jamaicas: The Role of Ideas in a Tropical Colony, 1830-1865 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955).	
11 Scarano, ‘Slavery and Emancipation’, p. 263. 
12 Edward Braithwaite, The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica 1770-1820 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).  
13 Gordon K Lewis, Main Currents in Caribbean Thought: The Historical Evolution of 
Caribbean Society in its Ideological Aspects, 1492-1900 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1983), p. 3. Sidney Mintz, ‘The Caribbean as a Socio-Cultural Area’, 
Journal of World History, Vol. 9 No. 1 (Jan., 1965), pp. 912-937. 
14 Hilary McD Beckles, ‘Economic Interpretations of Caribbean History’, in B W 
Higman (ed.), General History of the Caribbean, Volume VI: Methodology and 
Historiography of the Caribbean (6 vols, London: UNESCO Publishing and Macmillan 
Education Ltd, 1999), 6, p. 89. 
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plantation’.15 It is now ‘the preeminent lens by which scholars have understood 
the area’s social, economic and political currents’, gaining its staying power 
partly in the way it complements other historiographies such as imperial history 
(with its ‘emphasis on each European power’s sugar holdings’), nationalist 
history (with its search for commonalities in order to unify the region), and 
slavery history (with its focus on the enslaved masses).16 Many historians from a 
variety of subfields continue to delve into this institution to explain the region’s 
history. 
However, in the last twenty years, the field has opened up. There has 
been a proliferation of monographs and articles on Caribbean history from both 
within and outside the region engaging in an increasing variety of topics and 
themes from slavery, the slave trade and the African diaspora to women and 
gender and environmental history, often mirroring developments arising in 
metropolitan scholarship. For the purposes of this thesis, there are three sub-
fields of particular relevance.  
 
Alternative spaces of slavery  
 
While plantations were ‘dominant’ in the Caribbean, they were ‘not omnipresent’ 
and in recent decades there has been a notable shift to research the lives of those 
who worked beyond the limits of the plantation.17 According to Jesse Cromwell, 
‘current scholarship demonstrates that the narrative of plantation-driven 
development cannot, by itself, explain the diverse historical experiences of 
Caribbean life’.18 Within the sugar-producing island of Jamaica, Verene 
Shepherd has demonstrated in Livestock, Sugar and Slavery (2009) that both 
prior to the establishment of sugar plantations, and during their apogee, the 
island contained many cattle-pens of varying size, often small but sometimes as 
large as a plantation.19 Once the sugar revolution took root, these cattle-pens 
																																																								
15 Ibid. 
16 Jesse Cromwell, ‘More than Slaves and Sugar: Recent Historiography of the Trans-
Imperial Caribbean and Its Sinew Populations’, History Compass, Vol. 12 No. 10 (Oct., 
2014), p. 770. 
17 Ibid, p. 778. 
18 Ibid, p. 771. 
19 Verene A Shepherd, Livestock, Sugar and Slavery: contested terrain in colonial 
Jamaica (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2009).  
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adapted to supply the livestock needs of the plantations and often employed 
enslaved labourers. Sometimes, planters even hired-in these enslaved labourers 
from the cattle-pens to mitigate their high labour demands during the sugar 
harvest. Consequently, Shepherd keenly demonstrates the importance of this 
subsidiary industry to sustaining the sugar plantations, which is often overlooked 
in plantation historiography, while making a point of variegating our 
understanding of how enslaved people lived in Jamaica. 
 Other scholars have begun to unpack the lives of urban enslaved people 
that differed in important ways from those of the rural plantation. An early 
example is geographer Colin Clarke’s Kingston, Jamaica (1975).20 This was the 
first study of a port-town in the British Caribbean, and sought to explain the poor 
infrastructure development of modern Kingston in light of its historical trajectory 
and early social stratification that was expressed spatially. Clarke explains how 
the influx of free people of colour and enslaved people prompted the local white 
elites to resituate their dwellings on the hills surrounding the town, leaving its 
centre and inner neighbourhoods for those of a lower socioeconomic and 
differing racial class. Consequently, those with spending power did little to 
invest in the city’s public buildings and infrastructure development. Similarly, in 
Slave Society in the City (2004), Pedro Welch provides a detailed study of a port-
town in the colonial period as he mines the archives of Bridgetown in 
Barbados.21 However, whereas Clarke is interested in spatial analysis and racial 
segregation with a view to its implications for infrastructure development, Welch 
focuses on the ways free people of colour and enslaved persons were able to 
carve out more autonomous roles and spaces for themselves in this urban setting 
when compared to the rural plantation.  
 Work on alternative spaces of slavery has also taken scholars to islands 
and enclaves that did not produce sugar at all. Jennifer Anderson’s Mahogany 
(2012) is a skilful synthesis of this wood’s commodity chain, which from the 
mid-eighteenth century saw a new form of slavery increasingly develop in the 
																																																								
20 Colin G Clarke, Kingston, Jamaica: urban development and social change, 1692-
1962 (London: University of California Press, 1975).  
21 Pedro L V Welch, Slave Society in the City: Bridgetown, Barbados 1680-1834 
(Oxford: James Currey, 2004).  
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jungles of British Honduras (modern-day Belize).22 Compared to the sugar 
plantation, slavery in the mahogany industry involved smaller gangs of enslaved 
persons who made temporary camps in the jungle during the woodcutting season. 
Though they experienced relatively little supervision as they explored the jungle 
in search of suitable trees to cut, Anderson is clear this was hard, arduous and 
dangerous work in a foreboding environment that contemporary consumers of 
decorated mahogany cabinets would have been largely unaware. 
  Anderson’s foray into the lives of transient enslaved woodcutters is 
complemented by a growing body of work that researches another category of 
mobile and migrating enslaved labourers: enslaved sailors. Their greater mobility 
and interaction with shipboard and onshore communities shaped their experience 
of slavery in distinctive ways. While Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh 
explore these dynamics aboard large ships and in port towns in The Many-
Headed Hydra (2000), Michael Jarvis offers an alternative view from the decks 
of small family-owned sloops within Bermuda’s merchant fleet that became 
important freight carriers within the Caribbean region during the eighteenth 
century.23 As Caribbean historiography continues to take this turn to the sea, still 
more research can be expected on those who were enslaved and working in a 
multitude of maritime trades: from pearl diving, turtling and whaling to 
droghing, wrecking and privateering.  
This thesis has been inspired by this literature to move beyond the 
plantation and assesses slavery in the context of the saltpans that developed on 
Turks Islands during the eighteenth century. It offers salt island slavery as a 
counterpoint to sugar island slavery and pays serious attention to how salt and 






22 Jennifer Anderson, Mahogany: the costs of luxury in early America (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012).  
23 Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, The Many-Headed Hydra: The Hidden History 
of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000). Michael J Jarvis, ‘Maritime 
Masters and Seafaring Slaves in Bermuda, 1680-1783’, The William and Mary 
Quarterly, Vol. 49 No. 3 (Jul., 2002), pp. 585-622. 
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Sinew populations  
 
This shift away from the sugar plantation to study the diverse lives of enslaved 
people in other settings is also reflected in a scholarly interest to recover what 
Cromwell calls the Caribbean’s ‘sinew populations’: those colonial inhabitants 
who lived beyond the plantation and who were often ‘neither masters nor 
slaves’.24 For Cromwell, ‘despite planters’ attempts to essentailise race, class, 
legal status and occupation into their simplest forms, a broad body of historical 
actors resisted and coexisted with the plantation complex and reshaped the 
designs of empire in the process’.25 Although by no means an exhaustive list, 
these sinew populations could include urban dwellers, merchants, smugglers, 
sailors and soldiers. Sinew populations often moved between islands and across 
imperial borders or between the sugar plantations and the urban towns, creating 
‘alternative geographies’ as they navigated the Greater Caribbean.26 In so doing, 
they also formed ‘the connective tissue of European projects in the region’, 
‘inadvertently prevent[ing] highly unequal and artificial societies from 
collapsing’.27 These were often white colonists who have been marginalised 
within ‘the narrative of plantation-driven development’ as a result of their lower 
economic status and alternative pursuits.28  
 Since the 1980s and 1990s, one sinew population that has gained more 
attention has been smugglers involved in contraband trade and its proliferation. 
There is now widespread recognition that illicit trade was endemic to the 
Caribbean. While European maritime empires adhered to an economic policy of 
mercantilism in theory, in practice the opportunity for profit, the geographical 
proximity of neighbouring islands, and the material demands of the colonists 
themselves often resulted in commodities crossing imperial boundaries. The 
range of topics pursued underneath this umbrella has varied but recently there 
has been a trend towards understanding the smuggler’s ‘integral place in a web 
of social connections that linked together subjects, colonial administration and 
																																																								
24 Cromwell, ‘More than Slaves and Sugar’, p. 771. 
25 Ibid, p. 770.  
26 Ibid, p. 773. 
27 Ibid, p. 770. 
28 Ibid. 
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trans-imperial spaces’.29 This holistic approach often asks questions about 
colonial identity construction as a result of inter-imperial trade. For example, 
Linda Rupert’s Creolisation and Contraband (2012) assesses cultural formation 
in Dutch Curaçao during the early-modern period.30 It tracks how Curaçao 
became a centre of illicit trade and argues that this contributed towards a process 
of creolisation as smugglers from different parts of the Atlantic coalesced on its 
main town, Willemstad, and interacted with its multi-ethnic population of free 
black people, enslaved persons and Sephardic Jews. As a result, Rupert contends 
that, far from being just an interesting sideshow, illicit trade was fundamental to 
the construction of colonial society in Curaçao. 
Similarly, in In the Eye of All Trade (2010), Jarvis traces the smuggling 
activities of Bermudian seafarers but he does so alongside the other maritime 
activities that free and enslaved Bermudians engaged in across the Atlantic 
region.31 By focusing on this maritime economy, as opposed to Bermuda’s 
agriculture and ailing tobacco plantations, Jarvis is able to weave a narrative that 
resituates Bermuda as a centre of trade within the Atlantic. Like Rupert, 
Bermuda’s sinew populations – its maritime seafarers – were critical for the 
island’s socioeconomic development. Moreover, as freight carriers they played 
an important role connecting different littoral societies of the Caribbean and 
American coastline together. Without these stories, our understanding of the 
‘connective tissue[s]’ of empire would be poorer. 
The main protagonists of this thesis are sinew populations: Bermudian 
salt gatherers, salt merchants and their enslaved labourers who congregated 
around and within Turks Islands in pursuit of salt. These colonial inhabitants are 
some of the most underrated of the Caribbean’s sinew populations but the role 
they played was important. During the period under study, Turks Islands became 
an invaluable source of salt for preserving the protein supplements that 
ultimately fed inhabitants of the thirteen colonies and the British Caribbean’s 
sugar plantations. In the effort to acquire sustenance, salt was a vital ingredient. 
As such, the exertions of Bermudian salt gatherers, merchants and enslaved salt 
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rakers to colonise Turks Islands and nurture their saltpans into maximum 
productivity deserve a better place within Caribbean historiography. It adds 
richness to our understanding of diverse Caribbean processes, without which 
another ‘connective tissue’ of empire would be missed. 
 By studying those people – enslaved and free – who lived and worked 
beyond the plantation, scholars can learn more about the ‘commercial dynamism’ 
of the Caribbean, the diversity of the region’s social groups and the value of 
islands that were perhaps more useful for their strategic significance than their 
extractive purposes yet still important in the functioning of the whole.32 In 
particular, scholars know relatively little about the maritime and migratory 
labourers of the Caribbean and of the Atlantic, but they were arguably far more 
important for the populations they served than the similarly mobile but often 
destructive pirates and privateers who have received more scholarly attention.33 
 
Regional and pan-Caribbean history 
 
One of the most challenging aspects of writing Caribbean history is the 
linguistic, political and cultural fragmentation of the region that arises from the 
divisions created through its imperial legacies and African influences. Indeed, 
the idea of fragmentation is a key concept within the historiography. This can 
make writing pan-Caribbean history a difficult task as primary sources are 
scattered in metropolitan and island archives and the level of linguistic dexterity 
required often exceeds the historian’s abilities. Nonetheless, there is a belief that, 
despite its fragmentation, the Caribbean region should, and must, be considered 
as one socio-cultural area with shared historical experiences.34 Many scholars 
argue colonial inhabitants did not experience the Caribbean as a peripheral, 
isolated place, but an inter-connected inter-imperial region.35 As such, there is a 
need for more pan-Caribbean histories that authentically reflect this fact. These 
histories are not narrow in theme, chronological period or geographical expanse 
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but tend to focus on large-scale processes within a ‘Greater Caribbean’.36 While 
definitions of ‘Greater Caribbean’ shift over time, often at the discretion of the 
historian, it tends to encompass the islands of the Caribbean and those mainland 
enclaves such as Guiana and Belize that shared similar historical trajectories to, 
and active connections with, the Caribbean.37 Knight’s The Caribbean is an 
example of how such a pan-Caribbean history can be written, privileging no one 
territory or chronological period but rather attending to common themes that 
have shaped the region. Pan-Caribbean histories have also been utilised to frame 
environmental and ecological histories that cross imperial divides. For example, 
David Watt’s The West Indies (1990) charts the rapid and irreversible 
environmental transformations following the rise of the sugar plantation complex 
across the Greater Caribbean; while J R McNeill’s Mosquito Empires (2010) 
traces the fatal impact of pathogenic forces that were exacerbated by the spread 
of sugar plantations and European imperial wars.38 
 However, while there are calls for more inter-imperial pan-Caribbean 
histories, there is also a need for more regional histories that focus on more than 
one territory but are not necessarily inter-imperial. According to Bridget 
Brereton, such regional histories study ‘the origins and development of a 
significant group of Caribbean territories, paying some attention to the wider 
regional context, and taking a similarly broad chronological sweep’.39 They tend 
to resist rigid periodisation and are lead by unifying themes that emphasise inter-
island connections and shared histories. Within the English-speaking Caribbean, 
there is a need for more research on territories other than Jamaica, which 
receives the greatest scholarly attention, to include more marginalised islands 
and their agglomerations.40  
This thesis seeks to respond to that need. As a point of departure, it 
extends its gaze to the salt-producing islands of Turks Islands and their strong 
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40 Christer Petley, ‘New Perspectives on Slavery and Emancipation in the British 
Caribbean’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 54 No. 3 (Sept., 2011), p. 877.  
	 25 
inter-island relationships with Bermuda and the Bahamas that changed 
dramatically over the course of a century and a half. According to Michael 
Craton, Turks Islands and the Bahamas have some of the most underdeveloped 
historiographies within the region.41 Of Turks Islands his outlook is particularly 
bleak: ‘The Turks and Caicos Islands’ case is sorry indeed; historically the most 
marginalised of all Caribbean territories and still the closest to being without an 
historiography whatsoever’.42 While Bermuda’s historiography has benefited 
from Jarvis’ In the Eye of All Trade, nonetheless more could be done to bring it 
from the edges of Caribbean historiography; a position it surely deserves given 
its historically rich connections to the region. In addition to these three islands of 
the British Caribbean, this thesis also assesses Turks Islands’ – at times fractious 
– relationship with French Saint Domingue (Chapter 7) and its co-dependent 
relationship with the mainland colonies during the American Revolution 
(Chapter 8). By attending to these different littoral societies in one narrative, this 
thesis aims to tell a story that is regional in scope but with a firm footing in 
Turks Islands in order to demonstrate there is value in studying marginalised 
islands particularly when their inter-island histories are taken into account. 
In producing inter-island and regional histories, the maritime spaces in-
between become an important site of study. They call on historians to question 
how the sea itself plays a role in shaping human relations and societal 
development. Consequently, regional and pan-Caribbean histories often cross-




Since the 1990s, there has been a profusion of studies that self-consciously 
associate with oceanic histories. Though the historiographical inspiration of 
oceanic history is older, with forays into Indian Ocean history, Pacific Ocean 
history, Mediterranean history and Atlantic history pre-dating this decade, a 
‘growing environmental and global sensibility’ saw an expansion of scholarship 
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in the 1990s that accelerated with the decision of the United Nations to create a 
World Oceans Day in 2008.43 In this context, oceans have done, and continue to 
do, much ‘discursive work’ for the United Nations, advancing the idea of a 
‘single world ocean’ that can unify a politically-divided terrestrial world, at a 
time when ocean management and conservation is becoming increasingly 
urgent.44 This single world ocean, this ‘blue planet’, argues there is a ‘shared 
oceanic heritage’ among terrestrial societies and that the rise of globalisation is 
owed significantly, though not exclusively, to the connection of the oceans 
through European maritime expansion.45 Oceanic history is therefore an 
important, even fundamental, way to tell global history through a focus on its 
maritime regions. 
By refocusing our attention on the watery margins of coastlines and their 
interactions with each other and the sea, oceanic history offers an escape from 
what Martin W Lewis and Kären Wigen call the ‘myth of continents’ and the 
tendency towards ‘terracentricism’ within area studies that directed world history 
after the Second World War.46 In oceanic history, it is assumed ‘littoral societies 
often shared more in common with similar formations and oceans than they did 
with their own nearby hinterlands’.47 It is an exercise in ‘trans-local studies’ that 
seeks to deprioritise the nation and the notion of hermetically sealed empires.48  
 Unsurprisingly, oceanic history takes the ocean seriously. In maritime 
history, traditional analysis focuses on ships, their navigation technologies and 
human activities aboard those ships. Oceanic history, however, asks for more 
cross-pollination between maritime and environmental history so that the sea is 
brought into this equation. It explores ‘the complex relations between elements 
(wind, tides, currents), ocean life (mammals, fish, crustaceans, birds, plants) and 
human activity in or on the seas’.49 This ‘turn to the sea’ also reflects the rise of 
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the blue humanities within academic institutions and the shifts within 
environmental movements from ‘green’ to ‘blue’ issues.50 It is this combination 
of maritime and environmental history that makes oceanic history distinctive.  
 Oceanic histories are also attentive to the balance that exists between 
integration and fragmentation when studying the world oceans. While there is a 
tendency to emphasise connection and coherence within global history, this focus 
does not capture all human experience within the world oceans. Indeed, ‘seas 
oscillate between objecthood and fragmentation, internal coherence and 
transoceanic connection, openness and closure’.51 While many oceanic histories 
‘from Braudel in the 1940s to Bailyn in the early 2000s’ would argue that oceans 
performed primarily as connectors of society, a growing cohort of scholars are 
now considering the ways oceans, and seas within oceans, were segmented into 
‘multiple micro-environments’.52 This ‘revisionist pluralism’ means oceanic 
history does not ‘essentialise or classify the seas of the world as spaces set apart 
from each other, nor does it prioritise the spatial scale of the global over the 
micro-regional, the whole ocean over the little sea’.53 Rather oceanic history 
allows room for historians who share a common interest in human-sea 
interactions to choose the geographical scale that is most suitable for their 
subject of study.  
 As there are multiple oceans and seas within the ‘single world ocean’, it 
follows there are a number of subfields – from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea – 
that historians have attended to. One of the most prolific, and most relevant to 
this thesis, is Atlantic history. 
 
Atlantic history  
 
Atlantic history focuses on the history of the four continents surrounding the 
Atlantic Ocean and their interaction with this maritime space from roughly 1500-
1800. The historiographical roots of Atlantic history have both political and 
academic origins. Following the Second World War, Walter Lippmann, a 
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prominent American journalist, advised the American Government to embrace 
the idea of an Atlantic community in order to bring the United States out of its 
isolationism and pursue a more productive foreign policy.54 This was the era of 
building international institutions, such as the United Nations and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and ‘the geopolitical expression of an Atlantic 
community’ brought a sense of unity to the western world.55 Though it first 
appeared ‘as a historical entity in the writings of diplomats’, in the 1970s it 
entered academic historiography.56 At that time, historians, such as Richard 
Dunn, who were interested in both early-modern English and American history, 
found it difficult to situate themselves within literatures that treated these as two 
separate fields.57 Moreover, there were those, like Jack Green, who believed 
there was a fundamental problem within American historiography that 
understood its early history merely as a ‘prelude to the real thing’, i.e. the 
foundation of the United States following the American Revolution.58 There was 
therefore a push to study the history of the thirteen colonies for their own sake 
and a realisation that these colonial societies had more in common with early-
modern Europe than the American society that followed revolution.59 In the 
1970s, these currents converged to form the new field of colonial British 
America, which emphasised transatlantic connections between Europe and North 
America.60  
However, there was a growing concern that Africa and enslaved people 
did not feature in this story. This flaw revealed itself in R R Palmer’s The Age of 
the Democratic Revolution (1964), which provided a synchronised account of the 
growth of democracy in both Europe and North America but said little on the 
subject of slavery.61 In order to address that omission, some historians began to 
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pursue a larger Atlantic frame for their research questions. Studies of slavery, the 
slave trade and the black diaspora were arguably the first truly Atlantic histories 
to emerge. An early, salient example was Curtin’s masterful The Atlantic Slave 
Trade (1969) that knitted the Atlantic together through its pursuit of the slave 
trade.62 Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic (1993) was also path breaking by 
following a narrative that was neither African nor British nor American nor 
Caribbean.63 Instead, it related the development and spread of the Atlantic’s 
black diaspora from a non-national point of view. The focus of these new 
Atlantic historians was consistently on the commonalities, convergences, 
connections, and circulations that existed between the littoral societies of the 
Atlantic. They naturally expected the answers to questions they asked in one 
place might be found elsewhere.64 And because Atlantic histories often tracked 
broad social and economic shifts, they tended to incorporate large-scale 
processes, across broad spaces, over long periods of time. 
An outcome of this new Atlantic history was an appreciable re-centring 
of the Caribbean within the historiography of British America, with early 
American scholars keen to explore the socioeconomic, cultural and political 
relationships that developed between British America and the West Indies from 
the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. For Trevor Burnard, this shift restored 
‘the British West Indies to its rightful position as the most dynamic part of 
British America’.65 It represented a ‘Caribbeanisation of American history’ 
where the islands were appreciated as centres of the Atlantic system, instead of 
peripheral outposts.66 Early examples of such Caribbean-centred Atlantic 
histories can be found in Williams’ Capitalism & Slavery and James’ The Black 
Jacobins, but a more recent example is Vincent Brown’s The Reaper’s Garden 
(2010).67 This is a haunting tale of the cultural, social and political importance of 
death in Jamaica, an island that experienced high levels of mortality amongst all 
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sectors of its population. While it is a story about Jamaica, Brown’s conclusions 
are Atlantic in scope, demonstrating that Jamaica’s experience of death – and the 
systems of domination and terror that surrounded it – was not anomalous but 
‘representative of early America’.68  
 As the 1990s progressed, Atlantic history experienced an explosion of 
scholarship, spurred on by Harvard University’s International Seminar on the 
History of the Atlantic World under the coordination of Bernard Bailyn. So 
prolific was its output that by the start of the twenty-first century, Atlantic 
history was briefly considered a field of history in its own right. Though Atlantic 
history would be subsumed under oceanic history as the 2010s progressed, the 
continued proliferation of studies that take an Atlantic framework demonstrate 
the subfield is in good health. There are now several recognised ways of writing 
Atlantic history that David Armitage has usefully defined. Four have informed 
the writing of this thesis. 
In The British Atlantic World (2009), Armitage outlines three approaches 
to writing Atlantic history.69 The most ambitious is circum-Atlantic history, 
which refers to broad syntheses that try to approach Atlantic history holistically, 
placing emphasis on inter-imperial connections and ‘the Atlantic as a particular 
zone of exchange and interchange, circulation and transmission’.70 While such a 
broad synthesis is not the focus of this thesis, and is beyond the remit of many 
Atlantic histories, it remains an aspiring goal that the subfield gravitates towards. 
The second approach is trans-Atlantic history. This is ‘“the history of the 
Atlantic world told through comparisons” between empires, nations, states and 
similar communities or formations, such as cities or plantations’ and throughout 
this thesis there is an attempt to engage in trans-Atlantic history by using salt as a 
counterpoint to sugar in order to bring into sharp relief the variegated 
experiences of Caribbean life.71 However, undoubtedly, this thesis most strongly 
engages with the third approach that Armitage describes: cis-Atlantic history. 
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 Cis-Atlantic history is written from the viewpoint of one particular place, 
exploring its multifaceted connections with the wider Atlantic world and how its 
societal development may have been affected by its position within that world. 
Though many Atlantic histories do focus on large-scale process, across broad 
spaces, over long periods of time, as Nicholas Canny states, ‘that does not mean 
the only subjects are those that can be painted with a broad canvas’.72 Within 
Atlantic history, local studies can coexist with broader syntheses, as long as they 
acknowledge that these places are embedded within larger networks and owe part 
of their character to Atlantic forces running through/within/out of them. As Jorge 
Cañizares-Esguerra and Benjamin Breen put it, we must understand ‘each space 
shot through with a multiplicity of entangled actors’.73 In colonial societies, there 
was always this interplay between the local, the regional and the Atlantic. It 
follows it is also possible to write Atlantic history of the British Atlantic world or 
the French Atlantic world, so long as one understands these were more ‘spheres 
of influence’ than hard-edged, sealed-off entities.74 
April Lee Hatfield’s Atlantic Virginia (2007) is an excellent example of a 
cis-Atlantic history that seeks to debunk the myth that the American colonies of 
the seventeenth century had little contact with one another or the wider 
hemisphere, apart from indirectly via London.75 Instead, through following the 
movement of goods, people and trade, along rivers and across the Atlantic 
Ocean, Hatfield demonstrates how early Virginia was entwined in many Atlantic 
networks that contributed to its development.  
While at times this thesis does move beyond the shores of Turks Islands 
to Bermuda, the Bahamas and the mainland colonies, predominantly it is 
anchored within Turks Islands and narrates a cis-Atlantic history that faces both 
inwards and outwards. Through an investigation of the settlement of Turks 
Islands, the development of its political economy, and the islands’ defence and 
provisioning networks, it continuously explores what was particular to Turks 
Islands and what was regional and Atlantic in scope. Like Hatfield’s Virginia, it 
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contends that all these perspectives – local, regional and Atlantic – are necessary 
in order to sympathetically explicate the colonial society that developed around 
salt production and trade from the late seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth 
centuries. Consequently, this thesis pays serious attention to the forces that 
operated at different scales through, within and back out of these islands. They 
are all given equal space in its analysis: the Atlantic is not prioritised over the 
local; the local is not prioritised over the regional. In the end, this produces a 
narrative that is neither endogenous nor exogenous. It acknowledges Christer 
Petley’s suggestion that ‘whatever their geographical frame of reference or 
specific field of interest, Caribbeanists must continue to look both inwards and 
outwards in order to make sense of local societies and to understand their wider 
importance’.76 A cis-Atlantic history of Turks Islands is an effective means 
towards that goal. 
There are two more approaches to Atlantic history that this thesis takes 
into account, which are of more recent origin. By 2018, Atlantic history had 
sustained scholarly criticism for ignoring the ocean itself and for indulging in 
methodological separatism: treating the Atlantic as a bounded entity when it was 
connected to other oceans and failing to incorporate methodologies from its 
peers’ historiographies.77 As this was problematic, Atlantic history had to 
reorient, adapt and recognise its position as a subfield of oceanic history. 
Consequently, its future now looks brighter and Armitage has added three more 
approaches to Atlantic history that reflect this greater dialogue with oceanic 
historiography. These additional approaches are: infra-Atlantic history, sub-
Atlantic history and extra-Atlantic history.78 Though this thesis does not engage 
with extra-Atlantic history (which seeks to uncover the transoceanic connections 
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between the Atlantic and the other world oceans), both the perspectives 
represented by sub- and infra-Atlantic history have played a role. 
In accordance with oceanic histories, sub-Atlantic history takes the ocean 
more seriously by researching into human activities that occur on or below the 
waterline and the impact these have on marine ecology. It also calls on historians 
to consider how the elements of the oceans and its marine life have historically 
moulded and shaped human activity on and in the seas.79 As such, the ocean has 
a larger role to play in Atlantic history writing and this thesis has endeavoured to 
reflect that trend. Not only is salt a literal product of the ocean – sea water was 
pumped through sluices and gates into saltpans for solar-evaporation – but it had 
widespread and powerful consequences for the Turks Island environment, its soil 
fertility, its settlement and the health of those who were forced to work within it. 
Moreover, the elements of the ocean – the direction and force of its winds, 
currents and storms – heavily influenced the sailing approaches to Turks Islands, 
aiding the journeys of Bermudians who sailed between Bermuda and Turks 
Islands, but hindering travel between New Providence and the same. Moreover, 
the location of Turks Islands next to a major shipping lane – the Windward 
Passage – had serious implications for the islands’ defence and the region’s 
geopolitical security. All of these features and characteristics of the seas 
surrounding Turks Islands are attended to within this thesis.  
Finally, infra-Atlantic history reflects a new trend that can be witnessed 
across oceanic histories. It is the ‘inverse of circum-Atlantic history’ and holds 
there are certain sub-seas and sub-regions of the Atlantic Ocean that are 
relatively bounded, have their own integrity and can be studied in their own 
right, without reference to a wider Atlantic world.80 For Armitage, this ‘is not the 
Atlantic as a congeries of cis-Atlantic histories because there is no assumption 
that these places should be connected to a larger circuit of communication’.81 
Instead, it commits to the idea of plural seas and parallel spaces, of disintegration 
instead of aggregation. It is a push against the pitfalls of overgeneralisation that 
can accompany circum-Atlantic history, advocating for more diversity and 
complexity. Because these histories refuse to adhere to mega-trends and meta-
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narratives of the entire Atlantic basin, infra-Atlantic histories are not necessarily 
histories of the Atlantic, but histories in the Atlantic.82  
While this thesis is not fundamentally an infra-Atlantic history because it 
does assume Turks Islands were connected to wider Atlantic processes, 
nonetheless there are parallels. This thesis narrates a story that predominantly sits 
within a sub-sea of the Atlantic Ocean, the Sargasso Sea. It is a story of salt 
production and trade between Turks Islands, Bermuda, the Bahamas, and the 
mainland colonies chiefly within this maritime space. While at times there are 
wider references to London, London’s role in Turks Islands’ development is 
proven to be largely reactive. Moreover, the enslaved labourers who were 
brought to Turks Islands came from Bermuda, where foreign importation of 
enslaved people was banned by 1676. As a result, the enslaved labourers at Turks 
Islands were mostly Bermudian, and later Turks Island, creoles. They did not 
originate from Africa. And although Turks Island salt did return to the Caribbean 
in the form of salted foods, this thesis does not focus on its consumption. 
Therefore, while this thesis does not claim to be one of ‘Atlantic History’s 
Hundred Horizons’ as it is not primarily a story about disaggregation and 
isolation, undoubtedly it is set within a sub-sea of the Atlantic and, to the extent 
that it does attend to what was particular and local to Turks Islands, it is also in 
favour of diversifying our understanding of Caribbean processes.83  
These six approaches, when taken in aggregate, offer a healthy blue-print 
for historians to write Atlantic histories that are sensitive to local and regional 
diversity, attentive to broader Atlantic forces and cognisant of world processes 
flowing through this space. As Hatfield has said of Virginia, but with equal 
relevance to other societies within the Atlantic,  
Each of these constructions – Atlantic world, Virginia, local region, 
international colonial America, North America and English Atlantic – 
functioned in slightly different ways and each was relevant under 
different circumstances. They coexisted and intersected. All are necessary 
for understanding the reality of life in seventeenth-century Virginia that 
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was connected to different parts of its wider world in very different 
ways.84 
Playing with different scales and being mindful of what is local in the global and 
vice-versa produces a more authentic understanding of Atlantic littoral societies. 
All perspectives are necessary; each sheds light on a particular historical question 
or theme. The methodological flexibility this thesis utilises – from trans-Atlantic, 
to cis-Atlantic, to sub-Atlantic, to infra-Atlantic – is needed because the fragile 
balance between fragmentation and unity that characterises Caribbean 
historiography is also a feature of Atlantic history. It is a dialectic relationship 
that is informative: only through an investigation of the Atlantic’s propensity 
towards fragmentation and cohesion can historians arrive at a more informed 




Since the rise of globalisation in the 1980s, scholars have increasingly been 
interested in tracing the antecedent roots of this contemporary process. Many 
historians have used commodities to grasp these earlier connections as they allow 
historians to break free from nationalist paradigms and pursue the routes 
commodities took between colonies, across imperial borders and over maritime 
regions. In Atlantic and Caribbean history, commodities have proven a similarly 
useful analytical tool. As Burnard has reflected, ‘a particularly long-lasting 
consequence of Atlantic connections in the early-modern period has been a 
greatly accelerated movement of individual commodities throughout the Atlantic 
world’.85 While there are studies that approach a group of commodities, it is 
more common to focus on specific commodities.  
One of the most influential commodity histories has been Fernando Ortiz’ 
pioneering Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar (1995), which argued that 
the development of sugar and tobacco production intrinsically shaped Cuban 
society as it contributed towards the creation of a national culture through a 
																																																								
84 Hatfield, Atlantic Virginia, p. 227.  
85 Trevor Burnard, ‘Global Commodities’, The Idea of Atlantic History, 29 May 2015. 
<https://0-www-oxfordbibliographies-
com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/view/document/obo-9780199730414/obo-
9780199730414-0007.xml> (10 June 2019).  
	 36 
process of European and African transculturation.86 In Ortiz’ wake, many 
historians have addressed the impacts commodities have had on different aspects 
of Atlantic and Caribbean society.87 In fact, using commodities as an analytical 
tool is so useful precisely because they allow historians to mine different 
historical themes, allowing multiple stories to be told without their narratives 
becoming untenably disarticulated. At the heart of this thesis lies the commodity 
of salt and it is used as a binding agent that allows different historical themes to 
be explored at different analytical scales.   
 Since the 1990s, there has also been a growth within commodity histories 
of commodity chain studies that follow a commodity through its entire lifecycle: 
from its production and circulation to its final consumption. According to Arjun 
Appadurai, ‘it is “things-in-motion” that illuminate a commodity’s human and 
social context’.88 By following a commodity through time and space, historians 
can grasp the different relations, values and meanings it engendered, while 
avoiding any rigid organisational or national framework. Histories that do this 
tend to be global or Atlantic in scope. Giorgio Riello’s Cotton (2013) is a fine 
example of how a global history of the commodity chain of cotton can be written 
that incorporates India, China, Japan, West Africa and Europe.89 On the other 
hand, Anderson’s Mahogany effectively utilises an Atlantic perspective as it 
traces this wood from its Belizean roots to its crafting into furniture and ultimate 
sale in early America, in order to uncover a story of human and environmental 
exploitation. One of the path-breaking commodity-chain histories for the 
Caribbean has been Mintz’s Sweetness and Power (1986).90 This book 
synchronically brings together the sugar-producing societies of the Caribbean 
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with the sugar-consuming working classes of Britain in order to demonstrate how 
sugar shaped the modern world and provided the calorie-intake needed to fuel 
the urban populations of the Industrial Revolution.  
 While there are many benefits to writing the history of a commodity’s 
entire chain, there is always a possibility that the chain is not linear and will 
branch in multiple directions or conjoin with other commodities to become new 
products. While this can be fruitful for the global or circum-Atlantic historian, it 
is a challenging task for those interested in telling a story of one particular place 
or region. As this thesis tracks the settlement and development of Turks Islands, 
together with its regional inter-island connections, it is unapologetically a 
Caribbean-centred analysis whose objective is not to track salt’s entire 
commodity chain but to understand how salt impacted that colony’s 
development. As such, it focuses on the first half of this chain, looking at the 
production of salt and its trade before it was combined with other commodities 
and fashioned into food items like salted pork, beef and cod for colonial 
consumption. Moreover, in telling mega-histories of a commodity’s entire 
lifecycle an in-depth analysis of primary sources is not always possible. For these 
reasons, many historians prefer to write in detail about one or two aspects of a 
commodity’s lifecycle. As this thesis explores the production and initial trade of 





Given the interest in globalisation by economists and social scientists in the 
1980s, it is understandable that within commodity histories attending to 
production and trade there is a focus on economic and social analyses – things 
that have ample statistics and have been used to assess the state of the world 
economy.91 In Sweetness and Power, Mintz devoted a chapter to sugar’s 
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production and offered a fairly traditional economic and social analysis of the 
structure and profits of the sugar plantation system. Here the experience of 
enslaved workers was not specifically highlighted. Recently, however, there have 
been more efforts to recover the experiences of those who laboured in the 
production of commodities. For example, Anderson’s Mahogany does attempt to 
capture what it was like to work in a logging camp within the British Honduran 
jungle while John Tully retrieves the experience of indigenous free peoples who 
worked to extract gum from the gutta-percha trees of Malaysia, which would 
later be used to insulate British telegraph cables.92 In a similar effort, this thesis 
pays attention to how salt was fashioned into a commodity at Turks Islands and 
what it was like to work with this product, while attending to the political 
economy and colonial society that arose around it. As such, it balances aspects of 
a traditional socioeconomic analysis with contemporary efforts to recover the 
experiences of labourers in order to provide a more human history alongside the 
statistics that can inadvertently desensitise readers. In this it takes inspiration 
from Bruno Latour’s actor network theory set out in Reassembling the Social 
(2005), which argues inanimate non-human actors can and do contribute towards 
the construction of human systems and social networks.93 It takes the 
environment seriously when studying the quality of human experience. 
However, while some commodity histories cross-pollinate with 
environmental history to consider the ways nature was an agent in human 
socioeconomic development, another body of work considers how nature was 
also a victim of humanity. These tend to chart the negative environmental 
consequences that have resulted from the commodification of nature, tying into 
contemporary notions of planetary stewardship and its concern for environmental 
change. For example, Watts’s The West Indies describes the Caribbean as an 
archipelago of environmentally sensitive islands whose ecology was irretrievably 
transformed and damaged after the introduction and spread of sugar 
monoculture; while Mark Kurlansky’s Cod (1999) argues that the onset of 
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1981), pp. 428-442. 
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modern technological innovations, poor regulation, falling cod prices and 
growing European demand combined to devastate the reproductive capacities of 
Atlantic cod by the twentieth century.94 In these narratives the commodification 




While studying a commodity’s production can provide rewarding analyses of its 
political economy, its labourers, and the colonial society in which it was 
produced, the trade of a commodity sheds light on the merchant networks its 
circulations created. Trade was of paramount importance to the Atlantic world. 
As Adam Finucane reflects, ‘“commerce” as an organising concept would have 
been as logical as “empire” to those who lived and worked in the middle of a 
hugely active Caribbean marketplace’.95 When it came to knitting these regions 
together, regional trade was arguably more significant to colonial inhabitants 
than imperial directives or metropolitan interventions from London or Paris.  
Knowing this, a study of inter- and intra-colonial trades allows historians 
to move beyond the insular (and often arbitrary) boundaries of colonies to follow 
the movement of goods, people and ideas between littoral societies. Not only 
does this create rich inter-island histories, but it also questions the supposed 
sealed nature of empires. For example, Bertie Mandleblatt’s study on 
provisioning the French Caribbean follows the geographical trajectory of Irish 
salt beef from the Irish coast, to the French port cities of Nantes, La Rochelle and 
Bordeaux, to its final arrival in the French Caribbean.96 To great effect, 
Mandelblatt uses Irish salt beef to demonstrate that the nutritional demands of 
enslaved persons drove a commodity chain that effectively negated French 
mercantilist polices as it navigated a course across imperial borders.  
One new and exciting area of research is the study of merchant networks 
that were often built around kith and kinship connections. In Oceans of Wine 
(2009), David Hancock uses network theory in his analysis of the rise of the 
																																																								
94 Mark Kurlansky, Cod: A Biography of the Fish That Changed the World (London: 
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96 Bertie Mandelblatt, ‘A Transatlantic Commodity: Irish Salt Beef in the French 
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Madeira wine complex to challenge traditional interpretations that see states and 
empires as the principal actors driving colonial trade in the early-modern 
Atlantic.97 Instead, he demonstrates how trade was predominantly de-centralised 
and self-organised in nature, driven by individuals with rich interpersonal 
connections who engaged with market forces and often crossed imperial borders. 
In this way, the Portuguese wine of Madeira found markets within American 
settler society. In the process, Hancock skilfully de-centres Europe while 
highlighting the active role of merchants in integrating different parts of the 
Atlantic together. 
With a similar attention to Atlantic merchant networks, Jarvis unpicks the 
social structure and organisation of Bermuda’s merchant fleet.98 These small but 
fast sloops were often co-owned by multiple kith and kin relations and relied 
upon interpersonal connections and agents in the ports they frequented. As such, 
these small vessels were more like family farms than the large, rigidly 
disciplined deep-sea vessels or ‘floating factories’ Rediker describes in The Slave 
Ship (2007).99 Moreover, by focusing on Bermuda’s merchants and their 
extensive maritime commerce in ships, salt and provisions, Jarvis 
sympathetically reveals Bermuda as a centre of trade – something that would not 
have been possible with a focus on its agricultural settlement.100 As such, 
concentrating on merchant networks can be an effective method to re-centre 
small islands that are otherwise overlooked within Caribbean and Atlantic 
historiography.  
By focusing on the movement of salt, provisions and people between 
Bermuda and Turks Islands, this thesis similarly hopes to situate Turks Islands 
and Bermuda more centrally within Caribbean historiography and reveal the rich 
socioeconomic and interpersonal connections that existed between the two. It 
demonstrates it was these decentralised and self-organised merchant networks 
that incorporated Turks Islands into the British Empire. Consequently, it chimes 
with Hancock’s work on network theory and suggests the real agents of empire 
may well have been on the so-called margins. Common to all these histories that 
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focus on trade is their attention to sinew populations whose movements and 




Within historiography, this thesis is situated at the intersection of Caribbean 
history, Atlantic history and commodity history. It offers a Caribbean-centred 
Atlantic analysis that seeks to move beyond the plantation to further research 
into alternative spaces of slavery and sinew populations that incorporated Turks 
Islands into the British Empire from the late seventeenth century. In its 
exploration of the inter-island relations that developed between Turks Islands, 
Bermuda and the Bahamas, it is a regional history of some of the most 
marginalised islands within the Caribbean. Its lies within the British Caribbean, 
but it does not assume its imperial borders were hermetically sealed.  
 As this thesis encompasses the Sargasso Sea, and at times the wider 
Atlantic, it is indebted to oceanic and Atlantic histories. It consistently plays with 
different scales across the chapters, buoyed by the conviction that all of these 
perspectives are necessary to uncover the nuances of colonial society at Turks 
Islands. Therefore, while it is pre-dominantly a cis-Atlantic history, it 
incorporates aspects of trans-Atlantic history throughout – using salt as a 
counterpoint to sugar – and it dips into infra-Atlantic history to explore what was 
particular and unique to Turks Islands. Moreover, in line with sub-Atlantic 
history, here the sea is taken seriously. In this way, its methodology is flexible, 
weaving between different scales as and when appropriate. 
 To tie this flexible methodology together, this thesis uses the commodity 
of salt as a binding agent. Without salt, it is unlikely the tiny, flat and infertile 
Turks Islands would ever have been incorporated into the British Empire. 
Instead, they would have remained uninhabited Out Islands, as many of their 
neighbours were and still are to this day. Consequently, salt anchors this study 
and allows different historical themes to be explored together that may have 
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remained in isolation. In the process, this thesis extends the limited 
historiography that exists on salt, both in the Caribbean and globally.101 
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Chapter 3: Migratory, Maritime and Transient: Settling the Salt 




This chapter focuses on the settlement phase of Turks Islands and the roles that 
Bermuda and the Bahamas played in its economic and political incorporation 
within the British Empire. It will argue that Turks Islands’ settlement followed a 
fairly unique pattern within the British Caribbean: from temporary to permanent 
settlement, from maritime visitations to terrestrial habitation, and from de facto 
Bermudian rule to de jure Bahamian sovereignty, over the course of a century. In 
reaching this assessment it will pay attention to contemporary geographical 
sources that both reflected these changing settlement patterns and formed a part 
of the resources Bermudians and Bahamians deployed as they made claims to 
these spaces.  
To explore these trends, the chapter is divided into two parts. First, it will 
use cartographic sources to illustrate briefly the changing settlement patterns on 
Turks Islands during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and highlight 
how these patterns varied significantly from the sugar islands of the Caribbean. 
Whereas settlement of the sugar islands rapidly involved terrestrial, fixed, and 
permanent settlement patterns, the salt islands were initially sub-islands or sub-
colonies of Bermuda and experienced a fundamentally different maritime, 
migratory and transient form of early settlement. This began with their discovery 
in the 1660s and was still existent by the mid-eighteenth century. But over time it 
produced significant inter-colonial tensions in the region. Successive Bahamian 
Governors sought to formally incorporate Turks Islands into their jurisdiction 
and encourage permanent settlement in order to tax the salt industry more 
effectively. By the end of the eighteenth century, the gatherers’ migratory 
lifestyle was under threat. Cartographic sources can help historians track this 
change. 
The second part of this chapter will provide an in-depth exploration of the 
inter-colonial wrangling that took place. It will use contemporary geographical 
sources to illustrate the competing claims of the Bermudian and Bahamian 
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legislatures. Importantly, as Jordan Branch has argued, the Atlantic world was 
undergoing a cartographic revolution at this time, which saw an emergent and 
very specific geographical understanding of space gathering powerful 
momentum.1 As techniques of mapping were transformed, certain territorial 
claims were increasingly delegitimised as others were naturalised. At Turks 
Islands, Bahamian and Bermudian colonial inhabitants tapped into these trends 
and used complimentary and contrasting geographical logics in an attempt to 
demonstrate and secure their sovereignty over these saline spaces. In the end, 
Bermudian manipulation of geographical arguments could not win against the 
emerging early-modern conception of space that, with or without intention, 
served to authenticate Bahamian authority over Turks Islands.  
 
The settlement of Turks Islands 
 
Bermudian merchants and seafarers were the first to colonise Turks Islands in the 
1660s and it was their seasonal maritime activities that created the particular 
dynamics that became characteristic of their settlement. To uncover a story of 
Turks Islands’ development, it is therefore important to grasp the local 
conditions endemic to Bermuda, in the island’s demography, economy and 
governance, that prompted these Atlantic denizens to search abroad for a staple 
with which to trade and land on Turks Islands’ shores.  
 
Bermuda’s maritime revolution 
 
Though initially discovered by the Spanish in 1605, it was the Virginia Company 
(and later the Somers Island Company) that settled Bermuda from 1609. At first, 
the environment proved exceptionally wholesome to its inhabitants and they 
turned the soil to a diverse range of crops, but the island was small and quickly 
grew overcrowded. By 1625, ‘almost all of the island’s twenty square miles were 
under cultivation’.2 In line with efforts in Virginia, tobacco was considered the 
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prized export commodity. However, due to a lack of curing knowledge, skilled 
Africans and Amerindians were introduced. Though Bermuda’s first black and 
Amerindian inhabitants occupied an ambiguous legal status, a system of slavery 
had developed on the islands by the 1660s.3 Unlike the sugar plantations, the rate 
of natural increase amongst Bermuda’s enslaved population was positive. By the 
1670s, Bermuda’s enslaved population had outrun demands for its employ. In 
1676, Governor John Heydon capped the importation of any new enslaved 
persons.4 From then on, Bermuda’s enslaved population consisted of 
predominantly Afro-creoles, and the island’s overall population ‘increased from 
1,600 in 1625 to 8,000 in 1679’.5 Bermuda had become one of the most densely 
populated colonies of the English Atlantic and was widely regarded as 
congested. Pressure to migrate elsewhere was building throughout this period. 
 Moreover, Bermuda’s economic problems were beginning to show as 
tobacco rapidly exhausted its limited soil just when Virginia’s success created an 
irreversible fall in global tobacco prices. For Bermudians, it was clear they had to 
diversify into maritime trades. This they began to effect during the English Civil 
War but the Restoration marked a dramatic re-establishment of the Somers Island 
Company’s control. Shipbuilding was banned, tobacco production was 
reinstated, and the company forced Bermudians to restore fields to tobacco 
cultivation. These dogmatic controls harmed the local settlers and spurred them 
to take political action. A group of settlers and merchants took the company to 
court in London. In June 1684, after a four-year quo warranto trial, the court 
ruled in their favour. The Somers Island Company’s charter was revoked and, as 
part of Charles II’s designs to reign in the colonies, Bermuda was returned to 
Crown rule.6 As the company’s trading restrictions were lifted, entrepreneurial 
Bermudians began to fan out across the Atlantic littoral. Michael Jarvis has 
argued this was the pivotal moment in the island’s economic development.7 It 
marked the beginning of what he termed Bermuda’s ‘maritime revolution’, when 
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 46 
settlers turned away from agricultural pursuits towards maritime trades.8 
Bermuda’s overcrowding and exhausted soils meant, in a sense, it had to carve 




















 Bermuda was in a good location to do this, lying at the heart of the 
Atlantic trading system. Consider Figure 3.1, a flipped traditional textbook map 
of the British Atlantic. From emphasising the North American landmass, it has 
centralised Bermuda, which, according to a contemporary, was ‘in the eye of all 
trade’ during the eighteenth century.9 It brings the Caribbean Sea into focus, 
reflecting the fact Bermuda was increasingly engaged in dense socioeconomic 
networks across this space rather than towards Africa or Europe. Understood 
from Bermuda’s position, the Caribbean islands and coastlines of America were 
surveyed as a continuous arc, dotted with economic possibilities.  
																																																								
8 Jarvis, ‘Maritime Masters and Seafaring Slaves’, p. 592. 
9 Jarvis, In The Eye of All Trade, p. 4. 
Figure 3.1: The Atlantic Arc of British America, c. 1750. Drawn by Elizabeth 
Eaton. From Michael Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and 
the Maritime Atlantic World, 1680-1783 (Chapel Hill: University Press of North 
Carolina Press, 2010), p. 3. 
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The pressures on land meant seafaring and shipbuilding offered 
Bermudians an elegant solution. Maritime trades allowed merchants to engage 
their enslaved more profitably while free male Bermudians were also granted 
better employment opportunities.10 The fact Bermudians used enslaved persons 
as crewmembers also significantly reduced their shipping costs. This coupled 
with their fast and resilient cedar sloops meant Bermudian merchants could 
undercut their competitors as carriers of goods. As maritime trades opened up, 
the ensuing seafaring success was reflected in a dramatically expanded merchant 
fleet. By 1707, a contemporary reported Bermudians earned their ‘subsistence 
chiefly by Navigation’.11 It was a maritime revolution triggered by the 
dissolution of the Somers Island Company but clearly driven through the 
socioeconomic pressures brewing on this small, densely populated island. As 
Bermudian seafarers went in search of economic opportunity, a number 
discovered salt at Turks Islands. Here was a free staple with which to trade. 
 
Early settlement of Turks Islands 
 
Turks Islands’ settlement was the product of enterprising Bermudian seafarers 
who started making use of its plentiful supply of the eighteenth century’s other 
‘white gold’.12 While Bermudians had been intermittently raking salt since the 
1660s, a growing number of inhabitants became economically reliant on the salt 
harvests as Bermuda’s economy turned maritime.13 According to Cyril 
Outerbridge Packwood, about 500 Bermudians were engaged in the salt season 
in 1701.14 Wartime shortages made salt cargoes particularly valuable. In 1700, 
salt that was sold in Philadelphia could obtain two shillings and two pence per 
bushel but during Queen Anne’s War that rose to between three and four 
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shillings.15 One English captain even boasted he sold salt in Maryland for ‘above 
8 times what it cost’ him in Bermuda in 1705 – a rate many Bermudian 
merchants also capitalised on.16 In 1708, eighteen vessels ‘departed Bermuda for 
the Turks Islands, Salt Tortuga, or the Bahamas, accounting for one eighth of the 
island’s clearances’. 17 However, in 1716, this figure had risen to sixty-five 
vessels, a full third of all departures.18 At this point, a Bermudian sloop and its 
crew could fill their hold with salt in ‘as little as two weeks during the peak salt 
season’.19 So handy was the salt trade as an additional source of income that 
‘over the course of their lives, virtually every Bermudian seafarer engaged in 
raking to some extent and many spent years working Turks Islands pans’.20 
However, because these islands were vulnerable to Spanish and French 
privateers, salt raking was predominantly carried out by white sailor-rakers.21 
 In a letter to the Board of Trade in 1725, Governor John Hope of 
Bermuda wrote an account of the distinct pattern of salt raking. It is worth 
relating his passage in full: 
All vessels clear out with a number of mariners sufficient to navigate the 
vessel anywhere, but they generally take three or four slaves 
besides…[and] go agathering of salt at Turks Island, etc. When they then 
arrive, the white men are turn’d ashoar to rake salt…for 10 or 12 months 
on a stretch [while] the master with his vessel navigated by Negroes 
during that time goes a Marooning – fishing for turtles, diving upon 
wrecks and sometimes trading with pyrates. If the vessel happens to be 
lucky upon any of these accounts, Curacao, St Eustatia, St Thomas or the 
French Islands are the ports where they always are well received without 
any questions asked, and if a good price is offered, the vessel generally 
goes with the cargo. If not, they return and take in their white sailors with 
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salt from the Turks Islands and under the cover of their old clearings, 
from hence they proceed to some of the Northern Plantations to sell their 
cargo of salt.22  
From this passage, several notable characteristics of Bermuda’s maritime 
rhythms are revealed. Those who engaged in salt raking would not have 
considered themselves solely as ‘salt rakers’ or ‘salt merchants’. In the initial 
phase of Turks Islands’ development, these migrating Bermudians engaged in 
multiple trades. To spread risk, and maximise profit, early-modern Bermudian 
seafarers were engaged in a niche economy that was characteristically dynamic. 
In her study of the salt industry of Katwe in nineteenth-century Uganda, 
Kathryn Barrett-Gaines urges historians to adopt this ‘concept of the niche 
economy’.23 It applies to Bermudian mariners as well: 
The concept of the niche economy can help us to see African economic 
behaviour not only as adaptation to adversity, or as embattled people 
‘making do’ with short-term remedies. Looking at African economies as 
niche economies can help us to understand them in terms other than the 
‘crisis terminology’ of things falling apart into an ‘anarchy’ that has 
never been very far from Western images of African social life.24  
As Barrett-Gaines makes clear, it is a reflection of modern western lifestyles that 
people are encouraged and assumed to have one form of employment. Yet in 
colonial Uganda, Africans had multiple occupations (‘People Are Not One 
Thing’25) that did not reflect a situation of crisis, but of adaptability to local 
socioeconomic and political circumstances. Although colonial Uganda may seem 
far from its Caribbean contemporaries, this idea of a ‘niche economy’ – of 
pursuing multiple occupations at once – was clearly what Governor Hope 
described for early-eighteenth-century Bermuda. Moreover, his account 
addresses the fact that during this period Bermudians did not reside permanently 
on Turks Islands: they returned annually to their families in Bermuda. 
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 Life on the saltpans was seasonal and salt was produced from March to 
November when the weather was hottest and driest. Inclement weather and 
winter rains marked the end of the season that year. While initially salt gatherers 
would have arrived at Turks Islands on a first-come, first-served basis, following 
Britain’s formal extension of sovereignty over, and guaranteed protection of, 
Turks Islands in 1764 (see Chapter 7), more Bermudians became involved in the 
industry and it became necessary to regulate it more effectively. A system of 
Head Rights was introduced in 1767. Chapter 5 will explore that system in depth, 
but it is relevant to state here that this system involved apportioning salt pond 
shares at the start of each season in an equitable manner for its duration. Once 
this had taken place, salt gatherers dug out, demarcated and cleaned their 
saltpans of impurities within the drained lagoons, before a series of sluices and 
gates were opened to allow the seawater back in. As evaporation occurred, 
concentrated brine was encouraged into shallower pans to augment its surface 
area and facilitate further evaporation. While the sun and wind did much of the 
work, this was still exceedingly laborious. It involved standing in concentrated 
brine for many hours of the day raking salt and encouraging crystals to form. 
Once the salt was ready to be harvested, it was piled up on land, covered with 
palmetto leaves, and left to dry, before it was carried by hand in bushel bags onto 
lighters and transported to merchant ships offshore. The heat would have been 
unrelenting and there was real risk of pirates and privateers. With no fresh water 
and only limited provisions available, it is little wonder Bermudians preferred to 
annually migrate to these shores rather than permanently settle.  
These migrations had significant consequences for Turks Islands’ 
development. The decision to annually migrate was reflected in the lack of 
permanent structures within the islands. Consider Figure 3.2, an inset from a 
survey of 1753 that was produced during the initial phase of Turks Islands’ 
settlement. This survey was undertaken at a time when these islands were not 
Crown territory. As such it should be considered to reflect their development as 
part of de facto Bermudian territory. Within this survey, the surveyor has sought 
to include not only topographical elements but also some of the manmade 
structures erected on their terrain. Of particular interest is the inclusion of the salt 
gatherers’ lodgings. These are labelled ‘salt rakers huts’. Cartographers in 























codes, shading and lines. The rationing of words in cartography meant those 
chosen were chosen with care. Though more permanent than tents, ‘huts’ imply a 
basic and temporary structure. They were a long way from the double-storey 
stone houses that would epitomise Turks Island merchant dwellings in the early 
nineteenth century. An impression of these, more substantial, houses can be 
gained from Figure 3.3, a photograph of ‘The White House’ built in circa 1835 
by the Harriott family. 
While one could argue the erection of ‘huts’ may have been the result of 
inadequate investments and limited access to materials, such dwellings may have 
been financially judicious. Turks Islands were frequently vulnerable to Spanish 
and French attacks.26 For example, in 1764, the French invaded Turks Islands  
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Figure 3.2: Detail of Grand Turk from a survey of Turks Islands, 1753. From The 
British Library, ‘Turks Islands from a survey made in 1753 by the Sloops l’Aigle and 
l’Emeraude with improvements from observations made in 1770 in the Sr. Edward 


















and ‘destroyed the huts, tools and supplies of the salt rakers, and took them 
prisoner’.27 By installing temporary structures that could also be easily 
reconstructed, Bermudians were arguably being practical. Given their desire to 
annually migrate, these ‘huts’ reduced their financial losses in the event of an 
attack during their absence. If they had preferred to live there permanently, it 
would have been more prudent to erect enduring structures and lines of defence 
to ward off foreign incursions. 
However, Bermudians did not wish to permanently settle. Turks Islands 
were an unforgiving landscape in which to reside and to work. For example, in 
1790, the Committee of the Body of Salt Gatherers penned a letter to a local 
official explaining why they preferred to be transient. The Bermudians’ 
vehement rejection of residency was clear. They deplored ‘the opinion which has 
of late gone forth in the Bahamas that settlers should come and fix at Turks 
Islands on a stable and permanent footing; an idea of this sort should really seem 
to be quite repugnant’.28 Utilising an environmental counterargument, the 
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28 ‘Committee of the Body of Salt Gatherers to the Honourable Alexander Murray’, 16 
March 1790, in The Governor, Council, and Assembly of Bermuda, A State of the Claim 
Figure 3.3: Photograph of The White House, Salt Key, 1964. From Nigel Sadler, 
Turks and Caicos Islands in old photographs (Grand Turk: Turks and Caicos National 
Museum, 2003), p. 12. 
 53 
gatherers pointed out that ‘owing to some quality in the air and climate, which is 
of a most noxious and deleterious tendency, there is not more than one 
constitution in twenty that can bear a longer stay on the place, than two or three 
years at farthest’.29 Coming from Bermuda, a place known for its temperate 
conditions, healthy air and verdant nature, a preference to Bermuda over these 
flat, barren islands was understandable.   
How unique was this maritime and migratory settlement pattern within 
the British Caribbean? In the wake of the sugar revolution, which began in 
Barbados in the 1640s, the demands of sugar production heavily influenced how 
the sugar islands would develop. According to Barry Higman, ‘the sugar 
revolution brought with it a series of interrelated transformations that had 
fundamental implications for all aspects of the economy, society and government 
of the islands’.30 In short, it created the plantation, ‘a land unit that resembled a 
small region or domain, with the equivalent of a village at its centre and a 
population and architectural mass to match’.31 When harvesting cane, it was 
essential the juice be extracted within days. This necessitated that the industrial 
mechanism for extracting cane juice was located near the source of its 
cultivation. There needed to be a ‘mill to extract juice by crushing the canes 
between cylindrical rollers’ and a series of large copper pans for the juice to boil 
and crystallise in before it was packed into barrels and left to drain and dry.32 
This combination of factory and field required significant investment, labour, 
time and energy to build and maintain. Conversely, it needed protection, as the 
risk of loss was far higher on a sugar plantation than on a saltpan. Moreover, 
provisions could be produced in these fertile soils while staggered sugar harvests 
meant this cash crop could be planted throughout the year. As a result, many 
inhabitants chose to, or were forced to, remain on these islands. In this setting, 
there was less need for an adaptable niche economy. Instead, the sugar islands 
were characterised with fixed, permanent and terrestrial settlement, a marked 
contrast to Turks Islands. 
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However, there were other spaces of empire that did produce settlement 
patterns reminiscent of Turks Islands. The colonial history of the Caribbean is 
peppered with examples of secondary or sub-island settlement patterns. For 
example, after its settlement in the 1660s, Barbuda was considered an appendage 
of Antigua in an unusual fashion. As Margaret Tweedy has described, the Crown 
leased Barbuda to private entrepreneurs in order to encourage settlement and 
discourage foreign invasion.33 From 1684 to 1870 it was in the hands of the 
Codrington family who owned several estates in Antigua and used it to primarily 
furnish their plantations with livestock. Its enslaved labourers lived on the island 
permanently and, due to the abundance of provisions and less strenuous labour, 
experienced a natural growth ‘from 172 in 1746 to 503 in 1831’.34 As such, 
Barbuda was effectively a sub-island of Antigua, but the Codrington family 
largely administered it privately and unlike Turks Islands its population was 
terrestrial, permanent and settled.  
British Honduras, encompassing modern-day Belize and the Mosquito 
Shore on the Bay of Honduras, offers another example of a secondary settlement 
pattern. An informal relationship developed between the Baymen of Belize, the 
Mosquito Indians of the Shore, and the Governor and merchants of Jamaica. As 
Jennifer Anderson describes, the Baymen were a ‘small population of 
Englishmen (former buccaneers) who lived illegally in Spanish territory in 
makeshift enclaves along the shore’.35 Their impermanent settlements were often 
attacked and raised to the ground, at which point they would flee to the Mosquito 
Shore for protection before returning to Belize once the Spanish threat had 
passed. Their logwood industry had a unique seasonality. Although the 
Baymen’s ‘makeshift enclaves’ remained on the shore, during the logwood 
season ‘the Baymen sent gangs of ten to fifty enslaved woodcutters on long 
expeditions into the rain forest to fell individual trees, clear a road to each tree’s 
location, and then haul out the cut logs’.36 These woodcutters and overseers 
‘lived and worked together for months at a time in the far-scattered mahogany 
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works’.37 By the time of the seasonal rains, the woodcutters would have hauled 
their logwood to the river’s edge where ‘the gang floated the logs in large rafts 
from the interior down to the coast to be loaded on ocean-going vessels’.38 Like 
the salt industry, there was seasonality to woodcutting tied to the rains that 
shaped an annual and temporary migration from the coast to the interior. 
However, this was a terrestrial, not maritime, migration. 
Further down, on the Mosquito Shore, there was also a small town called 
Black River founded by William Pitt, which became the area’s administrative 
centre. After 1740, Jamaican Governors ‘encouraged Pitt to develop his 
settlement into an entrepôt for contraband trade’ on the Spanish Main and sent a 
Jamaican detachment of infantry for its protection in 1744.39 After the War of 
Jenkins’s Ear, the Jamaican Governor also appointed a Superintendent to the 
Mosquito Shore for its protection and to improve relations with the Mosquito 
Indians. In 1757, the Superintendent described ‘the settlers as differing from the 
more nomadic Belizean logwood cutters in that they were mostly raiders living 
in scattered areas with their dependents’ in houses ‘of wooden frames, thatched 
and the sides of lathe and plaster, white-washed. But there are some that make a 
good appearance built entirely of wood, two stories high’.40 Overall, then, British 
Honduras did exhibit a secondary settlement pattern to Jamaica, like Turks 
Islands to Bermuda, but within British Honduras there coexisted both nomadic 
and more permanent, terrestrial lifestyles that varied from the maritime and 
migratory patterns of the salt gatherers.  
In truth, those with lifestyles most like the salt gatherers may have 
worked a watery commons. Turtling was one activity that involved a transitory, 
migratory and maritime lifestyle. According to Shakira Crawford and Ana Isabel 
Márquez-Pérez, by the mid-eighteenth century ‘English-speaking inhabitants 
from the Cayman Islands, Jamaica, Nicaragua and the Colombian islands of San 
Andreas and Old Providence took to the sea in search of green and hawksbill 
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turtles’.41 This relied on following the turtles’ migratory patterns knowing that 
the ‘hawksbill mothers return to the places of their birth to deposit their eggs 
between March and September’.42 As this season began, turtlers migrated from 
across the Caribbean to the banks or keys where turtles were expected and ‘built 
temporary shelters as they waited for impregnated hawksbills to deliver and bury 
their eggs in the sands’.43 As such, these were ‘sporadic migrations, which may 
have amounted to a few hundred persons’, but as Crawford and Márquez-Pérez 
point out, they have ‘often been ignored by historians as they were difficult to 
identify or track’.44 The turtling industry, though hard to quantify, seems to have 
offered a similar migratory, maritime and transient settlement pattern to the 
Turks Island salt industry. Indeed, as Governor Hope described, it formed part of 
Bermuda’s own niche economy in conjunction with salt gathering. However, the 
turtle commons cannot be understood as a sub-island colony demonstrating a 
secondary settlement pattern, as it was transnational in scope, far more maritime, 
and without a fixed island location. 
As such, while the early settlement of Turks Islands did share certain 
features with other spaces of empire, its exact permutation was specific. 
Nowhere else in the British Caribbean was there a similar sub-island colony that 
so rigidly underwent a secondary settlement pattern characterised as maritime, 
migratory and transient. 
 
Late settlement of Turks Islands 
 
However, over time, external pressures from the Bahamas placed growing 
pressure on this mode of living as a succession of Bahamian Governors tried 
(and largely failed) to extend Bahamian taxation laws over the islands and 
compel the gatherers into a permanent residency. As early as 1693, Bahamas 
Governor Nicholas Trott tried to place a tax on Turks Island salt and seized 
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several vessels that were caught refusing to pay it.45 In 1701, Governor Elias 
Haskett also seized several Bermudian vessels laden with salt. And later, in 1738, 
the Bahamas Government legislated to impose a salt tax, this time with designs 
to fund an armed vessel to enforce and collect the fees. The Board of Trade did 
not support any of these measures and revoked the Bahamian Act, while a period 
of war caused a temporary hiatus in Bahamian taxation designs. But it was not 
the end of the matter. 
 The 1770s saw a decided renewal in Bahamian efforts to bring Turks 
Islands under its general laws. In 1772, the Bahamas Government passed a series 
of Acts ‘aimed at disrupting Bermudian salt raking and establishing Bahamian 
jurisdiction’.46 If these had been implemented, it would have made year-round 
residency obligatory to those wishing to harvest salt while introducing a new salt 
tax of ‘one Farthing per bushel’, a new tonnage duty of two shillings and three 
pence per ton on all vessels loading with salt, and a new poll tax on free white, 
free mulatto and enslaved persons.47 However, the Board of Trade again vetoed 
these Acts just as the American Revolution ensured such matters were left 
unresolved. It was a pattern of political manoeuvring that built over time, 
resurfacing once more in the 1790s. Eventually, in 1803, London intervened and 
Turks Islands were formally incorporated into Bahamian jurisdiction.  
Subsequent maps reveal the extent to which a more permanent settlement 
was carried out. This is apparent in an Admiralty chart (see Figure 3.4) produced 
by Commander Richard Owen on board HMS Blossom in the 1830s. Owen 
entered the Royal Navy in 1811 and his career allied strongly with surveying 
vessels. In 1829, he received a commission on board the Blossom to survey the 
West Indies, which continued until 1837.48 At the bottom of his survey for Turks 
Islands in 1830, there is a certification from the Hydrographic Office. This 
office, established in 1795 by order of King George III, collated and catalogued 
all existing charts and created a repository for the Admiralty to provide 
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‘accurate’ navigational aids to naval and merchant shipping – to better ‘know’ 
the geography of the British Empire. The fact Owen’s chart specifically equates 
Turks Islands with the Bahamas underscores how these islands had formally 
been incorporated into Bahamian territory by 1830. There is nothing on the chart 



















The chart records the depth of the ocean floor and the main sea routes, 
but importantly highlights the development that had occurred on Grand Turk. By 
1830, there is evidence of wharfs, merchant buildings (as opposed to huts), a 
church, as well as a Commissioner’s House built to collect the salt duties. Owen 
has marked a ‘ballast ground’ where Bermudian limestone would have been 
offloaded after it had weighed down incoming merchant vessels. When 
recounting her enslaved experience on Turks Islands in the early nineteenth 
century, Mary Prince reflected that ‘another of our employments was to row a 
little way off the shore in a boat, and dive for large stones to build a wall round 
Figure 3.4: Detail of Grand Turk from a survey of Turks Islands, 1830. From The 
British Library, Richard Owen, ‘Turks Islands surveyed by Captain R Owen in 1830, 
Admiralty Chart’ (London, 1842). 
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our master’s house’.49 By approximately 1812, therefore, Prince strongly 
suggests merchants were making use of limestone ballast to build more 
permanent structures, wall off their properties and set down roots. The White 
House, as shown in Figure 3.3, would have been emblematic of this new and 
permanent island architecture.  
From this analysis of cartographic and textual sources, this chapter has 
sought to illustrate the particular and changing settlement patterns at Turks 
Islands from the 1660s to the 1830s. It has analysed the demographic, economic 
and political circumstances of Bermuda prior to the 1660s in order to elucidate 
why Bermudian merchants and seafarers wanted to incorporate these salt islands 
into their sphere of influence. As Bermudian merchants and their crews sailed 
around the ‘continuous arc’ of the Caribbean, they discovered what became 
highly profitable islands. In that initial phase of settlement permanent habitation 
was not initiated or desirable. Instead, there was a pattern of annual migrations 
and semi-permanent dwellings that owed much to the maritime nature of the 
Bermudian niche economy and seasonality of salt. However, that migratory and 
maritime pattern increasingly came under threat from encroaching Bahamian 
designs. By the dawn of the nineteenth century, a more terrestrial and permanent 
settlement had taken place as authority passed from de facto Bermudian to de 
jure Bahamian rule. 
 
The competing claims of the Bahamas and Bermuda  
  
The second part of this chapter will explore in depth the competing claims that 
Bermuda and the Bahamas made over Turks Islands, which impacted its 
settlement during the late eighteenth century. First, it will chart the 
socioeconomic conditions of the Bahamas to understand why that colony became 
so interested in Turks Islands at this time. Then, it will situate this period in the 
broader context of the cartographic revolution, which was changing how early-
modern Atlantic inhabitants understood space and authority, before unpacking 
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the inter-colonial wrangling that took place between Bermuda and the Bahamas 
through an examination of the competing geographical logics each colony 
deployed. In these struggles there was a proliferation of colonial resources 
including petitions, surveys and maps. While Chapter 4 will investigate these 
written petitions and London’s final decision to place Turks Islands under 
Bahamian jurisdiction in detail, this chapter addresses the particular use of 
geographical sources in the discourses of Bermudians and Bahamians. In the end, 
it will argue that these were more effective in bolstering Bahamian claims over 
Turks Islands by inadvertently delegitimising Bermuda’s position. 
 
A Bahamian financial crisis 
 
Lying sixty miles off the coast of Florida, the Bahamian archipelago was a series 
of flat, limestone islands with no fresh water. Although the landing place of 
Christopher Columbus in 1492, it was not until the 1640s that these islands were 
settled in a systematic way. Over time, the original inhabitants and their 
descendants became known as Belongers or ‘conchs’ after the sea creatures they 
had a penchant for eating. They eked out a living turtling, whaling, wrecking, 
and logging, but like Turks Islands, the most significant industry was salt 
raking.50 As such, the Bahamas were never developed with sugar plantations nor 
could they be for want of suitable soils. For this reason, during much of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, they were predominantly marginal to British 
concerns.  
 However, in the 1780s, the Bahamas began to play a more prominent role 
in imperial affairs. Following the American Revolution, and the cession of East 
Florida to Spain, Loyalist refugees encamped there had to migrate. While there 
were drawbacks to the Bahamas, notably its ‘barren Rocks’ and unfavourable 
soil, the prime concern of these refugee Loyalists was to move somewhere with 
enough land to employ their enslaved.51 Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were 
too cold with a ‘climate…not being calculated for Southern Constitutions or the 
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employment of the Slaves’.52 Jamaica and Barbados had few acres left available. 
The Bahamas, on the other hand, were fairly uncultivated. They seemed the most 
practical choice. In 1783, the British Government bought out hereditary 
proprietors in order to offer Loyalist refugees ‘Tracts of Land…(gratis) in 
proportion to their former situation, and ability to situate them’.53 The Bahamas 
were now part of British resettlement plans. 
 The sudden influx of Loyalist refugees had serious consequences for 
these islands. Their population more than doubled with the rapid arrival of 6,000 
persons.54 Their ethnic make-up was significantly altered as the proportion of 
black persons to white persons doubled from one to one to two to one.55 
Governor John Maxwell reported: ‘They are sitting themselves down, where they 
can; and without order’.56 By 1784, he was dealing with a situation that had 
taken the form of a refugee crisis.  
It demanded a calm and organised response, but this was hard to deliver. 
These were refugees whose travels had often started beyond East Florida. As 
Maya Jasanoff reflects, ‘these doubly displaced refugees came bearing enormous 
resentment against their own government for abandoning Florida’.57 Tensions 
did not ease with resettlement. As the Bahamas were not able to sustain 
widespread agriculture, food shortages were rife. Governor Maxwell took what 
he thought the only decision: to open up a provisions trade with the United States 
and ignore Orders in Council that prohibited it. In doing so, he misjudged the 
sentiments of the Loyalist refugees. They castigated the Governor for dealing 
with their ‘enemy’ and responded by running up to the ships ‘to tear the stars and 
stripes down from the masts’.58 The cleft between Loyalist refugee and imperial 
authority widened.  
 Food was not the only issue. The influx of a large enslaved population 
sharpened debates around race and slavery. As tracts of land were granted, the 
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Loyalists desired to recreate the hierarchical and racial society they had 
previously enjoyed but they came up against ‘an existing white population 
determined to defend their own interests, and a belligerent governor with a 
penchant for idiosyncratic antislavery initiatives’.59 While a series of stringent 
racial laws were passed within the first years of the immigration crisis, the arrival 
of a new Governor in 1786 severely threatened their so-called progress. 
Governor John Dunmore reversed several of the racial codes, believing the 
liberties of free black persons had been unfairly curtailed and introduced a 
‘project of state-sponsored manumission’.60 The Loyalists viewed Governor 
Dunmore’s protection of free black liberties, and his softer approach to slavery in 
general, with disdain.61 So much so, according to Paul Daniel Shirley, ‘there 
could be no prospect of reconciliation with Dunmore’s governorship for many 
Loyalist slaveholders’.62 Riots around racial issues became frequent and 
Bahamian society grew increasingly polarised as Loyalists sought a break with 
imperial authority while Belongers wished to reinforce and extend it.63 
 Governor Dunmore responded to this civil unrest by suspending the 
courts, outlawing free elections and, most visibly, fortifying the Bahamas to an 
unprecedented degree. He genuinely worried that ‘had we a war with America 
tomorrow, the Loyalists…would be those I should have the greatest reason to 
fear’.64 A series of battlements were built around the Out Islands but the main 
fortification was Fort Charlotte, west of Nassau. This impressive structure was as 
imposing as any fortress in the Caribbean.65 Costs escalated to a shocking 
£32,000, eight times the original estimate.66 It was an enormous financial drain.  
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 Fiscal stress was compounded when the export economy went into 
recession in the late 1780s. Loyalists who had settled on the Out Islands had 
turned their hand to cotton. Though a new crop, initial signs had been positive. 
Clearing and preparing the land was difficult, but as William Wylly noted, one 
planter had managed with ‘no more than thirty-two slaves’ to make nineteen tons 
of cotton worth ‘nearly double the whole value of the negroes by whose labour it 
was made’.67 Overall, in 1787, 250 tons were produced in the Bahamas.68 
However, as quickly as these profits were made, so did the chenille bug latch 
onto the crops and gorge its way through. This blight damaged harvests in 1788 
and caused intermittent crop failures in subsequent years. An unwinnable battle, 
by 1800 ‘most planters had abandoned their struggles with cotton’.69  
 Thus, in the decade from 1783, the economic, political and demographic 
situation in the Bahamas was at breaking point. The population had more than 
doubled, with a significant reversal in its ethnic structure. Divisions between 
Belongers and Loyalists escalated with time. Riots broke out intermittently, and 
in response Governor Dunmore became obsessed with expensive fortifications at 
a bad time for the economy. As he looked around for alternative sources of 
revenue and more land on which to settle Loyalists, it was no surprise Turks 
Islands began to feature in his plans.  
 Moreover, as indicated, Governor Dunmore arrived as the latest of a long 
line of Governors who had tried and failed to enforce Bahamian jurisdiction 
over, and permanent settlement within, Turks Islands. Facing a refugee crisis, he 
immediately granted lots of land at Turks Islands as a means to ease population 
pressures and encourage permanent settlement. But these grants were in 
opposition to a King’s command. Later that year the King ordered their 
revocation and demanded ‘no land, for the future, will be granted upon any 
island or key where salt is made’.70 Thwarted, Governor Dunmore then visited 
Turks Islands to try and raise revenue, soliciting ‘the Residents there either to 
sell the Ponds in Lots for a Term of years for the purpose; or to adopt some other 
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mode of raising Revenue for the support of the Government of the Bahamas’.71 
In March 1790, the Turks Islands King’s Agent (who was also his son) addressed 
the Bermudian salt gatherers and pressed them to conform to Bahamian tax 
laws.72 This they refused and in 1792 Governor Dunmore sent a detachment of 
troops to force their submission – echoing his military response to civic unrest in 
New Providence.73 A jail was built and the Assembly legislated to tax Turks 
Island salt once again at one farthing per bushel. Thus the long-standing dispute 
at Turks Islands, pivoting around competing settlement logics and the legalities 
of taxing a migratory population, was stirred up again. It was beginning to reach 
boiling point. 
 
The cartographic revolution  
 
During the early-modern period, the Atlantic world was also experiencing a 
cartographic revolution that saw the emergence of a new conceptualisation of 
space.74 This had implications for how Bermudians could assert sovereignty over 
Turks Islands. Mirroring the rediscovery of key classical texts during the 
Renaissance, a Florentine scholar translated Ptolemy’s Geography from ancient 
Greek into Latin in the early 1400s. While Ptolemy’s map projections did not 
initially attract much interest, by the sixteenth century cartographers across 
Europe had begun to follow his methods. These methods promoted the use of a 
coordinate grid to situate all locations geometrically on a two-dimensional map. 
This introduced the idea of the graticule into their methods – i.e. plotting lines of 
longitude and latitude in accordance with the stars. In the process it also 
established ‘geometric accuracy of scale, distance and orientation as key 
cartographic goals’.75 These techniques ‘restructured the fundamental grammar 
																																																								
71 The National Archives, Council and Assembly of Bermuda to John Brickwood, 12 
August 1789, CO 37/42/50. 
72 The Governor, Council, and Assembly of Bermuda, A State of the Claim of His 
Majesty’s Bermuda Subjects to the Right of Gathering Salt at Turks Islands (London, 
1790), p. 2. The specific role of the King’s Agent will be explored in Chapter 5. 
73 The National Archives, Governor Henry Hamilton to Secretary of State Henry 
Dundas, 17 October 1792, CO 37/44/3. 
74 Branch, The Cartographic State, pp. 36-67. 
75 Ibid, p. 52. 
 65 
of European cartography’.76 They are now so engrained in modern 
understandings of space it is easy to overlook their historical contingency. 
This marked a significant departure from earlier mapping techniques. In 
the medieval period, political authority often resided in a series of unique places 
where rule was concentrated in urban areas, fading out towards the countryside 
and periphery.77 In this understanding of territorial authority, space was not 
homogenous and anarchical – it was not all of equal value – but rather particular 
locations were deemed qualitatively more important and jurisdictions could 
overlap. More importantly, medieval authority was principally claimed in ways 
that were not territorial. Textual descriptions were chosen over cartographic 
representation in the establishment and maintenance of medieval rule. The 
Domesday Book, for example, was a compendium of lists detailing exactly who 
and what was ruled over, rather than the territorial expanse of that rule.78 As 
such, maps were less useful in describing a polity and, prior to the printing press, 
extremely expensive.79 When they were produced, homogeneity of scale, 
distance and orientation were not a part of their production.  
For instance, although mappaemundi may appear to capture the entire 
globe within their depiction, in truth their geographical expanse was limited to 
the Old World, centring on the Holy Lands, surrounded by Asia, Africa and 
Europe. Their purpose was ‘religious instruction’: explaining the religious and 
moral relationships between specific places on the earth’s surface and the cosmos 
by constructing a biblical and classical history within the mappaemundi 
medium.80 As a result, their geographical content and delineation of political 
entities were deemphasised; there was no homogeneity in terms of scale, distance 
and orientation; and they were unable to incorporate new discoveries into their 
restrained format.  
Other medieval maps also had strikingly different logics to Ptolemaic 
cartography.81 Itinerary maps traced particular journeys like pilgrimages and 
sought to highlight specific landmarks and towns along the route for travellers. 
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Consequently, landmarks were disproportionately large by present-day standards, 
while the ‘spaces’ in-between were granted little attention. Distances between 
places were conveyed in terms of the time it took to travel. Even portolan charts, 
which have been understood as precursors to Ptolemaic maps, were in fact 
notably dissimilar. These navigational aids traced coastlines fairly ‘accurately’ in 
a modern sense, but their emphasis was always on the coast – the interior of 
continents was often completely ignored. The rhumb lines that connected 
specific ports together were also, like itinerary maps, drawn on the basis of travel 
time and not on the physical distances involved. 
As such, all these medieval cartographic productions – mappaemundi, 
itinerary maps, and portolan charts – ‘appear…to distort geography and greatly 
emphasised the importance of places over spaces’.82 In short, they embodied a 
heterogeneous understanding of space where specific places, or routes between 
places, were given disproportionate weight and reflected medieval conceptions 
of territorial authority based around unique centres of power. Moreover, the 
rarity of maps in general indicates something else: that space was simply less 
important when making claims of power in the medieval period.83 
This would change from the sixteenth century. With the rediscovery of 
Ptolemy’s Geography, cartographers began to adopt his map projection methods 
at a time when demand was rising for ‘scientific’ knowledge during the 
Enlightenment. This, alongside the ‘“communications revolution” initiated by 
the printing press’ brought Ptolemaic mapping to a wider, curious and more 
literate public.84 As more and more consumers bought, read and used these maps, 
the Ptolemaic conception of space was gradually normalised. From then on, the 
equality of scale, distance and orientation that accompanied the coordinate grid 
ensured places were no longer afforded unique status and could not be 
disproportionately represented. Moreover, the time it took to travel between 
places could no longer factor into the representation of distance. Instead, the new 
conception of space increasingly normalised the idea that space was 
undifferentiated, homogenous and geometrically divisible.  
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However, it was the expansion of European rule into the Americas, and 
its concurrent demands on cartography, that most significantly altered early-
modern claims to space and drove this new model of territorial sovereignty.85 
Unlike the Old World, European rulers could not ‘know’ exactly what was in the 
Americas upon discovery. Textual descriptions, in the style of the Domesday 
Book, were impossible to carry out from this distance. As they struggled for 
alternatives, Ptolemaic mapping offered a solution. For the first time in history, 
cartographers could produce maps that could plot any location, anywhere in the 
world, within a geometric two-dimensional projection. These projections could 
accommodate new discoveries within their coordinate grid and make room for 
adjustments as more accurate measurements were taken. Rather than claiming a 
space through a detailed description of its features, Ptolemaic mapping made 
land geometrically divisible from afar. As Branch has argued, colonial expansion 
therefore drove demand for these new Ptolemaic techniques in cartography that 
simultaneously changed how space – and sovereignty – would be understood.86 
Authority would no longer be claimed from the centre-out, but drawn from the 
boundaries-in. As this chapter will now demonstrate, this cartographic revolution 
significantly inflected the geographical arguments that Bermudians and 
Bahamians made for control over Turks Islands at a time when the Bahamas was 
increasingly preoccupied with dominating the latter. 
 
Bermuda’s geographical argument 
 
In the emerging early-modern conception of space, the geographical proximity of 
Turks Islands to the Bahamas ensured that, cartographically, Turks Islands fell 
within a line of longitude and latitude extremely close to the Bahamas. 
Conversely they appeared far from a potential Bermudian sphere of influence. 
While obvious to today’s observer given our own understanding of space, these 
new cartographic techniques in the eighteenth century changed how early-
modern Atlantic inhabitants viewed and understood colonial possessions. 
Consider how in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.5a the relatively new use of the 
graticule unavoidably placed Turks Islands in close proximity to the Lucayan 
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(Bahamas) archipelago. Notice also the way in which these possessions were 
shaded, which spoke towards the new linearly-bounded conception of space: the 
boundaries of Turks Islands were painted dark around the edges, fading into its 
centre, evoking the impression of homogenous bounded territories. As such, 
although the status of Turks Islands as official Crown territory was ambiguous at 
this time, to the reader in Britain this map suggested an undeniable proximity of 
Turks Islands to the Bahamas chain, offered no hint of the overlapping or 
complex jurisdictions that existed there, and effaced their connection with 
Bermuda. If an early-modern map user lacked adequate knowledge of the ocean 
currents and trade winds operating within this maritime space (see Figure 3.6), it 
would have been easy and logical for them to assume Turks Islands were under 
Bahamian, not Bermudian, influence given their close proximity to, and 
corresponding pink shading with, the Bahamas in this part of the map. Such was 





















Figure 3.5: Detail from a general chart of the West Indies, 1796. From The British 
Library, L S de la Rochette, ‘A general chart of the West Indies Islands with the 





































Figure 3.5a: Closer detail of Turks Islands from a general chart of the West Indies, 
1796. From The British Library, L S de la Rochette, ‘A general chart of the West 
Indies Islands with the adjacent coasts of the Spanish Continent’ (London, 1796).  
 
Figure 3.6: Chart of Atlantic Ocean currents and trade winds. From Robert 
Greenwood, A Sketchmap History of the Caribbean (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 
12.  
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Bermudians were keen to fight these kinds of assumptions latent within 
Ptolemaic cartography and even tried to use aspects of it to their advantage. In a 
petition sent to the Secretary of State in 1790, the Bermuda Government 
declared,  
The Turks Islands have never been deemed part of the Bahama Islands, 
nor claimed even by the inhabitants of New Providence as such, till 
within a few years past; neither can they this day be considered as part of 
the Bahama Islands, as Guthrie, Barrow, Beawes, Postlethwayt and every 
other geographical writer now extant, expressly declare the extent of the 
Bahama Islands to be no farther easterly than the seventy-third degree of 
western longitude; and it is notorious that the Turks Islands come not 
within this description by three degrees of longitude.87 
That the Bermuda Government was drawing on popular geographical writers was 
significant for two reasons. First, it demonstrated the political character of 
geography and how it was manipulated to make territorial claims. According to 
Robert Mayhew, geography was explicitly political in the eighteenth century. 
Politics at this time referred to ‘high’ politics, i.e. ‘discussions of dynastic 
legitimacy, of representation, and of the constitution’, and relied on historical 
examples for validation.88 As Mayhew attests, ‘To the extent that geography 
books touched on history…they would unavoidably become a politicised 
genre’.89 The works of these abovementioned geographical writers, which 
consisted of geographical dictionaries, grammars and gazetteers, were large 
tomes containing descriptions of each country including ‘sections on law, 
religion, constitution and history’.90 This was well within the scope of politics. 
As such, in Mayhew’s assessment, ‘geography books could not but be intended 
to make political statements’ and this was most readily seen in how readers 
responded to them.91 The fact the Bermuda Government was referencing William 
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Guthrie, John Barrow, Wyndham Beawes and Malachy Postlethwayt in its 
arguments for Turks Islands’ jurisdiction was a strong indication of the books’ 
political character.  
Second, this passage belies how Bermudians tried to use widely accepted 
coordinates to restrict the Bahamas’ encapsulation of Turks Islands. Although 
Turks Islands were not explicitly mentioned by any of the geographical writers, 
the Bahamas were consistently described. For example, in Guthrie’s A 
Geographical, Commercial and Historical Grammar (first published in 1770), it 
states: ‘The Bahamas are situated to the south of Carolina between 22 and 27 
degrees north lat. and 73 and 81 degrees west long’.92 In Barrow’s A New 
Geographical Dictionary (1759-1760), it relates: ‘Bahama or LUCAYA islands, 
in the Atlantic Ocean…They lie to the S. of Carolina, from lat. 21 to 27 degrees 
N. and between long. 73 and 81 deg. W’.93 In Beawes’ A Merchant’s Dictionary 
(1754), it reasons: ‘Of the Lucayos or Bahama Islands. These lie…between 21 
degrees and 27 degrees of Northern Latitude and from 73 degrees to 81 degrees 
of Western Longitude’.94 And finally, in Postlethwayt’s The Universal 
Dictionary of Trade and Commerce (1774), it describes: ‘BAHAMA or 
LUCAYA ISLANDS. These islands lie…between the 21st and 28th degree of 
north latitude, and between 72 and 81 of western longitude’.95 The use of the 
graticule to demarcate the extent of the Bahamas in all four descriptions indicates 
how the methods of Ptolemaic mapping had crept into even the overtly textual 
tradition of these grammars. By the mid-eighteenth century, geographical writers 
were using the coordinate grid as their preferred method for asserting Britain’s 
sovereignty abroad. The Bermuda Government was therefore making a concerted 
effort to use these descriptors as a way to legitimise their right to Turks Islands 
by showing these islands were not in the Bahamas, according to the latest, most 
‘accurate’ cartographic measurements.  
It is worth examining Guthrie’s Grammar in greater depth. Guthrie was a 
hack writer working out of Grub Street in London, and produced a broad corpus 
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of work including both history and geography books.96 Like his fellow 
geographers, his intention would have been primarily to eke out a living by 
pleasing his publishers with saleable, commercial books. Indeed, so saleable was 
Guthrie’s Grammar that it underwent forty-six editions, reaching a wide 
readership of statesmen, merchants, sailors, and a curious enlightened public. His 
Grammar was also one of the most political, inflected with ideals of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. In particular, he used it to deemphasise England’s uniqueness 
and press for an idea of universal human progress. He believed in stadial theory 
but warned England’s latest excesses in territorial acquisition and global 
commerce would lead the nation to luxury and decay. He forewarned problems 
erupting in empire prior to the outbreak of the American Revolution and argued 
the colonies should have their own form of government that differed from 
Britain. In this context, it made good sense for the Bermuda Government to 
invoke Guthrie’s Grammar to its defence. Like Guthrie, it favoured an unusual 
form of government over Turks Islands and often resisted imperial meddling in 
its own.  
However, in other respects, the new cartographic techniques undermined 
the geographical arguments of Bermudians when older cartographic traditions 
would have been more supportive. One of the most popular forms of 
cartographic consumption in early-modern Europe was the printed atlas. This 
was directed ‘toward the literate public as a whole and…driven by commercial 
motives from the very beginning’.97 The first printed atlas was published in 1570 
and ‘the immediate popularity of atlases is evinced by their rapid profusion and 
their variety’.98 There were town atlases, pocket atlases, regional atlases, nautical 
atlases and historical atlases all within a few decades of this publication, and they 
ranged from ‘extraordinarily expensive works for rulers and the richest to 
smaller, cheaper volumes for the general public’.99 As such, the printed atlas was 
a widely disseminated geographical medium that began to mould how Europeans 
viewed the world.  
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Early atlases did not always undermine Bermuda’s position within the 
Atlantic for they had not yet fully embraced Ptolemaic methods. For example, 
Figure 3.7 offers a far more flattering projection of Bermuda’s position than later 
atlases would depict. This map, published in 1633, was a copy of John Speed’s 
map of Bermuda. Speed was a cartographer, antiquary and historian, and he was 
one of the better-known English mapmakers of the early-modern period.100 His 
map was the first English map of Bermuda to be printed and included within an 
atlas, A Prospect of the Most Famous Parts of the World (1627), which in turn 
was ‘the first world atlas to be created by an English mapmaker’.101 Like many 
of his maps that drew on earlier models, this was actually compiled from Richard 
Norwood’s famous original survey of Bermuda in 1622 but Speed’s would 
become the standard map of Bermuda during the seventeenth century.  
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Figure 3.7: Map of Bermuda, 1733. From The British Library, Henricus Hondius, 
‘Mappa Aestivarvm Insularum, alias Barmvdas’ (Amsterdam, 1633).  
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This map is fascinating when understood as a map transitioning between 
different conceptions of space within its single frame. First and foremost it is a 
map of Bermuda or the Somers Islands divided into shares with a corresponding 
numbered list ascribing the owners of these shares. This large foregrounded 
projection of Bermuda is then overlain onto a second projection that endeavours 
to locate the island within the wider Atlantic world. However, while there is an 
attempt at scale on this second projection, it is not homogenous. In truth there is 
still, intentionally or otherwise, a notable distortion of distances between places. 
Whichever Bermuda one gazes at, whether it is the smaller Bermuda mapped in 
the background or, as is more likely, the larger foregrounded projection, 
Hispaniola (to the bottom-left), Florida (to the top-left) and New England (to the 
top-right) seem much closer to this central and oversized island than later uses of 
the graticule would allow. That this map seems to harbour hangovers of a 
medieval conception of space, which emphasised particular places over spaces 
and the time travels in-between, is further suggested by the map’s use of rhumb 
lines reminiscent of older portolan charts.  
Hence, Speed’s map was one grappling with old and new conceptions of 
space, but in doing so it also offered a more sympathetic depiction of Bermuda’s 
strategic importance and position within the seventeenth-century Atlantic. At that 
time, Bermuda was considered ‘in the eye of all trade’ and many believed if it 
were captured, it would seriously disrupt the flow of English trading networks. 
Merchant ships, wishing to sail from the Greater to Lesser Antilles, deliberately 
chose to sail northeast to Bermuda in order to catch the prevailing trade winds. 
Speed’s map was more sensitive to this Atlantic geography by suggesting an 
easy proximity between Bermuda and its Atlantic neighbours. 
For the same reason, in this Age of Sail, Turks Islands were also far 
easier to reach from Bermuda than from the Bahamas (see Figure 3.6 above). 
This is evident in a petition from the Bermuda Government to the Board of 
Trade:   
[T]hough Providence is something nearer to the Turks Islands than 
Bermuda, yet a voyage from Bermuda to Turks Islands is generally 
performed in one half of the time than it can be done from New 
Providence, as the Turks Islands and New Providence, which are distant 
from each other one hundred and sixty leagues, and nearly in the same 
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parallel of latitude, lie in the tract of a perpetual trade-wind, and 
consequently the passage from the latter to the former must be tedious.102 
Due to the prevalence of trade winds, Bermudians claimed they were in a better 
position to govern the salt islands, despite their physical distance to them. Like 
Speed’s map, they portrayed Bermuda as a colony in good overall proximity to 
the surrounding colonial possessions of the British Atlantic. While they had 
earlier used the more ‘modern’ graticule to delimit the Bahamas, here they used a 
contrasting geographical logic that was evocative of older, medieval conceptions 
of space that focused on travel times. It would seem Bermudian petitioners were 
struggling to put forward a coherent argument, as they mismatched different 
conceptions of space.  
Indeed, as Branch argues, a salient feature of Ptolemaic mapping was its 
ability to annihilate or delegitimise other forms of territorial and non-territorial 
authority that could not co-exist within its homogenous, geometric conception of 
space.103 The atlases that were increasingly produced in the eighteenth century 
rapidly adopted Ptolemaic techniques and could no longer include features like 
travel times or disproportionately represent specific locations that may have been 
considered qualitatively more important. The power of the graticule to flatten 
and equalise space harmed the Bermudians’ case because Bermuda would now 
be located in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean quite apart from other landmasses.  
This is evident in Herman Moll’s map (see Figure 3.8) entitled ‘A Map of 
the West Indies or the Islands of America in the North Sea’. This map was 
printed in London and was part of Moll’s Atlas Minor (1736), which included 
sixty-two maps of all parts of the world.104 His map shaded the colonial 
territories according to their imperial rulers: pink for Spanish, yellow for English 
and blue for French. Turks Islands are clearly shaded in yellow and due to its 
Ptolemaic methods Turks Islands appear geographically within the Bahamian 
archipelago, whereas Bermuda is but a small mark on the northeast fringe of the 
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map. Indeed, it is all but lost amongst Moll’s insets of the most important 


























Figure 3.8: Detail from a map of the West Indies showing Bermuda amongst insets of 
Spanish ports, 1730-1762. From The British Library, Herman Moll, 
‘A MAP of the WEST-INDIES or the Islands of AMERICA in the NORTH SEA’ 
(London, 1730-1762).  
 
Figure 3.8a: Closer detail from a map of the West Indies showing Bermuda amongst 
insets of Spanish ports, 1730-1762. From The British Library, Herman Moll, 























Similarly, Henry Popple’s famous map entitled, ‘A map of the British 
Empire in America’ (see Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.9a), was emblematic of this 
foreshortening of Bermuda’s strategic position. This map was printed in 1733 
and dedicated to the Crown. While little is known of Popple, members of his 
family had served within the Board of Trade, ‘a connection that must have been a 
factor in undertaking the map, his only known cartographic work’.105 This was 
the first large-scale map of North America and was later copied by many 
cartographers. It consisted of twenty sheets that could be conjoined as a wall map 
or bought as an atlas. It ‘had quasi-legal status, and a copy was sent to each of 
the governments of each of the colonies’.106 At the time, it was also considered 
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Figure 3.9: Detail from a map of the British Empire in America, 1733. From The 
British Library, Henry Popple, ‘A Map of the British Empire in America, with the 
French and Spanish Settlements adjacent thereto’ (Quebec, 1733). 	
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the most ‘accurate’ map available having gained the approbation of Dr Edmund 
Halley: ‘I have seen the aforementioned Map, which as far as I am Judge, seems 
to have been laid down with great Accuracy, and to show the position of the 
different Provinces and Islands in that part of the Globe more truly than any yet 
Extant’.107 This highlighted the fact that, by the 1730s, reputable cartography 
increasingly demanded the incorporation of the most ‘accurate’ Ptolemaic 

















On Popple’s map, Bermuda appears isolated, lost amongst the larger and 
bolder lettering of the ‘Atlantic Ocean’. Moreover, as the label ‘Bahamas 
Islands’ ends just above Turks Islands, the latter appear to be incorporated. The 
colour coding only serves to reinforce this impression, as the other immediate 
landmasses to the south and southwest of Turks Islands are shaded as French or 
Spanish. The swathe of the Bahamas seems naturally to embrace all the islands 
shaded pink in this part of the map, including Turks Islands. It is no surprise, 
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Figure 3.9a: Closer detail of the Bahamas and Turks Islands from a map of the British 
Empire in America, 1733. From The British Library, Henry Popple, ‘A Map of the 




then, that map users in Britain who consumed these popular atlases may have 
increasingly respected Bahamian claims, as they absorbed new ideas of 
homogenous space and territorial authority that Ptolemaic mapping had been 
signalling to them for over a century. Bermudians’ success in using competing 
geographical logics for their claim was, over time, gradually delegitimised as 
older mapping traditions, which may have supported their case, were deemed 
inferior.  
 
The Bahamas’ surveys of Turks Islands 
 
Atlases and grammars were not the only geographical resources imperial 
authorities had at their disposal to consider the position of Turks Islands. 
Localised surveys were also available and could prove powerful tools for 
claiming territorial authority. The rest of this chapter will analyse three surveys 
produced in 1790 for the Secretary of State to demonstrate how they consciously 
or otherwise naturalised Bahamian rule over Turks Islands. 
As previously discussed, at this time Governor Dunmore was suffering 
acute financial pressures due to an expanding Bahamian population, declining 
cotton industry and rising fortification costs. It was logical that within a context 
of heightened pressure for increased revenue, Governor Dunmore was keen to 
collect census data on the individuals responsible for salt extraction for taxation 
purposes. Yet collecting salt duties was difficult if the population of Turks 
Islands continuously migrated – almost en masse – off the islands. It would have 
proved a hopeless exercise for a Customs Commissioner. As such, Governor 
Dunmore’s surveys from 1790 speak to his designs to know and situate the 
Bermudian salt gatherers more permanently within Turks Islands – even when 
Orders in Council decreed land could not be granted there. They indicate that the 
Governor was serious about laying claim to this territory. This resonates with his 
character, as his expansionist ambitions were well known.108 The fact the plans 
also became the property of the Secretary of State in London further suggests 
they formed part of the resources of colonisation used to legitimise Bahamian 
claims over Turks Islands. 
																																																								




































Figure 3.10: Detail from a cover plan of Turks Islands for Governor Dunmore, 1790. 
From The National Archives, Plan of Turks Islands from an actual survey of John 
Ferguson, Deputy Surveyor, by Order of Governor Dunmore and his Council, 1790, 
CO 700/TurksIslands1. 
	
Figure 3.10a: Detail of Salt Key from a cover plan of Turks Islands for Governor 
Dunmore, 1790. From The National Archives, Plan of Turks Islands from an actual 
survey of John Ferguson, Deputy Surveyor, by Order of Governor Dunmore and his 


















In the cover plan’s inset (see Figure 3.10), we learn the Deputy Surveyor, 
John Ferguson, conducted them for Governor Dunmore at the latter’s request. 
Cartographic records are infrequently devoid of power relationships and by 
issuing a plan of Turks Islands in the name of the Governor of the Bahamas, 
Governor Dunmore was tacitly laying claim to these salt islands.109 Furthermore, 
the cover plan does not attempt a detailed representation of the topographical 
features of the islands but specifically focuses the viewer’s attention on the 
saltpans and plots (See Figure 3.10a and Figure 3.10b). These are arranged in a 
grid-like fashion of order and regularity. As a highly selective representation, 
what is included and excluded is very telling of the economic and political forces 
operating on and within this space at this time. Certainly, these plans make it 
clear: it was the lucrative commodity of salt that drew the Bahamas Governor to 
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Figure 3.10b: Detail of Grand Turk from a cover plan of Turks Islands for Governor 
Dunmore, 1790. From The	National Archives, Plan of Turks Islands from an actual 
survey of John Ferguson, Deputy Surveyor, by Order of Governor Dunmore and his 
Council, 1790, CO 700/TurksIslands1.	
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these islands. Furthermore, there is no specific mention of Bermuda – its 























Ferguson drew two further plans at the same time and in the same style 
suggesting all three were part of a series. They provide detail on the main islands 
boasting operational salt ponds: Salt Key and Grand Turk. Not only do they mark 
the relative size, and location, of the individual plots (see Figure 3.11) but 
significantly the plans include a corresponding numbered list entitled ‘proprietors  
 
Figure 3.11: Detail from a plan of the salt ponds at Grand Turk showing the lots, 1790. 
From The National	Archives, Plans of Salt Ponds, Turks Islands, showing lots with 






















of the lots’ (see Figure 3.11a). Like the cover plan, these two further plans focus 
exclusively on the salt extraction industry but, in addition, they are loaded 
politically by expressing the idea of proprietorship. A proprietor implies legally 
agreed tenure to someone who has indefinite rights to the plot in question. A 
proprietor gives the impression of permanence, of land that can be sequestered in 
a will to a dedicated recipient. Observing this survey, the reader would have the 
impression that habitation on Turks Islands was permanent and settled. The 
implication that these were Bahamian proprietors does not matter as much as the 
idea that there was something like proprietorship itself on Turks Islands when 
grants of land were specifically disallowed. These surveys of 1790 do not 
conjure the image of a migrating merchant who worked the ponds according to a 
Head Rights System. Nor do they imply a situation that changed on an annual 
basis. Yet, that was exactly how, repeatedly, these islands had been cultivated up 
to this point. Temporary, migratory forms of activity are absent within these 
surveys. As Branch has argued, in more modern maps, ‘the features to be 
Figure 3.11a: Closer detail from a plan of the salt ponds at Grand Turk detailing the 
‘proprietors of the lots’, 1790. From The National	Archives, Plans of Salt Ponds, 




included are those defined as permanent’, but ‘the distinction between what is 
seen as permanent and temporary is an arbitrary one and reflects an implicit 
norm that values settled and built human space over temporary or migratory 
forms of activity’.110 It was precisely this implicit norm that lay at the core of the 
diplomatic struggles that had taken place over Turks Islands in the late 
eighteenth century. The Secretary of State, sitting in London, would have 
received these surveys and their implication: that there were settled proprietors 
taking charge of the ponds. In a cartographic sleight of hand, these surveys 
obfuscated any notion of the salt gatherers’ migratory, maritime, transient and 
indeed Bermudian identity. It cemented visually on paper what was, until the end 
of the eighteenth century, highly contested on the ground.  
  
Conclusion   
 
This chapter has argued that Turks Islands’ settlement followed a fairly unique 
pattern within the British Caribbean. Whereas on the sugar islands settlement 
was quickly characterised as permanent, fixed and terrestrial – demonstrably 
because of the costs involved in building, maintaining and defending plantations 
– the salt islands witnessed an initial stage of settlement that was principally 
maritime, migratory and transient. Even when interesting parallels can be found 
in other areas of empire, such as in Barbuda, British Honduras, and the pan-
Caribbean turtle commons, Turks Islands’ particular settlement patterns were 
singular and generally not mirrored elsewhere. Much of their character in this 
early stage was owed to the way Bermuda’s niche economy and salt gathering 
interacted with one another: whereas eighteenth-century Bermudian merchants 
and seafarers pursued a vast array of maritime activities, one of which was salt 
gathering, the seasonality of salt meant it could only be produced for part of the 
year while its low up-front costs undercut the risk of loss during an absence. This 
paved the way for a migratory, maritime and transient settlement. It was only 
towards the end of the eighteenth century that this nomadic way of life came 
under threat as successive Bahamas Governments fought with Bermuda for 
control over these saline spaces. In the diplomatic wrangling that ensued, London 
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was eventually forced to intervene and ruled that Turks Islands were a part of the 
Bahamas in 1803. By the early nineteenth century, a more permanent and 
terrestrial habitation, more typical of the Caribbean as a whole, had developed, 
signifying that territorial authority had passed from Bermuda to the Bahamas. 
 In the diplomatic wrangling that effected this change, conceptions of 
space played a demonstrative part. The cartographic revolution and particularly 
the prevalence of Ptolemaic techniques significantly inflected the geographical 
logics Bahamians and Bermudians used in their territorial claims. While 
medieval conceptions of space that had revolved around the idea of unique 
places, and the travel times in-between, may have been more flattering to 
Bermuda’s position, the new and popular graticule and its accompanying notions 
of scale, orientation and distance increasingly delegitimised these ideas. At the 
same time, they made Turks Islands appear naturally an adjunct of the Bahamas. 
In this struggle, the Bermuda Government failed to produce a coherent argument, 
mismatching different and competing conceptions of space in a desperate attempt 
to maintain control. Bermuda’s case was further destabilised by local surveys, 
such as Governor Dunmore’s in 1790, which gave the misleading impression to 
London ministers that there was something like permanent settlement at Turks 
Islands. In this way, geographical sources of the period were not neutral mirrors 
of society but charged political tools that were actively used to formulate 
territorial claims to space. The cartographic revolution marked a significant 
paradigm shift in how Europeans viewed and understood the world around them, 
but on the salty fringes of empire it also weakened Bermuda’s position and 
consequently endangered its salt gatherers’ nomadic way of life. 
This chapter has sought to understand the role cartographic sources 
played within the diplomatic struggles between Bermuda and the Bahamas, but 
the fight for Turks Islands’ jurisdiction was far more layered and complex. The 
next chapter will seek to address this by examining another popular political tool 
in this intra-colonial feud: the written petition. It will do so in the context of 
London’s intervention to better understand why the Bermuda Government failed 
to convince those in power of its right to Turks Islands despite the islands’ 




Chapter 4: ‘This Agency has done much Mischief’: The Struggle for 




In 1769, Secretary of State Lord Hillsborough reflected on the difficulty of 
governing Turks Islands ‘under such peculiar Circumstances’.1 These ‘peculiar 
Circumstances’ prevailed for the best part of half a century. With the 
appointment of a Turks Islands King’s Agent in 1766, ‘an officer acting under a 
Commission of so new and unusual a nature’, Turks Islands ceased being subject 
to a purely informal self-organising system run by Bermudian salt gatherers and 
merchants, yet neither did they come under strict Bahamian authority.2 Exactly 
where Turks Islands sat within the milieu of Caribbean colonial jurisdictions was 
frustratingly vulnerable to interpretation.  
 These frustrations erupted and festered with a vengeance at the end of the 
eighteenth century when, after a long and protracted debate in London, the 
King’s Attorney and Solicitor General finally ruled that Turks Islands were a part 
of Bahamian jurisdiction. For the first time the Royal Assent was granted to the 
Bahamian legislature to extend its general laws to Turks Islands, including its 
contentious salt taxation laws, and Turks Islands were offered political 
representation in the same. The tense and drawn-out process that led to this final 
decision is the subject of this chapter. By paying close attention to the swathe of 
colonial petitions that were sent to the British Government and to the ensuing 
confusion evident amongst London ministers, this chapter will argue that Turks 
Islands were so hard to ‘situate’ precisely because they had rested at a unique 
political interstice within the imperial governing system for so long. 
Moreover, the involvement of the British Government at this late stage, 
as a final adjudicator, reflects how issues surrounding Turks Islands’ jurisdiction 
had erupted in the colonies themselves: London’s part in this story was 
essentially reactive. By the end of the eighteenth century, the maritime and 
migratory ties between Turks Islands and Bermuda were bonds the Bahamas 
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Government was determined to break. Salt gatherers would pay the Bahamas 
Government’s salt taxes; they would become inhabitants. In their efforts to stop 
this from happening, Bermudians from all levels of white society sent a flurry of 
petitions to the British Government pleading for its intervention and protection. 
London was forced, reluctantly, to intervene, but it would prove a difficult 
exercise, as Turks Island issues, revolving around self-identification, migratory 
lifestyles, and transient settlement, jarred with Bahamian intentions and 
jurisdictional rights. 
In order to tease out these threads, this chapter will begin by providing 
contextual background on the Acts of Assembly that were passed in the Bahamas 
in 1799 and 1802. These Acts initiated a new phase in the debate over Turks 
Islands’ jurisdiction and generated a cycle of colonial petitions, one of which was 
the Address of 1802 from the Bermuda Council and Assembly to the King of 
Great Britain. This Address, with its supplements, shall be analysed in two ways. 
First, the path it took to reach the British Crown will be examined and then its 
contents explored. The chapter will then widen its focus from the letter of this 
Address towards its inclusion as part of a mass of material that was collated by 
His Majesty’s Council and sent to the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade 
and Plantations for further deliberation. While the diversity of the papers will be 
discussed, two bodies of memorials prove particularly striking: that of Alexander 
Murray, the King’s Agent of Turks Islands, and those of the Governor and 
Colonial Agent of the Bahamas. The chapter will then conclude by appraising the 
decision-making process of London’s ministers. Faced with this mountain of 
material, the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations organised 
a hearing, before referring the issue to His Majesty’s Attorney and Solicitor 
General for consideration. In the end, these chief law officers had to answer a 
deceptively simple question: were Turks Islands a part of Bahamian jurisdiction 
or not? The memorials examined in this chapter should reveal why that answer 
was far from obvious, and why Turks Islands operated ‘under such peculiar 





An intra-colonial constitutional crisis 
  
On 11 November 1799, the Bahamas Assembly passed ‘An Act for authorising 
and empowering the Inhabitants of the several Islands and Districts therein 
mentioned to send representatives to the General Assembly’.3 Those islands 
included Turks Islands, Caicos Islands, Crooked Island and Watlings Island. It 
received the Royal Assent by His Majesty in Council on 25 June 1800. Under the 
preamble of the Act it stated, ‘it shall and may be lawful for the freeholders and 
House keepers of the Islands commonly called Turks Islands to elect and send 
one Member to represent them in the present General Assembly and in every 
future General Assembly of these Islands’.4 Following its implementation, Turks 
Islands could therefore legally take a seat at the Bahamian Assembly in Nassau, 
the capital of New Providence, over 500 miles away. For the Bahamas 
Government, this was viewed as an extension of a right to subjects already 
within their jurisdiction and was not an attempt to suddenly seize sovereignty 
over Turks Islands. Yet, for the salt gatherers this was the moment when the 
Bahamian legislature attempted to definitively ‘annex’ Turks Islands, a term 
endowed with all its negative connotations.5  
 The salt gatherers’ main concern in 1799 was the threat of increased 
taxation following the extension of Bahamian laws to Turks Islands. Such fear 
proved well founded. In April 1802, the Bahamas Assembly passed a colonial 
tax law with the purpose of raising revenues for the colonial government.6 It 
included a duty levied on salt and while it did not specifically target Turks 
Islands, the latter were the largest salt-producing islands in the entire Bahamian 
archipelago. With the passage of the Representation Act, the Bahamas Assembly 
viewed it their indisputable right to place a duty on Turks Island salt. Yet, the 
																																																								
3 The National Archives, An Act for authorising and empowering the Inhabitants of the 
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5 The National Archives, Memorial of certain Inhabitants of Bermuda and others 
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history of uncertainty regarding the government of Turks Islands prevented any 
simple acquiescence from her ‘subjects’. It was these two Acts, on representation 
and taxation, that signalled a new and decisive phase in the diplomatic feud over 
Turks Islands.  
 
The Address of 1802 and its path to London 
 
In August 1802, Bermuda’s Colonial Agent, John Brickwood, was in possession 
of an Address from the Assembly and Council of Bermuda to the King in 
Britain, regarding recent grievances suffered by the Bermudian salt gatherers at 
Turks Islands.7 This Address was accompanied by several annexed supplements 
and was the culmination of a large amount of correspondence that had 
crisscrossed the Atlantic between Bermuda, Turks Islands and London for over a 
year. While Brickwood was responsible for laying it before the Secretary of 
State, who in turn would lay it before the King’s Council, its lifecycle up until 
that point is worth examining. By piecing together the pathways this Address 
took, we can learn how colonial petitioners understood the apparatus of 
government as a ‘multi-layered formation’ and what fissures petitioners tried to 
exploit in order to seek redress.8 Moreover, it reveals the persistent ties between 
Turks Islands and Bermuda, as the former channelled its concerns through the 
latter. 
 The history of this Address began on 5 June 1801 when a poll was set up 
on Turks Islands for the election of a member to the Bahamas Assembly 
following the Representation Act of 1799. Writing to an acquaintance in 
Bermuda, Nathaniel Butterfield, a Bermudian salt gatherer, reported that ‘not a 
vote was given’.9 ‘The people all refused, and presented an Address to the 
[King’s] Agent stating their Reasons’.10 This Address to the King’s Agent was 
sent via Butterfield’s correspondence to members of the Bermuda Assembly. 
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Alongside it, Butterfield related the renewed sufferings of the salt gatherers and 
presumed,  
As the Legislature of Bermuda represents perhaps more than nineteen out 
of twenty [of] the Gatherers of Salt here, it is thought unnecessary, to 
address them from hence, but merely to mention the renewal of the 
Providence interference, assuring ourselves that nothing more will be 
wanting in order to engage them in such measures as bid fairest for the 
removal of our difficulties.11 
However, it would become clear this would not be sufficient if the grievances of 
the salt gatherers were to be addressed to the highest levels of authority, 
especially if their chosen channel was through the Bermudian legislature.  
At first, the Bermuda Assembly called for a committee to discuss the 
recent disagreements at Turks Islands and actions to be taken. Three members 
were appointed and after reading Butterfield’s correspondence, they wrote him, 
We apprehend there cannot be the smallest doubt that our Legislature will 
leave nothing undone, to cultivate and maintain the Commercial 
connections at present subsisting between Bermuda and the Turks 
Islands, but as that connection and our relative situation in other respects 
will not be so immediately obvious to the Administration in England, as 
they are to us…it is expedient a Complaint of the Grievances you labour 
under, should in the first instance form from you to our Legislature, either 
by Petition or Memorial, as you shall judge most proper.12  
The committee members made it clear that in order for Bermuda’s legislature to 
get involved, grievances would need to be addressed through the proper 
channels. As David Lambert has urged, it is important to understand West Indian 
petitions as ‘material objects whose potential efficacy derived from how, and in 
what textual company, they travelled’.13 Bermudian Assembly members were 
aware of how peculiar the Turks Island-Bermudian connection might appear in 
London, given the sheer expanse of the Sargasso Sea that stretched between the 
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islands. While it was understandable to Bermudians why its legislature had a 
right to be involved, this right was by no means obvious to all: ‘A representation 
from yourselves will…furnish the strongest Ground of Authority for the 
interference of our Legislature, which authority might otherwise seem 
questionable at first sight to administration at home’.14 Nor could the right for 
Bermuda to intervene in the current situation be explained through past 
interventions. The committee members stated clearly, ‘that right should be 
immediately evident from the papers submitted to Administration; and not to be 
left to be collected from former proceedings’.15 The salt gatherers would have to 
submit a new petition to the Bermudian legislature, if a process of redress was to 
be commenced.   
  Alongside this dialogue with the salt gatherers, the committee members 
ensured Bermuda’s Colonial Agent was primed for the upcoming Address. On 5 
August 1801, they wrote to Brickwood explaining the formation of their 
committee and their desire to place into his hands all materials ‘within our reach 
respecting the late interference of the Bahamian legislature with Turks Islands’.16 
This included a copy of the Representation Act of 1799, the petition of the salt 
gatherers to the Turks Islands King’s Agent with his reply, revenues from the salt 
gathered for the Crown, the number of people presently receiving shares in Turks 
Islands, the aforementioned letters from Butterfield, and, finally, a copy of a 
memorial from 1790. Further to this, they informed Brickwood that a petition 
from the salt gatherers to the Bermudian legislature was duly expected and that 
they had every reason to believe Governor Beckwith of Bermuda would mention 
the Bahamian interference in his latest dispatch to London. Brickwood responded 
in January 1802, informing the committee he had placed copies of their 
transmitted papers in front of the Secretary of State.17 With regards to the salt 
trade carried on by Bermudians at Turks Islands, Brickwood had proven himself 
a strong advocate: ‘I am so fully acquainted as to impress me with an active zeal 
in my endeavours to obtain all that you so reasonably claim for the protection of 
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that branch of Trade’.18 Thus, the Bermudian legislature had manoeuvred for 
Brickwood to be its main courier for this latest Address. 
 The support of the Bermuda Governor was also necessary. In July 1802, 
the Assembly and Council wrote a joint Address to Governor Beckwith 
informing him of their plans to send an Address to the King representing the 
grievances of the salt gatherers, and simultaneously furnished him with a copy of 
that Address and its accompanying documents. Before signing off, the authors 
solicited the Governor’s assistance, trusting ‘that Your Excellency will give 
every support to an application, on the success of which the prosperity of these 
Islands so materially depends’.19 After receiving this Address presented by the 
Council and Assembly, Governor Beckwith submitted it to London in July 1802. 
By including it within his official dispatch, he improved the Address’ credibility, 
and gave it a context. He explained that the two Houses had ‘framed an humble 
Address to The King, as they did upon former and similar attempts, which they 
successfully resisted, under His Majesty’s Paternal Protection’; and that this 
Address, and its supplementary documents, were to be conveyed to the Secretary 
of State via Brickwood.20 The Governor’s support for the Address was fully 
endorsed, as he ended his dispatch:  
I beg leave to add that the decision is of the deepest importance to his 
Majesty’s Subjects in this Colony who now, in company with their fellow 
subjects of the Empire at large, find a free trade…concentrated…into a 
Monopoly in favour of the Bahama Islands.21  
This was not the first time Governor Beckwith had officially advocated his 
support. Indeed, a year before, he had touched on the subject to the Secretary of 
State, noting he had heard that an Act had passed in the Bahamas authorising and 
empowering Turks Islanders to send a representative to Nassau and in the same 
dispatch he submitted a copy of a letter that his predecessor had received in 
1796. This letter, issued from the Committee of Council for Trade and 
Plantations, reassured the then Bermuda Governor that ‘all His Majesty’s 
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Subjects have an equal right to resort to Turks Islands for the purpose of 
gathering Salt’ and should any ‘specific Regulation or other Act’ compromise 
that right, it would be attended to.22 By raising this issue with the Duke of 
Portland at an early stage of the proceedings, Governor Beckwith was 
forewarning this subject might require clarification in the near future.  
 Thus, through the labour of its committee members, the Bermudian 
legislature had managed to align its diplomatic efforts: from grassroots 
mobilisation among the salt gatherers to a multipronged offensive at the highest 
levels of colonial government. In this chain of petitioning, that connected the salt 
gatherers, to the two Houses of the Bermudian legislature, to the Governor, to the 
Colonial Agent, and finally to the Secretary of State and King’s Council, it is 
clear the right channels had to be worked for a case to be presented effectively. 
Even more stridently, it signifies how close the socioeconomic ties were between 
Bermuda and Turks Islands. For this amount of labour and correspondence to be 
mobilised with such meticulous attention to detail, the Bermudian legislature had 
to have good reasons for doing so. The fact remains the salt gatherers appealed to 
the King through the Bermudian legislature, not through the Bahamian 
legislature. It was a classic example of how petitions have been used to go over 
the heads of powerful elite intermediaries (in this case, the Bahamas Assembly) 
in order to appeal to centres of power.23 On 31 August 1802, Brickwood laid the 
Address with its several supplements in front of the Secretary of State.  
 
The Address of 1802 and its contents  
 
The Address of 1802 was a large document that consisted of a covering Address 
from the Council and Assembly of Bermuda to the King, affixed with a 
supplement that directed the reader to several appendices marked A to M.24 This 
section unpicks its main threads to demonstrate the clear self-identification 
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between Bermuda and Turks Islands and the distance salt gatherers felt towards 
the Assembly in Nassau.  
 As Lex Heerma van Voss has argued, there is utility in studying the 
content of petitions. As much for rulers in the past, as for historians in the 
present, ‘they offered a window upon the mind of the general population’.25 The 
right to petition centres of power was engrained in English political culture, and 
it was a right that extended to all sectors of society. In this way, any individual or 
collective body was permitted to petition the King should other forms of redress 
prove unsuccessful. As such, historians can burrow into the frustrations, concerns 
and desires of different members of society by analysing the content of their 
petitions. In a colonial context, this is useful for prising apart the dissonances that 
may have existed between the metropole and its colonies, and between different 
sectors of colonial society. To be sure, the deferential style that pervades 
petitions should not be accepted uncritically. There was a formulaic way of 
writing petitions and it often required a professional hand. However, ‘whatever 
influences the way in which demands are voiced, demands have to be voiced as 
that is the point of a petition’.26 As such, the Address of 1802 and its appendages 
can reveal much about the concerns of the salt gatherers and the Bermudian 
legislature, as well as the relationship between the two. 
 The Address was formulated around a request that the King would act ‘to 
prevent any Authority whatever of the Legislature of New Providence being 
exercised at Turks Islands’ in light of the recent Acts passed by the Bahamian 
Assembly.27 This reveals the still-held belief of the Bermudian legislature that 
Turks Islands existed within a separate jurisdiction to the Bahamas Government, 
whose recent actions were an aggressive form of encroachment. This is 
underscored in the supplement to the Address, where the authors state: 
The said [Bahamian] Legislature have recently endeavoured to procure 
by finesse under the mask of a law, a jurisdiction as they affect to 
suppose over the Turks Islands, which they must have been sensible 
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26 Ibid, p. 7. 
27 The National Archives, The Address of the Council and Assembly of Bermuda to the 
King including a Supplement to a State of the Claim of His Majesty’s Bermuda Subjects 
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previous to the passing of such law, they never could have obtained in 
any other manner.28 
The latent suggestion is that the Representation Act of 1799 was produced in 
secrecy, without consultation with the Bermuda Government or the salt 
gatherers. This is echoed in a letter written from a salt gatherer to an 
acquaintance in Bermuda in July 1801. He related that the King’s Agent, who 
had returned to Turks Islands from a visit to England, ‘on his arrival here, 
expressed great surprise at the attempt [of the Act of 1799], which he deprecated 
very much – never having heard a syllable of it’.29 Upon hearing this news, the 
King’s Agent hastened to Nassau to take up his seat on the Council to protect 
Turks Island interests.  
It becomes clear that this ‘privilege’ of political representation bestowed 
on the Turks Islanders was not one they sought. The supplement to the Address 
is quite strong on this point:  
As to allowing the Salt Rakers at Turk Islands to be represented in the 
General Assembly of New Providence, they never wished it, a stronger 
proof of which cannot possibly be adduced, than that they have invariably 
refused to elect any Representative whatever.30  
Evidently, the salt gatherers did not agitate for the franchise. Rather, they saw 
their natural representation as being within the Bermuda Government where 
‘their permanent residence is, where their Interest Depends in Common with the 
rest of their Countrymen; and where they pay Seat and Lot’.31 Representation in 
the Bahamian legislature was considered an oppression, not a privilege. 
 To justify this aversion, the Address drew upon a multiplicity of sources 
within its appendices. These sources covered issues of a demographic, 
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environmental, economic, and constitutional nature – a multipronged attack – 
that to a large extent reprimanded the preamble of the Representation Act of 
1799 for being disingenuous. This preamble stated: 
Whereas the Turks Islands, the Caicos, Crooked Island, and Watlings 
Island have now become of importance to our Majesty and to the British 
Empire, on account of their increased population, agriculture, and 
contribution of considerable sums towards the support of this 
Government…it is therefore reasonable that they should be authorised to 
send Members to represent them in the General Assembly.32 
Demographically, the authors of the Address pointed out that those who resided 
on Turks Islands were, in 1801, still predominantly Bermudians. Appendix E 
states, that of the 160 white persons on Grand Turk, 144 were Bermudian, and of 
the 363 enslaved persons, 288 were attached to Bermudian masters.33 This meant 
that 83 per cent of the population at Grand Turk were either free Bermudian or 
enslaved to free Bermudians. Given this statistic, it is perhaps understandable 
that Turks Islanders did not associate strongly with the Bahamas Government, 
especially when it is considered Turks Islands were geographically distant, lying 
500 miles southeast of Nassau. Moreover, speaking to the preamble’s assertion 
that Turks Islands’ population had recently increased, the supplement declares 
that the population of Turks Islands ‘is by no means certain, but is always more 
or less fluctuating according to the numbers of Bermudians who annually resort 
thither’.34 Annual, migratory and maritime visitations to Turks Islands, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, had continued throughout this period. The islands’ 
population fluctuated each year depending on the economic conditions at 
Bermuda, or the yield of the salt season at Turks Islands. Demographically, the 
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authors of the Address demonstrated the enduring connections between Turks 
Islands and Bermuda and laid bare the preamble’s glaring errors on their 
settlement patterns. 
 Yet if demographics offered a good reason for eschewing Bahamian rule, 
so did environmental ones. The Address reiterated that in terms of agriculture, 
there were few opportunities on Turks Islands: ‘It was and is no less notorious, 
that the Lands of Turks Islands, if not absolutely inarable, are the least 
productive and the worst adapted for Cultivation of any in the Known World’.35 
They believed that the preamble’s justification for extending representation on 
the basis of improved agriculture was extraordinary. It betrayed the ignorance of 
Nassau for their local situation. To further underscore their environmental 
counter-argument, they again invoked, as in 1790, the geographical expertise of 
‘Guthrie, Beawes and many other Geographical writers’ who had declared that 
Turks Islands did not fall within the line of longitude for the Bahamas and 
pointed out that a journey from Turks Islands to Nassau took twice the time it 
took to reach Bermuda due to prevailing trade winds (see Chapter 3).36 Indeed, a 
recurrent complaint of the King’s Agent within his dispatches was the limited 
intercourse between Turks Islands and Nassau and the difficulty of sending 
letters between the two. Communication between Bermuda and Turks Islands 
was so much more reliable and frequent that in one letter to the Secretary of 
State, the (acting) King’s Agent recommended his return dispatches be sent via 
Bermuda rather than Nassau.37  
 Yet though demographic and environmental arguments were important, 
they were not necessarily the crux of salt gatherers’ concerns. Evidence would 
suggest that the reason why salt gatherers found this Act so threatening was not 
because of an incorporation into the Bahamian Assembly per se; it was because 
of the consequences that would arise from that representation: taxation. Resisting 
this constitutional change was critical to avoiding further duties and taxes on 
imported and exported goods. This was a fight that had raged for over a century, 
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Bahamian taxation. Yet, the urgency of their concerns in 1802 was as never 
before. They were battling against the Representation Act of 1799 that had 
already won the Royal Assent in London – their arguments were therefore 
working retrospectively against the clock. The threat of a tax law on salt and 
other sundry goods was immediate as the Act of 1802 had already been approved 
in the Bahamian Assembly and a Receiver General had been sent down to Turks 
Islands to begin its collection. Bermudian salt gatherers understood that if the 
Representation Act of 1799 remained in place, this subsequent taxation would be 
difficult to resist.  
 As such, the final attack against the preamble of the Representation Act 
was economic, aimed at the ‘contributions’ Turks Islanders had historically made 
to the Bahamas Government. The authors of the Address found this suggestion 
incredulous:  
It was, and is notorious to the Legislature of New Providence, and to all 
descriptions of persons who ever had any Knowledge of either place, that 
the Salt Rakers at Turks Islands, never did contribute in any wise to the 
support of the Government of New Providence, but on the contrary, have 
always resisted every Tax and Contribution attempted to be imposed or 
levied on them by the Legislature of New Providence, and in this 
Resistance we are happy to remark, that they have been countenanced by 
His Majesty.38 
Much of the reason for their resistance was the burden of double taxation. As 
migratory and maritime sojourners to Turks Islands, the salt gatherers were 
residents of Bermuda where their families resided and where they paid due 
contributions to its Government. Moreover, with the passage of the Tonnage Act 
in 1788, which placed a tax of two shillings and six pence per ton on American 
vessels, there was a further financial hit.39 Though American vessels laden with 
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King including a Supplement to a State of the Claim of His Majesty’s Bermuda Subjects 
to their Ancient privileges at the Turks Islands with its appendices, ‘A Supplement to a 
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salt were meant to pay this duty, in reality the salt gatherers assumed the burden 
by lowering the price of their salt in order to remain competitive in the Caribbean 
market place. In effect, the duty on tonnage became a tax on the salt gatherers.40 
When combined with the expense of maintaining enslaved labourers, importing 
provisions and contributing towards the defence of the islands, the white 
Bermudians resorting to Turks Islands were making only moderate profits. 
Appendices G, H, K, and I go to lengths to prove this. They include depositions 
taken from Bermudian salt gatherers, asking them questions about the quantity, 
sale price and shipping costs of salt for the preceding twelve years, as well as the 
expense of maintaining enslaved labourers and their annual contributions 
towards the islands’ public services. This information, collated and averaged, 
resulted in a net income of five pound sterling, fifteen shillings and two pence 
per share in the ponds compared to a gross income of twenty-one pound sterling, 
eighteen shillings and eight pence per share.41 The Bermudian interest argued 
that if further taxes were introduced on top, the benefits of the salt industry 
would not outweigh the costs. This would lead to the ‘distress and ruin of Your 
Majesty’s Bermuda Subjects’ and to the abandonment of Turks Islands; a place 
the salt gatherers and their enslaved labourers had ‘brought to perfection’ and 
formed 83 per cent of its migratory and maritime population.42 
 Through these economic, demographic and environmental factors, the 
Bermudian interest deplored the inexpediency of including Turks Islands within 
the Bahamas’ jurisdiction by specifically attacking the preamble of the 
Representation Act. By pointing to its glaring dissonances with the actual 
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circumstances present on Turks Islands, they showed how alienated Turks 
Islanders felt from Bahamian affairs.  
Outside of the preamble’s exact wording, however, there was a wider 
constitutional issue. By 1802, Turks Islands were not lawless, with only tentative 
oversight from Bermuda. Following a French attack on Turks Islands in 1764, it 
had an official appointed on the spot under the new title of the Turks Islands 
King’s Agent (see Chapter 7). This officer received instructions from the 
Secretary of State, rather than the Governor of the Bahamas, and he was 
appointed directly by the Crown. His commission stipulated that he would be 
granted,  
…full Power and Authority, by all lawful Ways and Means, to Aid, 
Assist, and Protect all our Subjects and People, that now are or from time 
to time shall be settled there, and also our merchants and other Subjects 
trading or that shall trade in our said Islands, or within any part thereof, 
and also all and every their Goods and Merchandises there, and their 
Ships, Vessels and Trade aforesaid.43 
Such a commission, ‘so new and unusual in nature’, was surprisingly expansive 
and open-ended.44 It gave the King’s Agent significant latitude in the two main 
areas that were of concern to the British Government in regards to Turks Islands: 
commerce and defence. Its description of those the King’s Agent should ‘Aid, 
Assist and Protect’ was telling: these were British subjects ‘that now are or from 
time to time shall be settled there’ as well as the merchants who plied the trade.45 
This was recognition from London of the unusual settlement patterns and sinew 
populations at Turks Islands that involved a significant number of transient, 
maritime and migratory salt gatherers. To be sure, the King’s Agent was tacitly 
accountable to the Bahamian Governor with a seat on his Council. Moreover, 
powers to legislate Acts and form a civil government were not specified in the 
commission. But that commission did not explicitly state this subordination 
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within its text, nor did it stop the first King’s Agent from promoting distinctive 
legislation for Turks Islands when he gained direct access to the Secretary of 
State and secured the Royal Regulations of 1781. 
 These Royal Regulations were for the good government and preservation 
of the peace at Turks Islands. While Chapter 5 will explore them in detail, it is 
relevant to state that they were intended to attune carefully to the particular 
circumstances at Turks Islands, which the Bahamas Government could not 
account for, and authority was given to the King’s Agent to implement them. 
Over time, these regulations also encouraged a feeling of independence amongst 
the salt gatherers. The supplement to the Address of 1802 states,  
It may be asked by the Legislature of New Providence, whether the Salt 
rakers wish to be under no Government whatever at Turks Islands. – Our 
answer is, that so far from there being no Government, it is with pleasure 
we contemplate, that they are controulled by the best of Governments – 
that is to say, by the wise and salutary regulations of His Majesty in 
Council, approved in 1781. Regulations divested of legal Subtleties, 
calculated to meet the understanding of a plain illiterate people.46 
From 1781, the Bahamas Government was not allowed to pass colonial laws 
obstructing the salt gatherers at Turks Islands unless granted the Royal Assent. 
Turks Islands were deemed a part of his Majesty’s Royal Bounty and their salt 
ponds were free to all British subjects. Like mines and fisheries, the salt ponds 
were reserved for His Majesty’s pleasure. Land grants on Turks Islands were 
prohibited while the revenue that was collected from the Tonnage Act went 
straight to London.  
In such unusual circumstances, it is no wonder that a cavity in the 
imperial system cracked open; that such prolific debate over the right to legislate 
for, and tax within, Turks Islands existed. Turks Islands seemed to exist 
somewhere between a Crown appendage in and of itself and islands within a 
larger archipelagic colony. By picking at that cavity, and shaping it into a 
crevasse, salt gatherers hoped to persuade London that these islands existed at a 
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unique imperial interstice, meriting their continued attention and protection; that 
the socioeconomic ties which bound them to Bermuda were strong and enduring; 




This Address went straight to the heart of the British Government, landing on the 
desk of the Secretary of State. The British Government’s response demonstrated 
that London did care about this issue and understood the need for resolution, but 
arriving at that resolution would prove a difficult process. The Committee of the 
Privy Council for Trade and Plantations marshalled a huge amount of 
information and knowledge about the salt industry at Turks Islands, in which 
multiple and oft-competing interests were consulted. Even so, the case was 
referred to the highest source of legal authority in Britain – the Attorney and 
Solicitor General – demonstrating the sensitive and intricate nature of the issue at 
hand. 
 
The Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations 
 
The Address of 1802 was not an isolated document. It formed part of a 
collection. With the receipt of news describing the discontent of the salt gatherers 
at Turks Islands, this bundle of documents was collected by His Majesty’s 
Council and sent to the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and 
Plantations. Contributors from all sides of the debate were encouraged to send in 
their evidence and claims. The collection included a variety of papers comprising 
correspondence from the Governors of the Bahamas and Bermuda; memorials 
from the King’s Agent and the Bahamian and Bermudian Colonial Agents; the 
original commissions of the Bahamas Governor and the King’s Agent; letters of 
correspondence between different ministers; the Acts of the Bahamian Assembly 
under scrutiny; and a series of historic state papers that went as far back as 1715 
respecting His Majesty’s original claims to the Bahamas and Turks Islands. This 
amassing of both external and internal documentation reflected London’s 
determination to decide upon this issue once and for all. As Heerma van Voss 
has argued, there is often a deferential style in the writing of memorials to assure 
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those in authority that the petitioners did not intend ‘to question the established 
power structure’.47 Yet, ‘behind the deferential face of a petition always lurked 
the threat that the population might revolt if a justified demand went 
unheeded’.48 Given the rebellious character of both Bermudian and Bahamian 
subjects, it was important London demonstrated to these colonists that it would 
treat this case fairly with due gravity and concern. A hearing was demanded and 
took place on 19 January 1803. 
 However, by paying attention to the array of documents, it becomes clear 
this was not only a dispute between Bermudian salt rakers and the Bahamas 
Government. It had severely ruffled the feathers of the King’s Agent as well. 
Alexander Murray was the third King’s Agent of Turks Islands, after Andrew 
Symmer and Zachariah Hood. He had received his commission in 1789, and 
consequently had been resident in Turks Islands for almost thirteen years by the 
time of the hearing in 1803. His father, John Murray, the 4th Earl of Dunmore, 
had been Governor of the Bahamas from 1786 to 1796. Governor Dunmore left 
that position in disgrace, recalled for consistent overspending, corrupt 
government practices and civil disobedience but not before he had manoeuvred 
his son to be Turks Islands’ King’s Agent. 
 In February 1802, Murray was presented with a memorial from the salt 
gatherers on Turks Islands, requesting him to represent their grievances to the 
King.49 This memorial was signed by seventy-five of the prominent salt gatherers 
whose reasons for resisting taxation and annexation were by this point well 
known. They included the years spent toiling the pans in order to support their 
families in Bermuda, the unfavourable climate precluding permanent habitation, 
the unreliable salt harvests which often meant expenditures exceeded profits, and 
the fact that previous attempts to extend Bahamian laws to Turks Islands had 
proven unsuccessful. In this present situation, they entreated Murray to represent 
their case once more and he acceded to their request. In November 1802 and 
again in January 1803, Murray presented memorials to the Committee of the 
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Agent Alexander Murray, 8 February 1802, BT 6/74. 
 
	 104 
Privy Council for Trade and Plantations.50 The salt gatherers not only had the 
Bermudian legislature backing their cause, but the King’s Agent as well. 
 Within these memorials, Murray was sympathetic to the objection of the 
Bermudian salt gatherers to Bahamian interference. Yet, Murray pushed their 
argument further. He believed that rather than being underneath Bahamian or 
Bermudian jurisdictions, Turks Islands were constitutionally a separate 
appendage of the British Crown, a direct possession of His Majesty.51 To support 
this, he pointed towards his commission and instructions to uphold the 1781 
Royal Regulations of the ponds. He reiterated the ‘peculiar circumstances’ of 
Turks Islands that precluded any easy communication with Nassau. Located over 
500 miles away and in the path of trade winds, it was extremely difficult for 
Nassau to govern or even materially assist these most out of ‘Out Islands’. As a 
result, there could be little material benefit for the salt gatherers in receiving 
representation at Nassau. Provisions were often so scarce in Nassau that their 
supply had to be sourced from elsewhere – often Bermuda, sometimes the United 
States. Could these islands be served practically within the Bahamas 
Government? Murray believed they could not, and constitutionally he believed 
they were never intended to be.  
Murray strongly conceived these salt islands were at ‘the sole disposal of 
the Crown’.52 Like mines and mineral-rich areas, no lands had been sequestered 
on Turks Islands. All remained in the hands of the Crown, for an Act of 
Parliament stipulated that ‘when Governors are empowered to grant Lands they 
are not permitted to deed any within a 100 yards of a Salt Pond, that Proportion 
with the Pond being reserved for His Majesty’.53 The salt gatherers, mostly 
transient migrants from another colony, could therefore never be termed 
‘freeholders’ as the preamble of the Act of 1799 suggested. Even more 
convincing was the operation of the Tonnage Act. The revenue collected from 
the tonnage duty was remitted directly from Turks Islands to the Receiver 
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General of Customs in England to be paid by him to the Exchequer. Yet the Act 
of the 18th George III Chapter 12 made it clear, 
That the King and Parliament of Great Britain will not impose any Duty, 
Tax or assessment, whether payable in any of his Majesty’s 
Colonies…except only such Duties as it may be expedient to impose for 
the regulation of Commerce, the net produce of such duties to be always 
applied to the use of the Colony or Province, or plantations, in which the 
same shall be levied, in such manner as other duties collected by the 
Authority of the General Courts or General Assemblies of such Colonies 
are ordinarily paid.54  
According to this law, Murray pointed out, if Turks Islands were a part of 
Bahamian jurisdiction, the revenues collected from the tonnage duty should have 
been for the use of the Bahamas. Yet the duties collected by the Tonnage Act 
were remitted directly to London. Moreover, as those revenues were submitted to 
the Exchequer under ‘the Head of Consolidated Customs’ it made those duties 
appear as ‘part of the British, and not Colonial, revenue of Parliament’.55 Murray 
reasoned that if this argument was followed to its conclusion, and Turks Islands 
really were underneath Bahamian jurisdiction, then Parliament was violating its 
own Act in recouping these duties.  
 However, if Turks Islands were understood as a separate appendage 
under the direct protection of the Crown, these laws remained unbroken. For 
Murray, this was the case in point, and maintaining this constitutional position 
was crucial, not just for preserving his own position but also for increasing the 
revenue of the Crown. This revenue had experienced a ten-fold increase under 
his protection, from 1790 to 1801.56 Murray argued that it could be improved 
further still, if the current system of government was allowed to mature. He thus 
urged the Privy Council to withhold assent to the tax law under scrutiny; to pass 
a bill which would prevent future Bahamian tax laws applying to Turks Islands; 
and to include clauses within it that not only permitted the establishment of 




56 The National Archives, Letter from the Turks Islands King’s Agent Alexander Murray 
to the Commissioners of the King’s Treasury, 24 December 1802, BT 6/74. 
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demarcated the limits of Bahamian jurisdiction.57 In this diplomatic maelstrom, 
Murray was seeking further devolution for Turks Islands, perhaps even a greater 
role for himself.  
 These aspirations echoed those of Andrew Symmer, the first King’s 
Agent, who was criticised by the Bahamas Governor for abusing the boundaries 
of his authority.58 Symmer wished to make Turks Islands a free port, with a self-
governing system and its own tax laws. Although Symmer was asked to temper 
his designs by the Secretary of State, his proposed regulations did become the 
basis of the 1781 Royal Regulations for the salt ponds. The commission of 
King’s Agent therefore did leave significant room for manoeuvre, to the point 
where Murray, like Symmer, began to question why Turks Islands should fall 
under Bahamian or Bermudian jurisdiction at all, when ‘by the progress of Trade 
and Population it might be expedient for the general Interest to form a new 
Colony’.59 This desire to set Turks Islands apart was picked up in a letter from 
the Speaker of the Bahamas Assembly to its Colonial Agent, George Chalmers, 
informing him of ‘the late Attempts of the Turks Island Ambassador and his 
Bermudian Friends, who without Doubt had an idea of forming themselves and 
their Constitutions into a Sovereign Republic’.60 While laced with disdain, such 
comments indicate how, in this vociferous debate, Murray’s was another voice 
pushing for the ‘peculiar circumstances’ at Turks Islands to be upheld.  
 In defending the independence of Turks Islands, Murray had to fend off 
severe Bahamian criticism that aimed to undercut his credibility. Amongst the 
collated papers were allegations from the Bahamas Governor, John Halkett, 
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accusing Murray of knowingly fermenting an illicit trade at Turks Islands.61 This 
trade involved allowing American vessels laden with provisions to enter at Turks 
Islands. While illegal by the strict letter of the law, which reserved the supply of 
provisions to British vessels only, Murray confessed he had but little choice 
when the inhabitants were facing famine and threatening to abandon the ponds.62 
With the future of the salt trade vulnerable, and the Crown’s revenue in jeopardy, 
Murray decided to temporarily depart from the law in order to import much 
needed supplies. Murray reflected, ‘I appeal to your Honourable Board whether 
by any construction of language this can be strained into a charge of Illicit Trade 
sanctioned by our Officers’?63 Yet Governor Halkett’s criticism extended to what 
he perceived to be the flagrant disobedience of Murray and his officers in 
hindering the rightful collection of salt duties. Writing in September 1802, 
Governor Halkett condemned the magistrates and officers there for allowing 
‘upwards of Twenty vessels’ to load and leave with salt ‘without paying one 
farthing of Colonial Revenue’ and by refusing to assist the Bahamian Receiver 
General in his duties.64 Accusations of governmental corruption were levied at 
the Deputy Collector of the Customs, Deputy King’s Agent, Deputy Commander 
of Turks Islands, and of course, the King’s Agent himself. Murray’s position was 
called ‘useless’, Governor Halkett not being ‘able to discover the smallest use of 
such an Establishment at Turks Islands, though I have enquired much into the 
subject’.65 Governor Halkett was adamant that all the fractious and irregular 
proceedings at Turks Islands arose from the ‘secret encouragement’ of the King’s 
Agent.66 He called for its abolition.  
Thus affronted, Murray addressed Governor Halkett’s attack, which he 
understood as ‘a reflection on myself personally by proposing not only the 
abolition of the Office of King’s Agent but that a respectable and trustworthy 
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person should be sent out as Collector of the Customs’.67 For Murray this was a 
personal insult against his status and ability to govern. It forced him to remark, 
acidly,  
Possessing hereditary rank at least equal to Mr Halkett and maintaining a 
respectability in my intercourse with Society in no respect inferior, I feel 
myself called upon to protect my own honour and assert that no Collector 
of the Customs (even Mr Halkett himself) could His Majesty’s Revenue 
have been better protected or a greater degree of subordination 
maintained.68  
Whether or not Murray acted illicitly, this exchange reveals the pressure he was 
under to prove his worth as King’s Agent.  
Murray also faced criticism from another corner: the Colonial Agent for 
the Bahamas. In his memorial to the Board of Trade in November 1802, 
Chalmers wrote that ‘His Majesty’s Agent at Turks Islands…disturbs His 
Majesty’s Government at the Bahama Islands, by acting contrary to his duty as 
Agent, as one of the King’s Council, and as the Collector of the Customs at 
Turk’s islands’.69 In his opinion, ‘much of that resistance by the Inhabitants at 
Turks Islands to His Majesty’s Government at the Bahamas have arisen from the 
appointment of the King’s Agent there’.70 Because of this, Chalmers believed it 
necessary to examine again the reasons why the position of King’s Agent was 
created. He pointed to the fact the role was enacted in 1766 after a French attack 
on Turks Islands in 1764. Following this invasion, and the eventual recapture of 
Turks Islands, it was agreed a British officer should be there ‘on the spot’ to 
defend and protect the inhabitants of these most valuable of Out Islands.71 
Symmer was appointed, but ‘when the Board of Trade were directed to draw up 
His Instructions, they said, in answer, that they had in their Books no Precedent 
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for such an Officer; and that his commission must be his Guide’.72 This position 
was innovative and novel. To Chalmers, the result was an uncomfortable 
ambiguity around the powers of the King’s Agent, which over time 
unintentionally presented a challenge to the Bahamian Governor’s authority and 
constitutional confusion for ministers in London. He lamented, ‘this Agency has 
done much Mischief, and no good: for it has assumed an independency on the 
Bahama Government, and has promoted incidentally refractoriness in the 
Inhabitants’.73 Like Governor Halkett, Chalmers called for the position to be 
suspended.  
From the Bahamian legislature’s perspective, Turks Islands were and 
always had been a part of the Bahamas. As a result, it viewed the resistance of 
the Bermudian salt gatherers to the Representation Act of 1799 and Taxation Act 
of 1802 as that of disobedient subjects whose rebellious tendencies had been 
encouraged by a King’s Agent overstepping his mark. It believed that the 
evidence placing Turks Islands within Bahamian jurisdiction was irrefutable and 
any exemption granted to Turks Islands from Bahamian colonial laws would 
strike at the heart of its sovereign powers. Colonial Agent Chalmers and 
Governor Halkett warned this would set a dangerous precedent, especially at a 
moment when moves were underway to develop the other salt ponds of the 
Bahamas. A memorial of the Bahamas legislature underscored these ambitions 
by estimating that a potential annual yield of three million bushels of salt could 
be extracted from the Bahamas, excluding Turks Islands, if His Majesty offered 
his assistance.74 This venture could only be profitable if the privilege that 
allowed foreign vessels to enter Turks Islands in ballast was extended to the 
other islands in the Bahamas and if Turks Islands were not exempt from colonial 
tax laws. Otherwise, ‘this will be holding forth encouragement among us to 
disunion or disobedience to the Provincial Laws, and will afford future ground 
for objections, delays and discontent among the distant but improving Islands of 
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this Colony’.75 Like any other Bahamian subject, the salt gatherer at Turks 
Islands should have to contribute to the government of which he was part – 
regardless of the demographic, geographical and economic pleas of the Bermuda 
Government. As a general colonial law, the salt gatherers had no legal right to 
disobey. It was a simple and compelling argument.  
 
The final report of the Attorney and Solicitor General 
 
This protracted debate, then, involved three colonial government groups: the 
Bermuda Government, the Turks Islands King’s Agent, and the Bahamas 
Government. All three urged that a final decision on the topic be made. The 
complexity of the issues caused a protracted and extensive investigation by the 
Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations. On 19 January 1803 a 
hearing took place before the committee, with a cross-examination of the 
Bahamas Counsel and Murray.76 Following this hearing, further information was 
collected from the state paper archives, calculations were made of the burdens a 
salt tax would actually impose, and an investigation into Murray’s conduct was 
authorised. In the end, London’s Customs House excused Murray’s decision to 
permit an illicit trade and thought it ‘right to observe that no other complaint 
against the conduct of Mr Murray is pending before this Board and that the 
revenue received…from the Turks Islands has of late been very considerable’.77 
But the urgent need for an indisputable legal answer remained and the case was 
referred to the King’s Attorney and Solicitor General.  
The Attorney and Solicitor General’s office contained the chief law 
officers of the Crown, representing His Majesty in legal matters, as well as 
offering advice to the Government. The fact their expertise was called upon to 
settle this debate over Turks Islands’ jurisdiction demonstrates both the gravity 
and ambiguity of this case. Upon receiving all the papers collected by the 
Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, the Attorney and 
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Solicitor General were asked to consider carefully ‘whether upon the true 
Constitution of His Majesty’s Commission to the Governor of the Bahama 
Islands, the Legislative Authority of the Bahama Islands extends over the Islands 
called Turks Islands’.78 Their decision upon this issue would be final.  
In the officers’ closing report, they made it clear it was not their place to 
judge the prudency of whether Turks Islands should properly be under Bahamian 
jurisdiction, but only whether legally it had been considered so. In stating this, 
the law officers were making it known that many of the socioeconomic, 
demographic and cultural arguments of the Bermuda Government and the salt 
gatherers would be put to one side as they considered in purely legal terms the 
extent of Bahamian jurisdiction.  
The report made two concluding points. First, it looked into the 
commissions of the Bahamas Governor and Assembly to decipher if their 
jurisdictions were in fact the same. Having attended to each commission’s 
precise wordings, the Attorney and Solicitor General believed it ‘to be quite clear 
that the true Construction of the Commission requires the same limits to be given 
to the Jurisdiction of the Legislative Assembly of the Bahamas as to the 
Executive Authority of the Governor’.79 Therefore, if Turks Islands were a part 
of the Bahamas, it was irrefutable that the Assembly was legally permitted to 
legislate for them. In that case, the Acts of 1799 and 1802 were valid. All of the 
Bahamas’ islands fell within the jurisdiction of the Assembly and the Governor – 
there were no exceptions and no islands that enjoyed special jurisdictional 
arrangements. 
 The report then had to qualify if Turks Islands were a part of the 
Bahamas. In the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General, ‘There can be no 
doubt we suppose that His Majesty might comprehend them within such 
Government and therefore it is only to be seen whether he intended to do so and 
has used apt words to execute such intention’.80 In the law officers’ assessment, 
the intention of the King was important: how he understood where Turks Islands 
sat within his realm would decide the matter. Passing a judgement on this would 
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depend largely on what historic legal advice had been given to the King to shape 
his opinion on this issue. Two reports of the Board of Trade to the King, from 
1764 and 1768, were duly and carefully deliberated.  
 The first report was written after a French attack on Turks Islands in 1764 
and sought to advise the King on his rights to Turks Islands in order to invalidate 
French claims. The report described the long-standing possession of the Bahamas 
by the British since the 1670s. It pointed to the original proprietor grants of the 
Bahamas to the Duke of Albermarle and others ‘by Letter patent from King 
Charles the Second’ in 1670, the subsequent decision to place the Bahamas under 
Crown rule in 1717, and a number of international treaties that had since 
confirmed the Bahamas were British possessions.81 The report firmly stated the 
Bahamas were indisputably British and not French or Spanish.  
The report then established that Turks Islands were ‘unquestionably a 
part of the Lucayos’ by referencing the works of two geographical writers who 
described the Bahamas ‘to comprehend all Islands between the Island of Bahama 
in the North and the Island of Inagua in the South’.82 As Turks Islands were 
north of Inagua, the Board of Trade argued they had to be considered part of the 
Bahamas. The original letters patent by King Charles similarly reinforced this, 
stating the Bahamas were to include: 
 All those Islands called Bahama, Eleuthera, Ucarnes, Providence, Inagua 
and all other those Islands lying in the Degree of Twenty and Two to 
Twenty and Seven North Latitude, commonly known by the name of the 
Bahama Islands or the islands of the Lucayos.83 
Although these lines of latitude actually excluded Turks Islands – something the 
salt gatherers were always keen to point out – in 1764 the Board of Trade 
reasoned ‘yet it can by no means be inferred from thence that they are not 
included in the grant, in as much as they are situated to the North of the Island of 
Inagua’.84 That Inagua was expressly mentioned was enough to convince the 
Board of Trade that this island was where ‘the Southern limits of the Lucayos 
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must have been intended to extend’.85 With Turks Islands lying north of Inagua 
and at significant risk of being taken by France, the Board of Trade strongly 
concluded: that Turks Islands were a part of the Bahamas, that the Bahamas were 
a long-held British possession, and that France therefore had no right to them. 
 The second report of the Board of Trade in 1768 returned to these issues 
when the Bahamas Governor accused the King’s Agent of abusing his powers 
and infringing on his jurisdiction over Turks Islands. To establish if this was so, 
the Board of Trade first referenced its previous report of 1764 to confirm Turks 
Islands were a part of Bahamian jurisdiction. It then referred to a memorial that 
Governor Thomas Shirley had made shortly afterwards in which he expressed the 
need to improve Turks Islands’ security and trade by ‘having some Person there 
to superintend the Commerce’.86 The Board of Trade reasoned this ‘being the 
origin and nature of Mr Symmer’s Appointment’ as King’s Agent, his attempts 
to form ‘a Constitution of Civil Government’ at Turks Islands in 1768 were 
‘illegal and unwarrantable and derogatory of, and inconsistent with, the Power 
and Authorities contained in your Majesty’s Commission under the Great Seal of 
Your Governor of the Bahama Islands’.87 The 1768 report chastised the King’s 
Agent for overstepping his mark and reaffirmed he was legally subordinate to the 
Bahamas Governor. 
These Board of Trade reports of 1764 and 1768 were those that primarily 
informed the legal opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General in 1803. The 
law officers reflected, ‘We think it is not Necessary to go beyond the information 
contained in the two reports of the Board of Trade in 1764 and 1768 to settle this 
Question [of Turks Islands’ jurisdiction]’.88 They placed heavy emphasis on 
how, during the 1760s, the Board of Trade had constitutionally situated Turks 
Islands within the Bahamas in order to secure its title against foreign incursions 
and therefore safeguard the overall integrity of the British Empire. The law 
officers stated, ‘from them, it appears that at that time one of the main grounds 
on which His Majesty’s Right to the Turks Islands was asserted was that they 
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86 The National Archives, Report of the Board of Trade respecting the King’s right to 
Turks Islands, 4 May 1768, BT 6/74. 
87 Ibid. 
88 The National Archives, Report of the King’s Attorney and Solicitor General to the 
Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, 4 June 1803, BT 6/74.	
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were a part of the Bahama Islands’.89 As a result, the Attorney and Solicitor 
General reasoned it was inconceivable that, from 1768 onwards, the King had 
not understood Turks Islands as part of the Bahamas. It was the grounds for his 
continued possession of them and the arsenal he used to fend off French and 
Spanish claims. As such, it must have been his intention that subsequent 
commissions to the Bahamas’ Governor and Assembly included Turks Islands 
within their jurisdiction, even if it was not explicitly stated and despite the 
ensuing confusion these absences caused. In this thought process, the 
socioeconomic, demographic and cultural arguments of the Bermudian salt 
gatherers were secondary to the legal and constitutional arguments that had 
secured British sovereignty over these saline spaces in the international arena. 
The latter would take precedence. On 4 June 1803, the Attorney and Solicitor 
General delivered their verdict: ‘we have concluded that the Turks Islands are 
within the jurisdiction of the Legislature of the Bahamas…[T]he Legislative 





With London’s decision to uphold the Bahamian Acts of Assembly, Turks 
Islands finally and formally came under Bahamian jurisdiction. After a 
protracted diplomatic feud that had lasted over a century, the issue was 
politically settled. However, as this chapter has shown, the process that led 
towards this decision was far from straightforward. By prying apart the 
multifaceted debate, this chapter has argued that Turks Islands were so hard to 
‘situate’ precisely because they had rested at a political interstice within the 
imperial governing system. The genuine difficulty of governing a scattered 
archipelago like the Bahamas and protecting it from the onslaught of foreign 
attack had led to the creation of a new role within the imperial governing system. 
Yet the very creation of a King’s Agent at Turks Islands, so unprecedented and 
‘peculiar’ in nature, helped foment a sense of ‘independency’ amongst those 






alongside the Royal Regulations of 1781, the reservation of all lands to the 
Crown, and the collection of the tonnage duty for His Majesty’s revenue, all 
helped to complicate issues around Turks Islands’ jurisdiction.  
Moreover, the ‘peculiarity’ of Turks Islands pivoted around potent issues 
of self-identification. The migratory, maritime and transient lifestyles of the salt 
gatherers tied them culturally, socially, economically and politically with 
Bermuda, a place where their families lived and to which they annually returned. 
It is a thread that is revealed in the historical record time and again. Their unique 
position in the imperial governing system, in having a King’s Agent, gave them a 
sense of privilege and entitlement. It fostered a sense of independence and 
certainly gave them improved access to those in power in London. However, the 
force behind their resistance undoubtedly sprung from the strength of their ties 
with Bermuda. Over the century, this would consistently fuel their opposition to 
any suspected encroachments on their preferred lifestyles. When the Bahamian 
Acts of Assembly on representation and taxation were passed at the turn of the 
century without the salt gatherers’ knowledge, the gravity of this new situation 
generated a huge mobilisation of colonial resources from Bermuda and Turks 
Islands. Once again the colonies grappled with the question of where Turks 
Islands’ jurisdiction truly lay, but this time the opinions of the Bermuda 
Government, the King’s Agent and the Bahamas Government were so opposing, 
so polarised, that London was forced to intervene. 
 The British Government’s response demonstrated that London did care 
about this issue. It certainly sensed the importance of forming a definitive 
resolution on it, not least because its own role in establishing the position of 
King’s Agent was hardly inconsequential. Yet, its response in 1803 was 
inevitably reactive. For here was an issue that had grown up organically in the 
colonies, from the ambiguous lines of sovereignty that had festered within them, 
and from the years of intra-colonial wrangling that had taken place. London’s 
ministers, an ocean away, struggled to understand the complexity of the issues – 
calling in experts from different state departments and rifling through old state 
papers. In the end, the intricacy and confusion mandated the referral of the case 
to His Majesty’s Attorney and Solicitor General for final deliberation. These 
were the highest law officers of the British Empire. As advisers to the King and 
British Government, these law officers ruled the issue could only be resolved by 
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upholding the integrity of the British Empire, citing international agreements that 
had secured Turks Islands to Britain purely on the basis that they were a part of 
the Bahamas. All other factors were secondary. It was an argument that 
Bermuda’s colonial petitions, as comprehensive as they were, could not refute. 
As a new century dawned, the porous administrative boundaries of Turks Islands 
hardened and closed as they slipped from underneath a Bermudian sphere of 
influence into a period of territorial Bahamian rule. The maritime, migratory and 
transient lifestyles of the salt gatherers were on borrowed time. 
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In 1768, the Secretary of State wrote to the Bahamas Governor ordering him to 
enact specific regulations for Turks Islands. He warned, ‘You should not 
countenance any regulations which may have the effect to restrain any of His 
Majesty’s subjects in the prosecution of those branches of commerce, which are 
in their nature, and by useage, free and unrestrained’.1 Lord Hillsborough’s 
description of the salt trade was significant. In one sentence he underscored how 
the ponds were underpinned by an economic philosophy that had few parallels in 
the British Caribbean. In Turks Islands, trade in salt was meant to be free, and it 
was meant to be unrestrained. At its heart was the idea that every British subject 
should have unfettered access to the salt industry. This question of access had 
huge ramifications for the islands’ political economy and their system of land 
tenure. It would represent a noteworthy departure from the plantation model.  
This chapter seeks to address the nature of this departure. It will argue 
that at a time when a drift towards privatisation throughout the British Atlantic 
world might have been expected, the saltpans tended towards collective 
ownership. This collectivistic enterprise was in part an Atlantic transfer of the 
early-modern English notion of ‘the commons’. However, it also owed its 
character to the islands’ historical development and the nature of salt production. 
Together, the blending of Atlantic and local evolution created a new sort of 
political economy. It was called the Head Rights System and it operated like a 
‘creole commons’: neither completely of the Old World nor entirely of the New 
but a hybrid; an economic system that complemented the specific challenges 
posed by eighteenth-century salt. 
To pursue this argument, this chapter will approach the Head Rights 
System in three different ways. First, it will analyse the distinctive features of the 
																																																								
1 ‘Letter from Secretary of State Lord Hillsborough to Governor Shirley of the 
Bahamas’, 20 July 1768, in The Governor, Council, and Assembly of Bermuda, A State 
of the Claim of His Majesty’s Bermuda Subjects to the Right of Gathering Salt at Turks 
Islands (London, 1790), p. 6. Italics added for emphasis. 
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Head Rights System through regulations that were implemented between 1767 
and 1781. Second, it will compare and contrast the Head Rights System to the 
sugar plantation model. And third, it will scrutinise the extent to which the Head 
Rights System should be considered an Atlantic transfer to, or creative hybrid 
within, the Caribbean. 
 
Features of the Head Rights System  
 
In 1766, following a French attack on Turks Islands, Andrew Symmer became 
the first Turks Islands King’s Agent with instructions to encourage settlement 
and deter foreign invasions (see Chapter 7). For the first time, the salt gatherers 
would benefit from the protection of the Crown. This made the salt trade a more 
attractive economic endeavour but it also meant the ad-hoc system of resorting to 
Turks Islands would come under scrutiny. In February 1767, Symmer wrote to 
the Secretary of State, ‘these Islands have been for some time by past, in a 
Maroon State, there has been neither Regulations nor Property maintained’.2 In 
May, he wrote again, ‘If the free and Licentious Life, which the Settlers on these 
Islands for Sixty Years by past, be considered, it will serve as a Vindication for 
such part of the Regulations as may seem severe’.3 Symmer was adamant that the 
‘Custom for many years by past’ of ‘Numbers of people’ arriving at Turks 
Islands and ‘under pretext of becoming Settlers’ taking ‘Shares in the Ponds’ 
would have to be stopped.4 From early in his tenure, Symmer intended to tie the 
salt gatherers to the islands more permanently, and publish regulations to 
encourage order and prosperity.  
One of his first actions was to assemble a board of eight elected members 
and publish a series of local regulations on the islands in 1767.5 While Symmer 
was accused of abusing his powers, officials in high circles took note and 
																																																								
2 The National Archives, Letter from King’s Agent Andrew Symmer to the Secretary of 
State Lord Shelburne, 27 February 1767, CO 23/16/205. 
3 The National Archives, Letter from King’s Agent Andrew Symmer to the Secretary of 
State, 26 May 1767, CO 23/16/231. 
4 The National Archives, Copy of an Act made by the General Board of Turks Islands, 
1767, CO 23/7/279. 
5 The National Archives, Heads of Rules and Orders for regulating his Majesty’s Ponds 
on Turks Islands and for maintaining Peace and Good Order among the Inhabitants, 16 
March 1767, CO 23/16/211. 
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recognised the need to codify a set of regulations for Turks Islands’ ‘peculiar 
circumstances’.6 In 1773, the Secretary of State directed the Bahamian Governor 
to legislate. From the start, Lord Hillsborough was clear these regulations should 
not be a re-enactment of Bahamian laws on Turks Island soil. For example, he 
reprimanded the Bahamian Governor for ‘referring this Gentlemen [Symmer] to 
the laws of the Bahama Islands, as a Guide to his Judgement in respect to Turks 
Islands, to which those laws were never meant to apply’.7 Rather, the regulations 
should be tailored specifically to the needs and trade of the Turks Island 
community. Significant pressure was placed on Governor Shirley to act in 
collaboration with Symmer, and the outcome of these cross-Atlantic 
conversations was a set of official regulations passed by the Bahamian Governor, 
Council and Assembly in 1774 entitled, ‘An Act for the better regulating and 
Government of the Salt Ponds at the Turks Islands’.8 With it, the Head Rights 
System was properly enacted with distinctive features of access, equitable shares 
and collective management. 
 
A common right of access 
 
The main difference between the unofficial regulations of 1767 and the official 
regulations of 1774 revolved around access. In 1774, every British subject had a 
right to rake salt at Turks Islands, provided they agreed to the regulations and 
maintained the peace. This was not the case in the unofficial regulations of 1767 
when Symmer initially tried to restrict access to those who had chosen to live at 
Turks Islands for at least three years. However, after facing opposition, not least 
from the Secretary of State, clauses that obstructed the customary practice of 
annual migrations were dropped. The importance of open access as a guiding 
principle was highlighted by the fact it was enshrined in the first regulation of 
both the 1774 and later 1781 series. It proclaimed, ‘All His Majesty’s Subjects 
																																																								
6 The National Archives, Letter from the Secretary of State Lord Hillsborough to 
Governor Shirley of the Bahamas, 4 August 1769, BT 6/74. 
7 Ibid. 
8 The National Archives, An Act for the better regulating and Government of the Salt 
Ponds at the Turks Islands, and for suspending an Act passed in the Eleventh Year of 
His Majesty’s Reign, initiated, an Act for imposing Fines and Penalties on Persons 
offending against the Regulations made or to be made for the Government of the Salt 
Ponds within these Islands, 7 February 1774, BT 6/74. 
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whatsoever shall have free liberty of raking and gathering Salt at the Turks 
Islands’.9 To uphold this liberty, land on Turks Islands was not freehold but 
reserved for the Crown. As late as 1803, the King’s Agent was still reaffirming 
in London that Turks Islands ‘continue at this day at the sole disposal of the 
Crown, not a foot of Land having been alienated by the King…Salt Ponds being 
held of the Nature of Mines and Minerals’.10	In further elaboration he stated, 
‘when Governors are empowered to grant Lands they are not permitted to deed 
any within a 100 yards of a Salt Pond, that proportion with the Pond being 
reserved for his Majesty’.11 In truth, the salt gatherers did not possess ownership 
of the ponds in a strict legal sense. Rather, they were given the right to access the 
industry. J M Neeson has said of the early-modern English commons, ‘the soil 
itself, the land, was not the commoner’s, but the use of it was’.12 Similarly, the 
saltpans were not the salt gatherer’s, but the use of them were. This was the first 
distinctive feature of the Head Rights System: the Crown reserved the land, and 
every British subject had a right to access the industry.  
 
An annual and equitable apportioning of shares 
 
The ponds were then annually divided into shares on an equitable basis, which 
could not be directly linked to capital. How many shares a salt gatherer received 
was equal to the size of his company. This explains why it was named the ‘Head 
Rights System’ – rights according to the number of physical bodies. A company 
would consist of the free salt gatherer alongside his enslaved salt rakers or 
servants. Apportioning shares in this fashion would theoretically ensure the 
ponds were worked with the greatest efficiency, as a salt gatherer could not buy 
shares but had to show, physically, he could work the ponds with an appropriate 
number of hands. This demonstration of strength took place each year on the 
tenth of February, at the beginning of the salt season and before the official 
division of the ponds. At that time, the salt gatherers would present themselves, 
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10 The National Archives, Memorial of the Turks Islands King’s Agent Alexander 
Murray to the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, 10 January 
1803, BT 6/74. 
11 Ibid. 
12 J M Neeson, Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in England, 
1700-1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 1. 
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with their complete company, in order to qualify for shares that season. 
Regulation 6 makes it clear,  
All persons intending to work in the…Ponds and Pans…shall, every year, 
on the tenth of February, or at the time of the general Division of the 
Ponds and Pans, appear with their Companies before the Commissioners 
then elected; and every Person who shall not appear as aforesaid, shall be 
excluded from any share in the said Ponds and Pans.13  
Thereafter, a salt gatherer could not augment his company further in the hope of 
gaining more shares, as ‘no Person shall be allowed any share for any Servant or 
Slave, who shall not be shewn to the Commissioners at the time of their 
regulating or proportioning the Shares’.14 Moreover, the salt gatherer had to 
choose which key he intended to work, either Grand Turk or Salt Key, and there 
remain for the duration of the season. The nature of these shares was therefore 
unusual. They were renewed annually; they were divided proportionally; and 
they could only be obtained for either Grand Turk or Salt Key, not both.  
 Thus, by 1774, Turks Islands had a curious, mixed system of land tenure. 
At the start of each year, the ponds were ‘open access’: any British subject could 
come and declare their stake in the salt industry. Following the tenth of February, 
this open access became group or collective, meaning only those present could 
obtain a share of the ponds that season. After the allocation of shares, land tenure 
shifted one last time, and ownership became something more like private 
property (but not its kin). Each company had the sole right to rake salt within 
their given shares, and ‘salt marks’ were erected to delineate those shares from 
each other. At the same time, there were general ponds worked in common and 
each company contributed towards them. Such a mixed tenure system was highly 
reminiscent of the open-field system in medieval and early-modern England 
where land tenures varied across time and space according to the agricultural 
needs of the commoners.15 In an open-field village, there was often a nucleated 
																																																								
13 The National Archives, An Act for the better regulating and Government of the Salt 
Ponds at the Turks Islands, and for suspending an Act passed in the Eleventh Year of 
His Majesty’s Reign, initiated, an Act for imposing Fines and Penalties on Persons 
offending against the Regulations made or to be made for the Government of the Salt 
Ponds within these Islands, 7 February 1774, BT 6/74.  
14 Ibid. 
15 For a description of an early-modern English commons, see Joan Thirsk, ‘The 
Common Fields’, Past & Present, No. 29 (Dec., 1964), pp. 3-25. 
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village surrounded by three open fields divided into strips organised on a crop 
rotation. During the crop season, commoners had the sole use and benefit of the 
crops harvested within their strips. Outside of crop season, these fields were 
thrown open and the commoners’ livestock was allowed to roam across. This 
was in addition to fields of pasture, woodland and waste held in common 
throughout the year. A traditional English commons thus had a mixed tenure 
system in which sections transitioned between collective and private property 
depending on the season. The saltpan operated in a similar fashion through the 
annual, equitable apportioning of shares in the private ponds and the existence of 
general ponds held in common throughout the year. 
 
A form of collective management  
 
A third distinctive feature of the Head Rights System was how it was overseen. 
Officials monitored the salt gatherers’ activities to an unprecedented degree. The 
responsibility for enforcing the regulations lay in the hands of elected 
commissioners, posts that were filled for one year for the duration of one salt 
season. In effect, these commissioners became an advisory board or council to 
the appointed King’s Agent and together they regulated the ponds. On the first of 
February each year, five commissioners were elected for Grand Turk from 
amongst the inhabitants ‘to regulate and proportion the Shares of all persons who 
shall be entitled to work in the Salt Ponds and Pans…on the said Key’ and three 
were elected for Salt Key.16	Becoming a commissioner was not necessarily a 
voluntary affair. If elected, a commissioner who refused to serve could be 
excluded from the salt season that year. Regulation 27 stipulated, ‘If any 
Commissioners, after being elected as aforesaid, shall refuse to serve without 
giving good and sufficient Reasons for the Refusal, he shall not be entitled to any 
Share in the Ponds or Pans for that Season’.17 For ‘his Trouble and Service’, 
however, each commissioner was given ‘one full Share out of the Ponds and 
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Ponds at the Turks Islands, and for suspending an Act passed in the Eleventh Year of 
His Majesty’s Reign, initiated, an Act for imposing Fines and Penalties on Persons 
offending against the Regulations made or to be made for the Government of the Salt 




Pans’, which may have presented a conflict of interest because these 
commissioners had juridical powers.18 If there were complaints or regulatory 
breaches, the commissioners would hear and settle the case, handing out 
punishments and penalties if and when necessary. This conflict of interest did 
concern some salt gatherers and is an issue this chapter shall return to. 
 All salt gatherers had certain obligations to these commissioners, which 
varied across the different ponds that could be found on Turks Islands. In the 
private ponds, as noted, the salt gatherers had to present their company on or 
before the tenth of February in order to qualify for their shares. However, they 
were not allowed to leave the saltpans for any period of time during the 
subsequent season without first notifying a commissioner. Moreover, if a salt 
gatherer wished to sell, barter or exchange one or more of his shares, he would 
have to seek prior permission from the commissioners. Failure to comply with 
these regulations meant fiscal penalties or total exclusion. In the event that shares 
were forfeited, control of them reverted back to the commissioners, and ‘all 
forfeited and deserted Shares of the Ponds and Pans shall be raked for the general 
benefit and Advantage’.19 In addition to the private ponds, the salt gatherers also 
needed to fulfil obligations in the general ponds. At the beginning of each salt 
season, commissioners would request a number of hands from each company to 
work the communal pond, ‘and every Person neglecting or refusing to send the 
number of Hands required, shall be fined’.20 Overall, these regulations reveal a 
desire to ensure the private and general ponds were as productive as possible: salt 
gatherers had to use them efficiently to maintain their shares. 
While it is apparent that there were at least two types of ponds at Turks 
Islands, another regulation hints at a third type of pond called the 
‘unappropriated’ pond. This regulation stipulated that,  
All Persons who shall arrive at Turks Islands, after the general laying out 
of the Pans and Ponds, shall be entitled to work in the unappropriated 
Parts of the Ponds, under the Direction of His Majesty’s Commander, and 







shall be allotted to them, shall be allowed to enjoy the sole Benefit of 
such Pans for that Year.21 
These ponds were the unclean and uncultivated ponds, and this regulation 
reflects how these rules were formulated to encourage industrious habits and 
efficient salt extraction. If a salt gatherer could, through his private efforts, make 
an unappropriated pond productive, then he was allowed to enjoy its benefits for 
that season. However, this right was only for one season. In subsequent years, 
this newly cultivated pan would become part of the share system. All these pond 
types – private, general and uncultivated – were thus heavily controlled and 
supervised by the commissioners, who sought maximum productivity.  
 This regulatory system was a necessary step towards effectively 
managing the ponds as a shared resource system. On a traditional English 
commons, the decision to hold strips in private during crop season and throw 
them open to common afterwards meant ‘necessarily that some rules about 
cropping are observed so that spring and winter-sown crops may be grown in 
separate fields or furlongs’.22 This ‘ordering’ of agricultural activities was 
‘regulated by an assembly of cultivators – the manorial court…or…a village 
meeting’.23 As Neeson has argued, ‘peasant agriculture required cooperation and 
the protection of common interests’.24 To do so, commoners ‘elected officers to 
enforce by-laws, and employed pinders and haywards to summarily fine 
offenders or to bring them to court’.25 Trespassing was punished, as were actions 
that would ‘damnify his Neighbour thereby’ such as bringing ‘waggons, carts or 
any other implements on to any balk’.26 These forms of collective management 
were reproduced under the Head Rights System. Like a commons, the salt ponds 
had a regulatory body in the form of the King’s Agent and his commissioners, 
who were elected by the salt gatherers each year to preside over the following 
salt season. Their role was to supervise the fair division and regulation of the 
ponds. As in Neeson’s Warwickshire commons, specific regulations were 
enacted to prevent self-interested activities that would harm the public or another 
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23 Ibid. 
24 Neeson, Commoners, p. 319. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, p. 320. 
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salt gatherer’s pans. For example, Regulation 11 stipulated that ‘No white person 
shall, on any pretence whatsoever, wilfully move, or cause to be moved, any Salt 
Marks, on pain of total Exclusion from any Share’, while Regulation 23 punished 
‘any Person’ who ‘shall throw pickle, wheelbarrows, or walk through any Pans 
the property of another, so as thereby to damage the same’.27 As James Acheson 
has argued, shared resource systems can work, despite increasing population 
pressures and scarcity, when there are effective cooperative practices in place.28  
 
The salt gatherers’ response  
 
While the 1774 regulations helped to maintain the saltpan system, they were not 
unanimously accepted. There was resistance to certain measures and a major 
source of opposition came from the Bermuda Government and some of its salt 
gatherers. The 1774 Bahamian Act contained within it a suspending clause, 
which required Royal Assent. Upon consultation, London ministers decided to 
converse with the Bermudian legislature, whose subjects it understood were 
predominantly concerned with the Turks Island trade. In response, the Governor, 
Council and Assembly of Bermuda sent a Memorial to the Board of Trade in 
London expressing great anxiety.29 In particular, they warned ‘that no 
Regulations should be countenanced which may have the effect to restrain any of 
His Majesty’s Bermuda Subjects in the prosecution of those Branches of 
Commerce, which are in their nature and by usage free and unrestrained’.30	The 
regulation that stipulated the salt gatherers must be present with their companies 
on or before the tenth of February was viewed as ‘particularly oppressive’.31 The 
Memorial clarified these concerns: 
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They [the inhabitants of Bermuda] remain at Turks Islands ‘till 
November in order to dispose of their Salt, and therefore have scarcely 
enough time to return to their Families and attend to their necessary 
Business there and be in Time at Turks Islands to prevent an exclusion 
from the benefit of the Season. [A]s the Salt seldom makes at Turks 
Islands ‘till the Month of April, such early attendance is quite 
unnecessary.32		 
For other inhabitants, the regulations lacked legitimacy because the 
Bahamas Governor compelled the salt gatherers to sign them. Such was the 
belief of a plaintiff in an illuminating court case in 1773, which illustrated the 
potential for conflicts of interest to obstruct justice. This court case involved 
plaintiff Paul Bascome and defendant Samuel Tatem and took place at the King’s 
Bench in Bermuda.33 It referred to an incident at Turks Islands on 1 March 1772 
whereby Bascome accused Tatem of having forcibly broken into his close ‘and at 
diverse other days and times…dug up, raked, gathered, carried away and 
detained 20,000 bushels salt, valued at £500 Bermuda currency’.34 Bascome 
stated that as every British subject had a right to rake salt at Turks Islands 
‘without any trouble, hindrance, molestation or disturbance of any person’, 
Tatem was guilty of trespass.35	However, Tatem, who was a commissioner, 
defended his actions as being guided by legal authority. The regulations stated 
that any person who wished to gather salt at Turks Islands had to be present 
before the commissioners by the tenth of February and they had to remain at 
their respective key for the duration of the season. As Bascome had sailed to 
Hispaniola prior to the tenth of February and had been absent from Grand Turk 
for ten days, Tatem believed Bascome had breached these regulations. As a 
result, he should forfeit his shares for that season.  
Although the records are incomplete, it seems the court ruled in favour of 
Bascome. He was able to demonstrate that he was the victim of a vindictive 
commissioner who had used the regulations to his personal advantage. While 
according to the letter of the law Bascome may have been liable to forfeit his 
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private shares, he should not have been excluded from the unappropriated ponds, 
which were open to British subjects at all times.36	Yet as Bascome’s witness 
testimonies made clear, he was not only denied his private shares but also access 
to the unappropriated ponds. Such an act was ‘illegal’ for it had no basis in the 
regulations.37  
But Bascome went further, denying the overall efficacy of the regulations 
in the first place. Having produced letters from the Secretary of State, Bascome 
understood the regulations were only intended to be ‘such as shall be necessary 
for the benefit and advantage of the trade in general and for improving the staple 
so essential to the Fisheries of this Kingdom’.38	He questioned whether anyone 
would believe his exclusion from salt gathering in 1772 fulfilled these conditions 
and consequently whether the regulations answered the purpose. Furthermore, it 
was understood that the commissioners would settle any complaints. Bascome’s 
lawyer lamented how this was ‘an insult to Common Sense. To empower a 
person aggrieved to complain to the persons who have injured him’.39 For 
Bascome, the commissioners were ‘complete despots’, supported by a system 
that lacked legitimacy because the regulations were ‘signed by compulsion’.40	
Given that Bermudian seafarers depended on the salt trade for their livelihood, 
‘persons in such a situation might have been made to sign anything…they would 
have signed a Carte Blanche’.41	 
Clearly, not all the salt gatherers supported these regulations and it would 
be a mistake to interpret them uncritically. However, they remained in force until 
the expiry of the Act in 1779. At that point, Symmer decided to travel to London 
with a proposal for the better defence of the islands and a revised set of 
regulations. In London, Symmer wrote to the Secretary of State and his 
recommendations were referred to the Board of Trade in December 1780. After a 
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prompting in January, the Board of Trade reviewed the proposals and summoned 
Symmer, who was ‘questioned by their Lordships as to such particulars as they 
thought fit’.42 Following further deliberation, it was agreed that while the 
defence of the islands fell within other departments, the matter of salt pond 
regulations was within their remit. Symmer’s regulations were considered, 
adjusted and redrafted. They became Royal Regulations, requiring endorsement 
from the King and a draft was prepared and sent to His Majesty. In its covering 
letter, the Board of Trade highlighted the need to ‘maturely’ consider regulations 
that would not only answer their ‘proposed End’ but also ‘the local 
Circumstances of the Community’.43	At the Court of St James on 29 June 1781, 
the Royal Regulations were read, approved and signed by His Majesty and Privy 
Council ‘for the good Government of the Salt Ponds at the said Islands, and 
those that resort there to make Salt’.44 The King immediately ordered his 
Secretary of State to give the necessary instructions for their execution and to 
inform the King’s Agent to duly publish them in Turks Islands.45	 
The content of the Royal Regulations was a simplification of the 
regulations of 1774.46 Whereas there had been twenty-seven regulations in 1774, 
by 1781 these had been reduced to fifteen either by omitting certain regulations 
or combining two together. In truth, there were only two new regulations: one 
which referred to slavery (and shall be discussed in Chapter 6) while the other 
stipulated that ‘no person on any account shall be allowed to erect any Building 
or Inclosure whatever, on what is deemed Public Ground’, suggesting a greater 
proliferation of homes, warehouses and wharfs by 1781.47	Otherwise, the most 
important regulations that delineated the Head Rights System remained 
unchanged and intact, while the more fastidious were dropped.  
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Since the King and not the Bahamas Government had authorised the 
Royal Regulations, evidence suggests these were widely accepted and highly 
regarded. In subsequent years, Bermudian salt gatherers would regularly invoke 
them in their defence. Overall, the Royal Regulations were praised for being 
sensitive to local conditions, applauded for protecting the rights of British 
subjects, and revered for coming from the highest source of authority in Britain. 
Indeed, the efficacy of the Royal Regulations was demonstrated by the fact they 
remained in force until 1845. In so doing, they solidified a system that 
distinguished the island’s economy from amongst its peers in the British 
Caribbean.  
 
A counterpoint to the sugar plantation model 
 
The Head Rights System was a significant departure from the plantation model. 
Many historians have shown that following the sugar revolution in Barbados, and 
later Jamaica, the sugar islands of the Caribbean gravitated fast toward the 
engrossment of large estates into private hands. While initial settlement may 
have involved more diverse economic activities and yeoman white farmers, 
early-eighteenth-century agriculture was increasingly a monoculture with large 
estates pushing small farmers off most of the valuable fertile lands. In Jamaica, 
the Crown initially reserved the land but that policy was abandoned in 1678.48 A 
map of 1685 already showed 246 sugar plantations.49 As Richard Sheridan has 
stated, after the sugar boom, ‘a class of large planters came into possession of the 
lion’s share of the fixed and moveable wealth…[whereas]…a much larger group 
of small farmers and indentured servants were made redundant’.50 Wealthy 
planters, such as Simon Taylor, were allowed to flourish in this environment.51 
At the time of his passing, Taylor owned six sugar estates and three cattle 
ranches or pens in Jamaica.52 
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Whereas planter capitalists owned land in a legal sense and could plough 
money back into their estates, the same was not true for the salt ponds of Turks 
Islands. There, salt gatherers relied on the longevity of a system that promised 
them a right to annual shares, but did not offer them the security of 
proprietorship. In these salt islands, land was not freehold. The shares themselves 
also had distinctive characteristics. Whereas a plantation could be sold or 
sequestered in a will, shares legally could not be passed down families and they 
could not be sold without the commissioners’ permission. Even if permission 
was granted, this agreement lasted only for the duration of one salt season. At the 
end of the season, ownership of the salt ponds reverted back to the Crown. 
Custom would, presumably, have ensured that salt gatherers tended to be granted 
more or less the same ponds they worked each year but this was not guaranteed 
within the regulations. In a marked departure from the sugar economy, the salt 
economy was not based on a right to property. It was based on a right to take part 
in an industry. In that sense, the Head Rights System, as a shared resource 
system, was surprisingly reminiscent of an English commons.  
Moreover, though sugar plantations were, or could be, sold to the highest 
bidder, Turks Islands’ regulations ensured a salt gatherer could not use capital to 
buy a way into the ponds. More important than flaunting money was an ability to 
demonstrate that he could effectively manage and maximise his pans’ output. As 
a result, shares were distributed according to the number of labourers within 
companies – according to the number of ‘heads’. The more servants and enslaved 
persons a salt gatherer had to work the ponds, the greater his portion of the 
ponds. While arguably this could be linked to capital as wealthier individuals 
could afford more hands and acquire more shares, it does make for a significant 
legal departure. In the sugar islands, the acquisition of land involved the transfer 
of capital from one owner to another. If a planter bought a plantation for 
£10,000, he was £10,000 worse off (although he now had a plantation). 
However, in Turks Islands, a salt gatherer did not buy his shares for he had a free 
right to them and it was the size of his entourage, and not his pocket, that 
governed how many shares he got.  
Finally, the salt economy of Turks Islands was a highly supervised form 
of activity. The King’s Agent and his commissioners were empowered to ensure 
the salt gatherers utilised the ponds to their maximum benefit. Consequently, 
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those salt gatherers who did not look after their ponds or fulfil their obligations 
would have to pay fiscal penalties or risk total exclusion. The Head Rights 
System was designed to ensure fairness and order but, importantly, it was geared 
towards productivity as a collective responsibility. This was a departure from the 
sugar economies where notions of private property allowed owners to effectively 
do as they pleased within the walls of their plantations. As Sidney Mintz has 
explained, ‘plantation regions tended to consist of uninterrupted series of manor-
like (but capitalistic) estates’.53 However, on Turks Islands, the supervisory 
antennae of the Royal Regulations reached within an individual’s saltpans, and 
the acquisition of rights required significant obligations in return. A salt gatherer 
could not do as he pleased. He had to prove he was worth his salt – or he was 
out.  
Consequently, whereas a sugar planter had ownership rights of access, 
withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation, the salt gatherer’s bundle of 
property rights was more complicated.54 He had the right to access the ponds (if 
he was present before the tenth of February) and he had the right to withdraw salt 
from the ponds (once the King’s Agent gave the signal to start salt harvesting). 
However, the King’s Agent and his commissioners oversaw the general 
management of the ponds; they had the right to exclude participants from the 
ponds; and they had the last say when bartering, selling or exchanging pond 
shares. Understood from this perspective, the salt gatherer’s rights were more 
limited and the reason was clear: he partook in a shared resource system of 
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A creole commons 
 
During this period, one might have expected a drift towards privatisation 
throughout the British Atlantic world. Certainly, in Britain, this was the 
prevailing trend. From the fifteenth century to the early nineteenth century, the 
enclosure movement saw the fencing off of the English countryside as landlords 
progressively raised rents, annulled common-right practices and created vast 
numbers of dispossessed commoners.55 Those who pressed for enclosure – 
landlords, capitalist entrepreneurs and imperial rulers – urged it was in the 
national interest and critical to refashioning Britain’s economy towards 
international trade and commerce.56 By the eighteenth century, there was ‘an 
agreement that Britain’s power lay in her navy, her merchant marine, her 
manufacturers as well has her agriculture’.57 But there was widespread concern 
over labour supply shortages. Enclosure offered a solution. For Marcus Rediker 
and Peter Linebaugh, creating an Atlantic proletariat from the enclosure of the 
commons in England was the first and necessary step in the accumulation of 
capital and the transatlantic redeployment of labour.58 Imperial rulers wanted 
commoners to become the wage labourers of empire. Key theorists agreed, 
extolling the virtues of private property against what they increasingly perceived 
as the backwardness, primitiveness, and even barbaric nature of ‘commoning’. 
As Allan Greer has pointed out, ‘a pro-colonist, pro-enclosure variant can be 
traced from [John] Locke and his predecessors through the Scottish 
Enlightenment, where the idea took root that private property was the very 
hallmark of civilisation’.59 As a new vision of Britain’s place in the Atlantic took 
shape, its countryside was progressively enclosed and its commoners turned into 
a wandering proletariat. 
 When faced with colonisation, then, several historians have been 
‘tempted to think in terms of a great “enclosure movement” that took shape first 
in England and Western Europe and then extended overseas to the New World, 
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bringing survey lines, fences and legal rules fostering exclusive access and 
transferability’.60 Indeed, Rediker and Linebaugh have remarked, ‘when the 
English took possession of land overseas, they did so by building fences and 
hedges, the markers of enclosure and private property’.61 Similarly, E P 
Thompson has argued for ‘a connection between enclosure within England and 
the imposition of private property across the overseas British Empire…pointing 
to a long-term global movement to privatise the commons that emanated outward 
from the British Isles’.62 As this chapter has argued, a private property regime 
was rapidly evident in the sugar islands of the British Caribbean.  
 However, this grand, if not teleological, narrative needs some 
refashioning. Colonisation did equate to enclosure in many places, but as Rediker 
and Linebaugh have also pointed out, the dispossessed commoners of England 
did not suddenly disappear.63 Their memories of an alternative way of life were 
not immediately forgotten.64 Rather, they became the new proletariat of the 
Atlantic. They dispersed as sailors, settlers and indentured servants on board 
Royal Navy and merchant ships and across the Atlantic littoral in newly settled 
colonial societies. Linebaugh and Rediker pose the tantalising question: if given 
the opportunity, what sort of society and economy would they choose to 
develop?65 Would they tend toward private property regimes as in England, or 
would the ‘many-headed hydra’ raise itself on a commons somewhere along the 
margins of empire? 
There are examples to suggest a transfer of ‘the commons’ could and did 
take place. Barbuda, for instance, was one large cattle pen: the vast majority of 
its lands were open to common pasture.66 Inhabitants lived in the only village on 
the island, Codrington, and supported themselves through a combination of 
subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Their livestock roamed freely on the 
common pasture and was sold to the neighbouring island of Antigua for use on 
its plantations. These commons were a true commons – there was no fencing or 
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variations in access across time and space. However, it is also the case that the 
whole island, as a single entity, was leased to the Codrington family. It 
functioned overall as one large private estate. 
Several of North America’s first settlement towns offer historians more 
typical examples of common property regimes that were valued because of their 
ability to pool risk within an otherwise uncertain contact zone.67 Robert 
Ellickson, a knowledgeable figure on property rights, found that Jamestown, 
Plymouth and Salt Lake City all initially had common property regimes in which 
inhabitants worked collectively and were given an equal share in the settlements’ 
produce.68 As Stuart Banner has reflected, 
In Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, Illinois and Missouri…English 
and French settlers replicated the property regimes they remembered 
from Europe, in which a significant portion of the local productive land 
was understood as an asset belonging first to the community, and 
secondarily to the individual.69 
While these common property regimes may not have lasted long – and most did 
not – their early existence suggests that many European colonists were keen to 
transplant familiar types of agricultural systems, at least at first.70 As has been 
demonstrated, the Head Rights System at Turks Islands did share many elements 
of a traditional English commons, suggesting an early Atlantic transfer may have 
taken place. 
 However, the balance of evidence indicates the Head Rights System may 
have owed more of its final form to local evolution. There were aspects of the 
Head Rights System that were distinctive, adaptive, if not creole in character. To 
demonstrate this, the chapter will analyse three variables that influenced the 
Turks Island salt economy. These were: the evolution and transfer of Bermudian 
land tenure regimes; the specific endorsement and protection of the Head Rights 
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System by officials in London; and the nature and status of salt production in the 
eighteenth-century Atlantic world. 
 
An intra-colonial transfer 
 
In his study of property regimes, Ellickson has argued that private property 
regimes do not have to be unequal property regimes.71 Three years after Bermuda 
was first settled, the Somers Island Company ordered a survey of the entire 
island.72 In its wake, Bermuda was divided into eight tribes containing roughly 
1,250 acres each. These tribes were then split into shares of twenty-five acres 
each. Each newly settled inhabitant of Bermuda was allowed up to ten shares, or 
250 acres, for which they paid quit-rents. While the tribes were named after 
‘eight of the chiefest persons and deepest adventurers’ of the colony, these 
original owners were not allowed more shares than the average proprietor.73 If a 
landowner did obtain more than his fair share of 250 acres through marriage or 
inheritance, he was obliged to ‘divest himself of the excess acreage within a 
limited time’.74 As a result, land ownership was restricted in Bermuda from the 
beginning. 
Such a land scheme did not encourage the acquisition of large individual 
wealth. According to Virginia Bernhard, by the end of the seventeenth century, 
‘the richest planters and merchants had holdings of only a few hundred acres and 
fortunes of no more than 100 pounds’.75 In comparison, when tobacco planter 
Robert Beverley died in Virginia in 1687, ‘he left a fortune of 50,000 acres and 
5000 pounds’.76 In Bermuda, the limited size of the islands put pressure on the 
resources available and forced inhabitants to carefully manage their assets (see 
Chapter 3). Consequently, ‘life in Bermuda was marked by limits: everything 
from profits to wages to the killing of young tortoises was closely regulated’.77 In 
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this situation, ‘there was little an individual could do to enrich himself at the 
expense of his neighbours or his servants’.78 Instead, land and wealth was shared.  
Consequently, Bermudians approached Turks Islands with a heritage of 
dividing land proportionally amongst themselves. Given the features of the Head 
Rights System, it is not inconceivable that Bermudians were informed by their 
own tenure practices as they developed their salt raking activities. Though not 
private property, Turks Islands’ ponds were divided into equal shares amongst its 
salt gatherers. However, pinpointing customary practices before the formal 
regulation of the Head Rights System is difficult. The earliest record the author 
has found of Bermuda’s salt-raking activities in Turks Islands dates from 1699 
and refers to a petition written by several masters of sloops whose vessels had 
been seized by the Bahamas Government. Of Turks Islands, they wrote, ‘we 
humbly conceive that it is the King’s Island, and does not belong to the Lord 
Proprietors of Providence, the Burmudians having had a constant trade without 
any molestation or trouble for Forty Yeares last past’.79 While it is hard to draw 
firm conclusions, by calling Turks Islands the ‘King’s Island’ the petitioners 
suggest they understood Turks Islands as a commons held by the King in which 
their trade there was customarily free. Certainly, they were not private property. 
This suggests that, prior to the regulations of 1767, the salt trade at Turks 
Islands may have been like the salt trade at Cape Verde.80 There, the process of 
harvesting solar-evaporated salt was fairly straightforward. Ships would arrive at 
Cape Verde in December, knowing the salt season could last until July. Once 
they came upon the western side of Mayo, they would anchor within 200 yards 
of the shore. This shore consisted of a sand bank, behind which were extensive 
salt marshes, divided into hundreds of saltpans with channels and sluices, filled 
with ‘a strong brine…to the depth of about eight inches’.81 Those sailors who 
first arrived would clean out their chosen pits from mud and impurities, before 
other merchant and naval ships arrived to do the same. The sun and wind would 
then concentrate the brine until salt crystals began to fall out of the solution to 
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the bottom of the pan. Sailors would rake this salt ‘twice a week…into little 
heaps’ until it was ‘fit to be put on board their ships’.82 At that point, small boats 
were loaded with salt and it was transferred into the holds of vessels anchored 
offshore. Once the hold was full, the captain would declare it was time to move 
on. This entire process could take as little as two weeks, but in unfavourable 
conditions, it could take months. Any ships that arrived after all the pits were 
occupied, would have to wait until a proportion of the pits became free again. 
These records of eighteenth-century Cape Verde cannot be over-
extrapolated for Turks Islands but the available evidence indicates Bermudians 
also visited Turks Islands on an ad-hoc basis and could arrive whenever they 
wished. This changed after 1767. By the mid-eighteenth century, Turks Islands’ 
salt trade was more significant with a growing number of participants. The 
creation of the King’s Agent’s commission had placed the islands’ defence 
higher on the imperial agenda, lowering the associated risks of foreign attack and 
increasing the attractiveness of the trade. While settlement was encouraged, the 
expected increase in salt gatherers challenged the islands’ limited physical 
capacity and natural resources. In February 1767, Symmer wrote to the Secretary 
of State reckoning that ‘in four weeks’ time the number of Male Settlers here 
will increase to upwards of Five Hundred White Men’.83 Within this context, the 
ponds required a clear system of economic regulation. The salt gatherers, who 
were accustomed to Bermuda’s tenure systems, were consulted and a system 
implemented that divided the ponds equally. Knowledge of one system likely 
informed the next, resulting in a strong resemblance between the two.  
 
The endorsement of the British Government 
 
However, while the initial framing of the regulations may have drawn on 
Bermudian traditions and customary practices, the longevity of this shared 
resource system suggests additional factors were operative. Acheson has argued 
that land tenure systems are determined by a resource’s level of ‘economic 
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defendability’.84 A resource has economic defendability when the benefits of 
excluding others from its use outweigh the transaction costs of doing so. 
Transaction costs can include, for example, maintaining a fence around a field or 
paying for monitoring systems. Many variables can impact a resource’s 
economic defendability. One important factor Acheson identified was 
government or state intervention.85 In eighteenth-century England, the final 
enclosure of the commons was achieved through Parliamentary Acts, which were 
responsible for fencing in approximately 22 per cent of England’s land.86 
Between 1800 and 1814, Parliament passed almost a hundred Acts on 
enclosure.87 For Neeson, this ‘institutional and political intervention’ marked the 
real end of the peasantry in early-modern England.88 She stated, ‘It was no small 
event…No other attack on common right succeeded as well as enclosure. No 
other means could be found to raise rents as far or as fast’.89 In this case, the 
action of the British Government significantly reduced the transaction costs of 
fencing in the commons by providing proponents of enclosure with a firm piece 
of legislation to pursue their actions with.  
It follows that the British Government could significantly increase 
transaction costs if it supported the rights of commoners and the infrastructure of 
shared resource systems. Prior to parliamentary enclosure in England, this had 
been the case as ‘common right was defended at the centre of government in 
sermons, pamphlets, judgements and speeches for three hundred years’, 
frustrating landlords’ ability to fence off their lands.90 Parliamentary support 
would prove powerful for the shared resource system of Turks Islands. However, 
first it needed a good reason to become involved. 
 In the eighteenth-century Atlantic, salt had become a commodity of 
interest to many metropolitan actors. One of the era’s most significant natural 
philosophers was William Brownrigg. He was not a marginal figure in British 
society. His prolific research carried weight and he was awarded the prestigious 
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Royal Society’s Copley Medal in 1766, an accolade shared by such celebrated 
figures as Benjamin Franklin, James Cook and Charles Darwin. Earlier in 1748, 
Brownrigg produced a treatise on salt production, which highlighted the pressing 
need to improve methods of salt production for the benefit of the British 
Empire.91 The Art of Making Common Salt emphasised how Britain relied too 
heavily upon foreign powers, particularly the Dutch, for salt, while the quality 
and quantity of its own production lagged behind.92 By the 1750s, salt was not 
only valued as a condiment for the table or as a preservative for domestic 
consumption. It had become a vital, irreplaceable means to preserve animal 
proteins during long oceanic voyages.  
With the advent of Atlantic empires, Britain’s economic prowess became 
tied to commerce and the strength of her navy and merchant marine. As Rediker 
and Linebaugh point out, in 1649 officials realised they had only fifty naval ships 
‘to defend their republic’ with.93 This precarious situation prompted them to 
‘take immediate steps to extend their commercial and military power at sea’.94 
Parliament passed the Navigation Act in 1651 and the Articles of War in 1652. In 
the process the Royal Navy was transformed. By 1688, it had 173 ships and 
42,000 sailors.95 By the 1690s, ‘the Royal Navy had become England’s greatest 
employer of labour, its greatest consumer of material and its greatest industrial 
enterprise’.96 These trends persisted in the following century. Feeding thousands 
of hungry sailors on long transoceanic voyages suddenly became a colossal task. 
At the same time, the growing enslaved populations of the Caribbean were 
increasingly reliant on external sources of food as land for planting provisions 
gave way to sugar cultivation. In this context, salt was progressively of more 
importance to the health of sailors and enslaved persons alike.97 Salted cod, beef 
and pork were in high demand and the Admiralty, Merchant Navy and British 
																																																								
91 Brownrigg, The Art of Making Common Salt. 
92 Ibid, p. ix. 
93 Rediker and Linebaugh, The Many-Headed Hydra, p. 145. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid, p. 146. 
96 Ibid, p. 148. 
97 For a comparison of the need for salted goods within the French Atlantic world, see 
Bertie Mandelblatt, ‘A Transatlantic Commodity: Irish Salt Beef in the French Atlantic 
World’, History Workshop Journal, Vol. 63 (Spring, 2007), pp. 22-24. 
 
	 140 
Government were all deeply concerned with the production and acquisition of 
the vital preserving ingredient.  
Consequently, many physicians and natural philosophers were 
encouraged to search for an improved method for producing a curing salt. In his 
preface, Brownrigg fore-fronted this support stating ‘that august body of the 
Commons of Great Britain, having taken into consideration the great importance 
of this art [of making salt], judged some improvements proposed therein worthy 
of its regard and encouragement’.98 Another contemporary whose research 
received parliamentary support was Thomas Lowndes. In 1746, he sent his 
proposal to the Secretary of the Admiralty stating ‘my encouragement for this 
undertaking comes from the House of Commons’.99 The Admiralty’s pressing 
need for salt was clear. Having received Lowndes’ proposal, it contacted the 
College of Physicians requesting their expert opinion, emphasising that ‘their 
Lordships’ were ‘desirous of encouraging any reasonable Scheme, that may tend 
to the preservation of the health of the seamen on board his Majesty’s ships’.100 
Many important metropolitan bodies were keen to obtain this white gold.  
 Given such interest, Symmer recognised the potential of Turks Island salt 
for providing both the quantity and quality needed for curing the fish of the 
empire’s northern cod fisheries. He and subsequent King’s Agents wrote on 
many occasions to the Secretary of State expressing the benefit of Turks Island 
salt for this purpose. In 1766, he called Turks Islands, ‘a Valuable mine for our 
Fisheries in North America’ where ‘the Salt has answered so well, both in curing 
Fish and Meat’.101 Two years later, he reaffirmed, ‘Turks Islands are of more real 
consequence to North America on Account of the Fishery and Salt Provisions, 
than all other West India Islands belonging to the Crown’.102 Bermudians also 
recognised this advantage. The Colonial Agent for the islands wrote to the 
King’s Council, the Treasury and the Admiralty stating, ‘the Bermudians…have 
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for near a Century been chiefly supported by gathering Salt at Turks Islands’ and 
‘by their Commerce in that Article they have rendered very great Advantages to 
your Majesty’s Fisheries in the Northern Colonies’.103  
 The necessity for ‘improving the staple of a commodity, so essential to 
the fisheries of this Kingdom’ ensured London officials took a disproportionate 
interest in the affairs of the salt gatherers.104 From 1766, the Secretary of State 
and Commissioners of Trade and Plantations continuously sought to encourage 
the trade without obstructing its access. Among London officials, it was 
understood that the Bermudian salt gatherers were migratory inhabitants who 
provided most of Turks Islands’ labour force during the salt season. As such, 
they instructed legislators to respect these migrations in order to protect the trade. 
For example, the Secretary of State castigated Symmer’s early attempt to restrict 
access. He wrote to Governor Shirley in 1768, ‘I have reason to believe…that 
His Majesty’s subjects of the Bermuda Islands, have been obstructed and 
restrained in the liberty that they have long enjoyed, of collecting Salt from the 
Ponds in Turk’s Islands’.105 Lord Hillsborough went on to instruct the Governor 
to personally look into these matters and ‘not countenance any regulations which 
may have the effect to restrain any of His Majesty’s subjects in the prosecution 
of those branches of commerce, which are in their nature, and by useage, free 
and unrestrained’.106 This was an official intervention that could not be ignored. 
Consequently, the 1774 regulations dropped any restrictions on the industry’s 
access.  
However, London’s protection of the salt trade went further with the 
introduction of the Royal Regulations. These were agreed at the highest circles of 
governance, signifying these islands were of prodigious concern. The Royal 
Regulations provided Bermudian salt gatherers with an unprecedented level of 
protection. In subsequent years, whenever the salt gatherers felt threatened, these 
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regulations were consistently invoked in their defence. Two examples prove 
illustrative. In a copy of an Address from the Inhabitants of Bermuda at Turks 
Islands to the Bahamas Governor in 1789, the authors wrote,  
We beg leave with all due deference to suggest to your Lordship 
that…the Royal Regulations framed at the Court of St James in the year 
1781 for the equal Distribution and allotment of the Salt Ponds on these 
islands…were not only then Considered but have since by Annual 
Experience been found in a large degree productive.107  
Second, in the Address of the Body of Salt Gatherers to King’s Agent Alexander 
Murray in 1790, the petitioners wrote,  
The Royal Regulations framed at the Court of St James’s in June 1781 
for the good government of the Bermudians and those resorting here to 
make salt, [have] been found in ample degree productive of every 
advantage which our most Gracious Sovereign in his paternal solicitude 
for us was led to expect.108  
Though petitions and memorials have a political agenda and need to be treated 
with a healthy scepticism, the consistent invocation of the Royal Regulations 
confirm the salt gatherers had, at least publicly, accepted their implementation. 
The Crown’s endorsement of the Head Rights System provided a very effective 
support to its continuation. After 1781, the nature of its shares and mixed tenure 
system could not be easily revoked. Any manoeuvre to privatise the ponds would 
need Royal approval. Effectively, the question of economic defendability had 
become redundant. The transaction costs to enclose the ponds were 
insurmountable so long as the salt gatherers had His Majesty’s protection. This 
protection was offered because salt had become an essential product to the 
fisheries and functioning of the British Atlantic world. 
 This unfurling imperial support offers a caveat to the persuasive narrative 
offered in Rediker and Linebaugh’s The Many-Headed Hydra.109 In it, they shine 
a light on the strenuous ‘herculean’ efforts of the British Government to clamp 
down on its unruly Atlantic proletariat whenever it reared its ugly ‘hydra-like’ 
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head or tried to create alternative, unsanctioned ways of life.110 The chapter on 
‘Hydrarchy’, in particular, focuses on the relationship between sailors and the 
navy and merchant marine.111 It frames this relationship as a battle between a 
maritime state operating from above, which sought to expropriate maximum 
labour and terrorise its subjects into submission, and a self-organising society of 
sailors building from below, which found its apogee in the more cooperative, 
democratic, and egalitarian practices of the pirate ship. Over time pirates so 
threatened the order and trade of the maritime state that the British Government 
felt compelled to brutally suppress them in the early eighteenth century. In this 
chapter and throughout the book, a narrative thus emerges that pitches a 
terroristic, domineering and capitalistic imperial state on the one hand against a 
democratic, cooperative, and resistant proletariat on the other – a battle whose 
origins began with enclosure in England. While this narrative is persuasive for 
Rediker and Linebaugh’s subjects of study, it does not seem to capture the 
dynamics of power operating within Turks Islands. 
Like Rediker and Linebaugh’s hydra, those who gathered salt at Turks 
Islands were engaged in a fairly egalitarian, democratic, and collectivistic 
enterprise. Neither rich nor poor, they were merchants of a middling sort. But, 
unlike Rediker and Linebaugh’s hydra, they were not pitched against an imperial 
state that sought to annihilate their common rights. On the contrary, they were 
supported by this imperial state, which endorsed and helped frame their shared 
resource system for its own particular reasons. The Bermudian salt gatherer 
therefore does not fit into Rediker and Linebaugh’s revolutionary Atlantic: 
neither a Hydra nor a Hercules, the salt gatherer was someone in-between, 
operating in a space the imperial state had helped carve out for him. In an era 
predominantly characterised by top-down privatisation this is important to note. 
The salt gatherers’ way of life was not a mere leftover or a hangover of archaic 
tradition. Nor was it deemed especially subversive or dangerous by the imperial 
state. Rather, it was actively maintained and protected from the salt gatherer to 




110 Ibid, pp. 1-7. 
111 Ibid, pp. 143-173. 
 
	 144 
The nature of bay-salt production 
 
Finally, there were properties specific to salt that impacted how its economy 
could be organised. In the scientific debates of eighteenth-century Britain, two 
main types of production were hotly debated: brine- or boiled salt, as favoured 
by Lowndes, and bay-salt, as favoured by Brownrigg. Lowndes championed a 
salt that could be produced by boiling down brine through a staged process, 
using different additives, until the solution became so saturated salt crystals 
formed.112	It was a method of production based on a process that had been used 
in Britain for hundreds of years, in a more basic and simple form. Brine – salted 
water – was historically sourced either from seawater or extracted from natural 
springs.113 In brine-salt production, artificial or manmade fires provided the 
necessary heat to encourage the evaporation of water from large iron pans filled 
with concentrated brine. The process took place in purpose-built ‘boiling’ 
houses, where furnaces, fed by coals and wood, were connected to a series of 
iron pans with a wall normally erected between the furnace and the pans to 
prevent smoke and ash dirtying the salt. Overall, brine-salt production was a tried 
and tested method that was conducive to the gloomier climate of Britain where 
rain and winter temperatures limited other forms of production.  
Lowndes’ research made alterations and added stages to this established 
model. First, he backed a more complex process of boiling where the brine was 
repeatedly heated, cooled and re-heated, at different times, to different 
temperatures, to theoretically encourage the creation of strong large crystals. 
Second, he believed certain additives would help separate unwanted particles 
from the salt as the brine boiled. Egg whites, ale, fresh butter, and even blood 
were all introduced in the preparation of Lowndes’ brine-salt. The result was a 
more extensive and expensive method.  
 Lowndes’ research did carry some weight. It had, after all, received 
encouragement from Parliament, the Admiralty and the College of Physicians 
with permissions to extend further trials.114	However, Brownrigg was sceptical. 
He suggested that while Lowndes’ methods offered improvements, his ‘method 
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of making salt for curing provisions doth not appear to be the best that may be 
put in practice’.115	Brownrigg strongly believed that bay-salt was the most 
suitable for curing sea provisions. This type referred to any salt that was formed 
from the natural evaporation of water by the sun. Here, the sun, and not artificial 
fire, provided the necessary heat. As the sun encouraged the evaporation of 
seawater or brine, the liquid left behind became increasingly concentrated until, 
when fully saturated, salt crystals began to fall out of the solution. If all the water 
evaporated, a thick salt crust was all that was left behind. Brine-salt and bay-salt 
were therefore two distinctive options in Britain’s eighteenth-century 
marketplace. Brownrigg argued more energy should be spent investigating the 
latter, which could produce a better curing salt at a lower cost. It was a belief 
shared by many of his contemporaries. Even Lowndes conceded that French bay-
salt produced near La Rochelle was ‘by all Merchants, Victuallers and 
Fishermen…universally looked upon to be the best Salt in Europe’.116	 
 Brownrigg specified two types of bay-salt production: that which was 
‘drawn from the sea water; as is practised in France, Spain, Portugal and many 
other countries’ and that which is ‘extracted from salt springs, ponds and lakes; 
as at the Cape de Verd islands, in Africa; and at Salt-Tortuga, Turks Island, and 
many other parts of America’.117 While the former was imported into Great 
Britain, ‘our American colonies, and fisheries, in times of peace, are chiefly 
supplied with the latter’.118 By the eve of the American Revolution, Turks 
Islands were producing a substantial amount of North America’s salt supply, not 
least because its salt was widely purported to produce a curing salt that surpassed 
any in Europe. Time and again, its quality was emphasised. In 1766, Symmer 
wrote to the Secretary of State, ‘the great Quantity of Salt made on Turks 
Islands, and its Superior Quality, to any used for curing Fish, induces numbers of 
People to go yearly from North America and Bermudas, during the Salt Season, 
for the sole purpose of making that article’.119 In 1767, he wrote again, ‘The Salt 
on these islands is deemed equal if not superior to any in the World for curing 
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Fish and Salting meat, the Quantity made is considerable’.120 This superiority 
owed much to the properties that solar-evaporated salt embodied. 
Brownrigg reflected, ‘it appears that various kinds of salt are used for 
curing provisions, but the salt which may in general be esteemed for that 
purpose, as preserving animal food most effectually, and for the longest time, is 
that which is strongest and purest’.121 He clarified,  
It is usually concreted into large grains or crystals, which are firm and 
hard, and in respect to those of other kinds of common salt, the most solid 
and ponderous; it is not disposed to grow soft or moist in a moderately 
dry air, to which it must have been exposed a considerable time; its 
colour is white, and somewhat diaphanous; it hath no smell; its taste is 
truly muriatic, and more sharpe and pungent than that of other kinds of 
common salt; being dissolved in pure water it casts up no scum, and 
deposits no sediment.122 
Brownrigg had good reasons for highlighting these characteristics. Salt for sea 
provisions had to be able to withstand long oceanic voyages and destinations to 
the tropics without corruption. When large-grained, the surface area of salt was 
reduced, decreasing the chances of air penetrating the preserved meats and flesh, 
the main cause of putrefaction. Similarly, if salt was hard it was unlikely to break 
up and increase its surface area. Salt that was liable to moisture would dissolve, 
allowing air once again into the food. While taste and aesthetic appearance were 
of some consideration, much more important to the Admiralty and Merchant 
Navy was a positive affirmation of the following three characteristics: Was the 
salt of large grain? Did it have firm, hard crystals? Was it resistant to moisture? 
For Brownrigg, ‘the salt which approach nighest to this degree of perfection are 
the best kinds of bay-salt’.123	This was because salt produced by the gradual 
exhalation of water through the heat of the sun created larger crystals and tended 
to be stronger and less prone to corruption than salt extracted through rapid 
boiling or mining. As late as 1897, salt merchants in Turks Islands were still 
advertising using these favoured criteria. D F & H F Harriott, a company 
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established in 1833, proclaimed themselves ‘Manufacturers & Shippers of 
Coarse & Fishery SALT. Clean and Pure, White and Dry’.124  
Turks Islands were in a good position for producing this archetypal 
curing salt. The islands were flat, allowing for the development of large saltpans, 
which a hilly or mountainous topography would otherwise inhibit. Moreover, the 
climate was warm with relatively low levels of rainfall due to its geographical 
position at the southernmost tip of the Lucayan archipelago. A constant, but not 
fierce, trade wind encouraged the gradual exhalation of water from the saltpans. 
However, the production of bay-salt also had ramifications for the islands’ 
economic organisation. First, there were risks in salt production at Turks Islands. 
Fear that rain would come and ‘melt’ the salt or weaken the brine ponds was 
always a factor of concern. Merchant correspondence from the early 1800s 
includes intermittent complaints about a sudden ‘check from above’. For 
example, in April 1807, Captain John Lightbourn reported, ‘We have gathered 
about 100 bushels salt per share, and about 6 days past received a Check from 
above which has put us back 4 weeks’125; and again, in April 1811, ‘I have had 
no chance of disposing of Salt. There is a great Check on Vending of the 
above’.126 These rainfall events, though not the norm, had severe consequences 
when they occurred. The islands were very small. Any event of rain near harvest 
time would likely destroy a significant portion of a salt crop. Holding a quantity 
of the ponds in common was good insurance policy. Should his crop fail, the salt 
gatherer at least maintained his right to a share in the profits of the general 
ponds.   
Second, salt could not be produced all year round. In bay-salt production, 
the onset of winter foreshortened the length of the harvest season. By November, 
weather conditions for raking salt at Turks Islands were no longer suitable. These 
dead months at the end of the year marked a hiatus in economic activity. This 
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seasonality, and the lack of alternative economic pursuits, shaped a pattern of 
migration that saw the majority of inhabitants leave Turks Islands from 
November until February. Maintaining the ponds as private property in these 
circumstances would have been difficult; to police, monitor and regulate the 
ponds when so few were present a costly and inefficient enterprise. 
Finally, on average, the salt gatherer who engaged in bay-salt production 
required less capital for his venture than the sugar planter embarking on building 
an estate. This had implications for land tenure. As Nuala Zahedieh argues, ‘a 
sugar plantation, with its combination of industrial and agricultural operations, 
required a very large-scale capital investment by seventeenth-century 
standards’.127 In the eighteenth century, Sheridan similarly reflects that ‘so large 
an outlay was required for Negro slaves, cattle, sugar works and utensils, that 
few planters were able to produce the staple that promised to yield the greatest 
comparative advantage’.128 On average, £5,000 was needed to raise a plantation 
of 1,000 acres.129 In Jamaica, the wealth in sugar estates, and the need to patent 
land, was reflected in a proliferation of surveyors ‘who by their indispensible 
skills…became a vital (and hitherto unrecognised) subclass of the Jamaican 
plantocracy’.130 Through their work, estate owners became ‘sugar barons’.131 The 
risk for capital in this industry was tangible. For every plantation that succeeded 
several faced bankruptcy. Such capital-intensive enterprises leant themselves to 
private property regimes. 
In comparison, the initial outlay and risk in bay-salt production was less. 
Unlike the sugar or brine-salt industry, there was no need for boiling houses or 
expensive utensils for the extraction of bay-salt. The sun and wind performed 
most of the work in crystallisation. When salt was ready for raking, simple 
wooden rakes were used to pile it into heaps, before it was moved by hand and 
transported to larger vessels anchored offshore. Like a sugar plantation, enslaved 
labour was the single largest cost, but the skills required were less exacting and 
the workforce could be moved. As a result, salt raking was comparatively more 
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accessible given its lower start-up costs but, by the same token, the profits to be 
made were not as lucrative. This combination of low risk and low reward is often 
a feature of shared resource systems and helps to explain why the Head Rights 
System suited Turks Islands: the transaction costs of enclosing the ponds and 
monitoring behaviour, especially in the winter dead months, simply exceeded the 
moderate benefits to be gained by the individual. It was more economical to 
place regulatory responsibility in the hands of commissioners, and support a 




The Head Rights System that prevailed at Turks Islands from the mid-eighteenth 
century was a creative, adaptive and innovative form of economic organisation 
within the Caribbean. It had salient features suggestive of an Atlantic transfer, 
but it was also a product of specific, local circumstances. While the practice of 
obtaining an equal share in the industry was likely informed by custom and 
Bermuda’s tradition of land tenure, it is also clear that by the mid-eighteenth 
century the Crown was intervening to protect this as a common right. Yet the 
economic regime adopted at Turks Islands could still have been different if 
weather conditions had permitted salt extraction all year round or if extraction 
had proved capital intensive. Such interlocking factors informed the development 
and maintenance of a system of mixed land tenure that as much reflected early-
modern European practices as it did the preferences of Bermudians, the 
seasonality of salt and London’s interest in the trade. Like a ‘creole commons’, 
the Head Rights System thus matured out of a blend of English, Bermudian and 
Turks Island influences, through acts of cooperation that extended between the 
salt gatherers, the King’s Agent and the King. In this, there was no obvious 
‘hydrarchy’, no obvious battle that pitched the imperial state against the common 
salt gatherer. Nor was it merely a struggling leftover, a ghost of an older 
tradition. Rather, the Head Rights System was actively constructed, protected 
and maintained because it was important to the salt gatherer and the maritime 
state alike. 
 As a shared resource system, this was a notable departure from the 
plantation model. The idea that productivity should be a collective responsibility, 
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that a salt gatherer could obtain free rights to access an industry if he met 
significant obligations in return, was antithetical to the economic principles of a 
freehold plantation. The salt gatherers and sugar planters were not singing from 
the same hymn sheet and the virtues of private property, so fundamental to the 
sugar industry, were shunned on the saltpan. As such, the Head Rights System is 
significant because it demonstrates that there was still space within the British 
Empire for different economic models and different ways of life to coexist and 
flourish – and for far longer than most historical narratives would currently 
admit.  
It remains to be said: this was no ‘Tragedy of the Commons’.132 It was an 
effective way to deal with and fairly divide the ponds amongst a migratory 
population. These salt gatherers mostly journeyed from Bermuda, a place where 
‘The Island…appears like, and is really, One Continued Village, there being 
scarcely a House in the whole Island but if a person speaks loud at the Door, he 
may be heard at his Neighbours’.133 At Turks Islands, such close-knit ties were 
not cut and a sense of community endured. The Head Rights System functioned 
for so long because most inhabitants trusted each other and were generally 
willing to place regulatory powers in elected commissioners and the King’s 
Agent. For eighteenth-century England, Neeson has challenged the idea that 
common property resources are always overexploited, over-consumed and 
inefficiently managed by showing English commoners actually had an effective 
system of shared regulations, rules, customs and celebrations that bound 
everyone together and deterred selfish activities.134 The same seems apposite for 
Turks Islands. On these salt islands, a community of salt gatherers existed who 
were consulted in the organisation of their economy and who put faith in 
regulations to monitor their resources effectively, all to uphold what they 
considered was their right: to have free and unrestrained access to the salt trade. 
It was a political economy that would have remarkable longevity but, in 
1845, the Head Rights System was dismantled. Chapter 6 charts that change 
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while it strives to tell a story about those who laboured within the companies of 
the salt gatherers: the enslaved salt rakers. 
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Chapter 6:  ‘Work – work – work – oh that Turk’s Island was a 




When Mary Prince was sent from Bermuda and sold to her new master at Turks 
Islands, she reflected it was ‘to my great joy’.1 Having spent several years 
working for an abusive Bermudian household, the prospect of a new owner 
elsewhere seemed an opportunity for betterment. However, such joy was short-
lived and what she would experience on the salt islands caused her severe and 
sustained psychological and bodily harm. In that ‘strange land’, Prince joined a 
form of slavery her early life in Bermuda had not prepared her for.2 When she 
returned to Bermuda, roughly ten years later and approximately around 1812, her 
memories of the salt islands were lacerated with deeply negative connotations. 
Prince ‘was sick, sick of Turk’s Islands’, and desperate to be away from that 
‘cruel, horrible place!’3 
 This chapter seeks to understand Prince’s recollections of Turks Islands, 
exploring the ways salt raking and the Head Rights System impacted her 
experience of salt island slavery. In so doing, it follows the calls of recent 
scholarship to delve into alternative spaces of slavery in non-plantation contexts; 
a practice that deepens our understanding of the diverse lives enslaved people 
lived throughout the Caribbean region.4 It seeks to do this in comparison with 
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a Supplement by the Editor. To which is added, the Narrative of Asa-Asa. A captured 
African (ed. by Thomas Pringle, London: Westley and A H Davis, 1831) p. 9.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid, p. 12 and p. 11. 
4 See Verene A Shepherd, ‘Land, labour and social status: non-sugar producers in 
Jamaica in slavery and freedom’, in Verene Shepherd (ed.), Working slavery pricing 
freedom: perspectives from the Caribbean, Africa and the African diaspora (Kingston: 
Ian Randle Publishers, 2002), pp. 153-178; Verene A Shepherd, Livestock, sugar and 
slavery: Contested terrain in colonial Jamaica (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2009); 
Jennifer Anderson, ‘Nature’s Currency: The Atlantic Mahogany Trade and the 
Commodification of Nature in the Eighteenth Century’, Early American Studies, Vol. 2 
No. 1 (Spring, 2004), pp. 47-80; Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, The Many-
Headed Hydra: The Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2000); Diana Paton, No bond but the law: punishment, race, and gender in 
Jamaican state formation, 1780-1870 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); and 
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plantation slavery.5 Like the sugar plantations, this chapter will argue that the salt 
industry on Turks Islands always involved ‘unfree’ labour in some way, but that 
there were specific aspects of salt production which defined that labour. Both in 
freedom and in slavery, the debilitating nature of salt raking ensured the industry 
only operated effectively because its labourers were literally and, later, 
effectively held captive. Given a viable economic alternative, a salt labourer 
would not willingly choose this profession. Yet the salt industry persisted and, to 
some degree, flourished after emancipation in 1838.   
 To pursue this argument, this chapter anchors itself in The History of 
Mary Prince, with supplementary evidence from slave registers, merchant 
correspondence and colonial office records. Prince’s History was published in 
London and Edinburgh in 1831 and was a bestseller, going through three print 
runs in its first year. While all slave narratives are mediated documents, Prince’s 
History remains of great historical value.6 Prince was born in Brackish Pond, 
Bermuda, where she spent her childhood years in domestic slavery alongside her 
mother and several brothers and sisters. They were enslaved to a seafaring 
family, where the husband was often at sea, leaving behind a wife and daughter. 
For Prince, ‘This was the happiest period of my life; for I was too young to 
understand rightly my condition as a slave, and too thoughtless and full of spirits 
to look forward to the days of toil and sorrow’.7 However, her life within a caring 
family unit was not to last. Prince was sold to two further, much crueller, 
mistresses and masters before she was shipped to Turks Islands where she spent 
ten years of her life, during her early twenties. Her History provides the only 
																																																																																																																																																					
Michael Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians and the Maritime 
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Slavery from Broader Perspectives’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 105 No. 2 
(Apr., 2000), pp. 452-466.  
6 For studies that debate the utility and veracity of Mary Prince’s slave narrative, see 
Janice Schroeder, ‘“Narrat[ing] Some Poor Little Fable”: Evidence of Bodily Pain in 
The History of Mary Prince and “Wife-Torture in England”’, Tulsa Studies in Women’s 
Literature, Vol. 23 No. 2 (Fall, 2004), pp. 261-281; Kremena Todorova, ‘“I Will Say the 
Truth to the English People”: The History of Mary Prince and the Meaning of English 
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Antigua’, Slavery & Abolition (Nov., 2012), pp. 1-10. 
7 Prince, The History of Mary Prince, p. 1. 
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account historians have of Turks Islands written from the perspective of an 
enslaved salt raker. At Turks Islands, slavery had begun to replace free white 
labour on the ponds from the mid-eighteenth century, once the Crown had 
asserted its sovereignty (see Chapter 7) and the Head Rights System had been 
formally encoded (see Chapter 5). While we can only speculate what salt island 
slavery in the late eighteenth century may have been like, Prince’s History 
provides a good indication and is the most authentic account available. This 
chapter therefore uses it to stand in for salt island slavery across the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
 For the purpose of this chapter, Prince’s History provides an invaluable, 
irreplaceable source of detail on the daily experiences of salt raking that cannot 
be deduced elsewhere. It affords a much-needed correlative to the relatively 
abundant material that is available for the salt gatherers while serving as an 
important reminder: that behind every statistic of salt raking, there was a 
thinking, breathing, feeling human being carrying out the work. And, finally, by 
addressing salt labour practices that changed little after 1838, Prince’s narrative 
acts as a bridge between slavery and freedom. 
 
Salt island slavery 
 
Salt raking was not the only occupation for enslaved persons at Turks Islands. In 
the Slave Register of Returns in 1834, 21.4 per cent of the enslaved population at 
Turks Islands were designated non-effective, 2.8 per cent were field labourers, 
and 16.3 per cent were involved in domestic employment (see Figure 6.1). 
However, the majority – 52.7 per cent – were variously designated as ‘in the 
cultivation of salt’ or had dual occupations whose primary employment was 
similarly assigned. This section will explore what life on Turks Islands may have 
been like for these enslaved salt rakers. To do this, it will examine the 
ramifications of working with(in) salt, the implications of labouring in a 
precociously modern industry, the challenges posed by the white creole culture, 
the scope of Turks Islands’ slave economy, and the options available for 

























Working with(in) salt   
 
Prince’s account of toiling in the ponds sheds light on the working lives of over 
half of Turks Islands’ enslaved population and she makes it clear: if scholars 
wish to understand the challenges posed by salt island slavery, they must pay 
attention to the salt raker’s body and the nature of salt itself.  
As noted in Chapter 1, from the late seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth 
century, salt was used to preserve vegetables, fleshy meat and fish within 
Europe’s maritime empires. Salt was able to do so because its crystals drew out 
moisture while creating an environment that was inhospitable for most bacteria, 
fungi and other potentially harmful organisms to live. This also had implications 
for a salt raker’s skin. Skin that was repeatedly exposed to concentrated brine 
physically transformed and became prone to cracking, bleeding and infection. 
Prince’s account illuminates these painful conditions. Prince ‘was given a half 
Figure 6.1: A pie chart showing the distribution of enslaved persons in different 
modes of employment at Turks Islands, July 1834. This data has been compiled from 
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barrel and a shovel, and had to stand up to [her] knees in the water’ for hours on 
end, encouraging salt crystals to form and raking it into mounds.8 This she did 
from dawn until dusk, stopping only for a rushed meagre breakfast and lunch. 
From ‘standing in the salt water for so many hours’, Prince noted the injurious 
effects: ‘Our feet and legs…soon became full of dreadful boils, which eat down 
in some cases to the very bone, afflicting the sufferers with great torment’.9 To 
mitigate salt’s worst effects, after the working day the enslaved labourers ‘went 
down to the sea, where we washed the pickle from our limbs’.10 This daily toil 
exposed a constant battle between Prince and her environment. As Barbara 
Baumgartner states, ‘in [Prince’s] description, the external surroundings are 
given more agency than her body, which appears unable to resist, incapable of 
self-defence, acted upon and destroyed by the water and the sun’.11 Here, salt 
was an agent with a power to adversely affect shovels, barrows and bodies alike. 
Echoes of sore and swollen feet rise up from the slave registers: Robert Smith 
recorded a female, Doll, aged 45, suffering from ‘swollen feet’; Benjamin Wood 
recorded Rachael, aged 55, labouring ‘with a sore foot’; and Henshall Stubbs 
recorded enslaved male, Tom, aged 56, ‘labouring under sore foot’.12  
These acute injuries became chronic on a saltpan because there was never 
adequate time for recovery. On ‘rest’ days, Prince and her fellow labourers could 
not escape the corrosive nature of Turks Islands’ environment. Bodily injury 
impacted all hours of a salt raker’s life, keeping enslaved persons awake at night 
and preventing their bodies from experiencing the healing effect of a good 
night’s sleep. Prince recounted, 
On Sundays, after we had washed the salt bags, and done other work 
required of us, we went into the bush and cut the long soft grass, of which 
we made trusses for our legs and feet to rest upon, for they were so full of 
salt boils that we could get no rest lying on the bare boards.13 
Here Prince reveals the disjuncture between her physical pain and the lack of 
provisioning available to ameliorate her discomfort. Not only were her exposed 
																																																								
8 Prince, The History of Mary Prince, p. 10. 
9  Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Baumgartner, ‘The Body as Evidence’, p. 257.  
12 The National Archives, Slave Register of Returns for the Bahamas, July 1834, T 
71/460. 
13 Prince, The History of Mary Prince, p. 10. 
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feet ‘full of salt boils’ but the only bedding she was provided with were ‘boards, 
fixed upon stakes driven into the ground, without mat or covering’ in a ‘long 
shed, divided into narrow slips’.14 Consequently, she was unable to sleep 
adequately. While Sunday may superficially have been a ‘rest’ day (the Royal 
Regulations did stipulate, ‘No Person whatever, shall work in any of the Pans or 
Ponds, or wheel Salt on Sundays’15), chores linked to the salt industry 
consistently encroached on this ‘free’ time. Sometimes, Prince ‘had to work all 
night measuring salt to load a vessel; or turning a machine to draw water out of 
the sea for salt making’.16 The resultant fatigue did not prevent tasks the 
following day. Rather, ‘then we had no sleep – no rest – but were forced to work 
as fast as we could and go on all next day the same as usual’.17 As one of the 
body’s essential healing functions, sleep deprivation on this scale was unhealthy, 
physically and psychologically. 
The salt environment also caused sightlessness. Prince was called to work 
in the ponds ‘through the heat of the day; the sun flaming upon our heads like 
fire’.18 While the heat caused ‘salt blisters in those parts which were not 
completely covered’, the glare contributed to long-term eyesight problems.19 
Unlike field labourers on sugar plantations, saltpan workers had to cope with a 
heightened ‘exposure to sunlight, reflected from both the surface of the brine and 
from the surface of the salt crystals’.20 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3, although of a later period, provide a visual 
impression of this brilliantly white, oppressive landscape, where straw-woven 
hats protected the face from the sun above but not from the glare below. In the 
appendix to Prince’s narrative, her editor states, ‘since the First Edition of this 






15 The National Archives, The Royal Regulations, 29 June 1781, CO 23/15 ff. 134-137. 
16 Prince, The History of Mary Prince, p. 11. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid, p. 10. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Murli L Mathur, Kripa Ram Haldiya, Raman Sachdev and Habibulla N Saiyed, ‘The 





Figure 6.2: Photograph of salt raking, c. 1900. From Mike Nash, ‘White Gold: 
How Salt Made and Unmade the Turks and Caicos Islands’, History, 14 
December 2012. <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/white-gold-how-salt-
made-and-unmade-the-turks-and-caicos-islands-161576195> (13 August 2017). 
Figure 6.3: Photograph of salt raking, c. 1900. From Turks and Caicos National 
Museum, ‘Salt Raking in the TCI’, Culture & History, 2017. 
<https://www.tcmuseum.org/culture-history/salt-industry/> (13 August 2017). 
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feared, may terminate in total blindness’.21 In the slave registers, enslaved 
persons were also listed as being ‘non-effective’ because of blindness. For 
example, David Bethell recorded Tom as ‘Non-effective, blind’.22 David Francis 
Eve recorded David as ‘Non-effective, blind since 1827’.23 While not conclusive, 
it is likely such eyesight problems were compounded, if not created, by 
conditions on the saltpans.  
This sustained physical assault had implications for identity. Evocative of 
Barbara Duden’s body theory in The Women beneath the Skin, Prince’s flesh 
refused to act as a barrier between her inner self and the outer world, but became 
infected and permeable, letting the outside in and leaving her psychologically 
vulnerable.24 As Michele Speitz puts it, ‘Prince’s text records how lethal amounts 
of salt seep through the skin, forging a visceral, literal and grotesque union 
between salt, the commodified substance, and the slave, the commodified 
worker’.25 This seepage would later impact how Prince evaluated key life-
events.26 In The story of pain, Joanna Bourke convincingly argues that ‘being-in-
pain’ is an event, which gains meaning through evaluation.27 The sensual event 
itself – the salt blister, the boil, the blindness – may not be inherently painful, but 
it becomes painful when the sufferer evaluates it according to their previous 
experiences and personal, cultural and societal beliefs. In her History, Prince 
evaluates Turks Islands in comparison to her life in Bermuda as a domestic 
enslaved labourer, which did not prepare her for work on the saltpan; and she 
raises salt as an agent, giving it a power that rivalled, if not surpassed, her 
master’s. Salt became a powerful, existential marker and a form of ‘retrojection’ 
																																																								
21 Mary Prince, The History of Mary Prince, a West Indian Slave. Related by Herself. 
With a supplement by the Editor. To which is added, the Narrative of Asa-Asa. A 
captured African (ed. by Thomas Pringle, 3rd edn, London, 1831), p. 36. 
22 The National Archives, Slave Register of Returns for the Bahamas, July 1834, T 
71/460. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Barbara Duden, The Woman Beneath the Skin: a doctor’s patients in eighteenth-
century Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).  
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26 Ibid. 
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took place.28 This is evidenced in the way salt entered Prince’s lexicon. As she 
evaluated her experiences, she used salt’s flavour profile to describe and give 
meaning to important, poignant and catastrophic moments of her life. For 
example, when Prince was sold and separated from her family in Bermuda she 
cried, ‘oh the trials! the trials! they make the salt water come into my eyes’.29 To 
describe tears as salt water, and equate emotional pain with salt, is a charged 
metaphor. It was not coincidental.  
Moreover, one of salt’s accompaniments, cayenne, was similarly used to 
convey emotional pain. When Prince was appraised by her potential buyers, 
‘their light words fell like cayenne on the fresh wounds of our hearts’.30 This 
language of seasoning echoed real punishment practices observed at Turks 
Islands. There, Prince recalled how her master beat ‘poor Daniel…with a rod of 
rough briar till his skin was quite red and raw’ and then called for ‘a bucket of 
salt and flung it upon the raw flesh till the man writhed on the ground like a 
worm’.31 In evaluating these events, Prince ‘frame[d] her existence through the 
lens of salt’.32  
Yet if Prince used savoury seasonings to represent her worst memories, 
she used their opposite to describe positive ideas and desires. Sugar and 
sweetness became the representation of all things good. Twice in her narrative 
Prince compared sweetness with freedom, using the phrase ‘to be free is very 
sweet’.33 At the end of her narrative, Prince chastised anyone who believed 
enslaved persons did not want to be free by stating forcefully: ‘It is not so. All 
slaves want to be free – to be free is very sweet’.34 In so doing, Prince cast 
particular flavour profiles with different metaphorical meanings leaving salt 
without any redemptive qualities. As Speitz has remarked, ‘her text displays not 
one kind word devoted to the world of the savoury’.35  
																																																								
28 Ibid. Bourke defines retrojection as ‘the means by which ways of naming pain 
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29 Prince, The History of Mary Prince, p. 5. 
30 Ibid, p. 4. Italics added for emphasis. 
31 Ibid, p. 11. Italics added for emphasis. 
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33 Prince, The History of Mary Prince, p. 18 and p. 23. 
34 Ibid, p. 23. 
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 In part, this was because salt raking did not provide a restorative to its 
labourers as harvesting sugar cane did. Many physicians noted how, despite the 
brutal demands of the cane harvest, field labourers developed a ‘peculiar 
glossiness of the skin, so indicative of health [which] is never seen to the same 
extent at any other season’.36 In Jamaica, Bryan Edwards remarked, ‘The Time in 
crop in the Sugar Islands is the season of gladness and festivity to man and beast. 
So palatable, salutary, and nourishing is the juice of the cane, drinking freely of it 
derives health and vigour’.37 The intensity of the sugar harvest was relentless, but 
it did permit relatively nutritious consumption. No such ameliorative existed in 
the salt ponds. Salt did not provide any satisfaction to Prince both during and 
after raking. Indeed, her only reference to consuming salt was medicinal and 
even then it seemed a punishment. When the enslaved labourers were taken ill, 
they were given hot salted water to drink. Far from curing them, this ‘made 
[them] very sick’.38  
The salt raker’s body therefore had a particularly abusive relationship 
with salt, reflected in Prince’s ‘obsessive focus on the physical’ while at Turks 
Islands.39 The Head Rights System was organised around the production of a 
commodity that had specific and sadistic effects on those who were forced to 
rake it. These effects would outlast slavery. 
 
Working in a precociously modern industry  
 
The enslaved body also laboured under an intense work regimen imposed by the 
slavery system, which had features of a precociously modern cast. In Caribbean 
historiography, many historians have argued the sugar plantations were proto-
industrial, a ‘modernity that predated the modern’.40 Sidney Mintz, in particular, 
has long placed emphasis on the combination of ‘factory and field’, which 
																																																								
36 Physician quoted in Kenneth Kiple and Virginia Kiple, ‘Deficiency Diseases in the 
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typified sugar production.41 While salt production did not involve the same 
combination of manufacturing and agriculture, this did not prevent the growth of 
other proto-industrial features. 
For instance, there was a comparatively modern sense of time-discipline 
at Turks Islands. This was driven in part by salt’s natural rhythms and in part by 
technology. On the sugar islands, the need to process sugar cane within forty-
eight hours of the plant being cut drove a particularly vigorous work regimen 
during harvest time. Similarly, on the salt islands, fear that rain would ‘melt’ the 
salt, or that the onset of winter was near, drove a notably intense schedule of 
work during the salt season. Both in sugar and salt production, a distinct 
seasonality meant labour demands were constantly in flux around harvest season. 
Moreover, in the American South, Mark Smith has argued that planters 
and enslaved persons increasingly understood the clock-face as the legitimate 
arbiter of time rather than the previous pre-modern, nature-based conceptions.42 
Bell towers were erected on estates to ring in the working day and wristwatches 
were purchased for planters and overseers to keep track of time. Prince’s 
narrative reflects this trend by revealing a keen sense of time punctuality at Turks 
Islands. Though the natural world determined the seasonality of salt and the 
limits of the diurnal working day, within that working day there was a modern 
time-schedule. Prince had to,  
…stand up to my knees in the water from four o’clock in the morning till 
nine, when we were given some Indian corn boiled in water, which we 
were obliged to swallow as fast as we could…We were then called again 
to our tasks…We came home at twelve; ate our corn soup, called blawly, 
as fast as we could, and went back to our employment till dark at night.43 
These time references strongly suggest Prince’s overseer had access to a 
timepiece in order to orchestrate the regimen of the working day. Towards the 
end of slavery, a gaol was erected on Grand Turk, which had a bell tower. J 
Henry Pusey called this bell the ‘Public Time-Keeper’ and it was rung five times 
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	 163 
a day.44 Moreover, Prince indicates that overseers were preoccupied with strict 
timekeeping, fearing lost time. During her breaks she was obliged to eat her food 
‘as fast as [she] could’ and in her examples of punishment, often the crime was 
the labourer not moving fast enough.45 ‘Poor Daniel’ was punished because he 
‘could not keep up with the rest of the slaves’.46 An old woman called Sarah was 
punished because she ‘did not wheel the barrow fast enough to please’.47 Prince 
herself was punished ‘for not being able to move so fast as he [the master] 
wished me’.48 This attention to time-discipline drove an intense, strict and 
modern schedule of work. 
 There was also a modern division of labour. As Gail Saunders relates, 
‘Turks Island was one of the only islands [in the Bahamas] with “gangs” of 
slaves’.49 Due to the intensity of the salt harvest, gangs were needed to rake salt 
efficiently from the ponds. On eighteenth-century Jamaican sugar plantations, 
gang systems were the norm. Field labourers tended to be separated into three 
gangs according to their age and strength, which ‘raised plantation outcrop by 
increasing the intensity of labour’.50 For historians such as Mintz, David Eltis, 
Russell Menard and Susan Dwyer Amussen, the slave gang was a sign of things 
to come in industrial Europe.51 Certainly it was the most intense form of labour 
yet seen in the western world. 
 In Turks Islands, this division of labour was apparent: of the 474 
enslaved persons employed in salt raking in 1834, 63 per cent were male, the 
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average age was 32, and they were overwhelmingly black and creole.52 Salt 
raking was clearly gendered and racialised, with slaveholders preferring fit, 
young, black, male creoles. Moreover, these gangs contained hierarches. Within 
the slave registers, several were listed with supervisory roles. For example, John 
Eve had fourteen enslaved persons in the ponds including Jack who was a 
‘Driver’.53 These elite enslaved labourers worked alongside white overseers to 
apportion tasks depending on the time of year and condition of their companies. 
Following the salt season, Prince recalls that her gang was ‘sent to South Creek, 
with large bills, to cut mangoes to burn lime with’ while another gang was ‘sent 
to the other side of the island to break up coral out of the sea’.54 As ever, ‘if we 
could not keep up with the rest of the gang of slaves, we were put in the stocks, 
and severely flogged the next morning’.55  
Strict time-discipline coupled with gang labour created a notoriously 
intense, supervised and regimented work schedule at Turks Islands. Prince’s 
impression was summed up in three words: ‘work – work – work’.56 It was 
labour intensive; it was arduous; and it brought real corporeal and psychological 
change to the enslaved body. The Head Rights System depended on it because in 
a limited salt season, when the risk of rainfall threatened to destroy a harvest, this 
regime ensured maximum productivity and minimal loss of profits. 
 
The white creole culture  
 
Larger societal forces also created specific challenges for enslaved salt rakers. 
Prince was keen to highlight that a corrupt white creole culture existed, which 
allowed masters to punish with impunity beyond official oversight. In the British 
Caribbean, David Lambert has shown that white creole identities were an 
important ‘site of struggle’ during the abolition era.57 Abolitionists sought to 
create a moral distance between metropolitan inhabitants and their colonial 
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counterparts in order to galvanise support for their cause and demonise their 
opponents. Consequently, white creoles were often portrayed as corrupt, 
indecent, violent and un-British seigniors who treated their enslaved labourers 
dispassionately. Simultaneously, white creoles fought to maintain their status in 
these debates as quintessentially, benevolent British gentlemen of peaceful, 
organised agricultural estates. In these disputes, notions of gender, race and 
religion often surfaced. At Turks Islands, we hear these debates refracted 
frequently in the early 1800s, and they are interesting for what they might 
suggest about daily practices.  
 In 1811, Methodist missionary William Dowson arrived at Turks Islands 
and spent two months there on route to his post in Nassau. He arrived on 
Christmas Day and was introduced to the Reverend Thomas Dalziel, a 
Presbyterian clergyman who was ‘about 70 years old, lately married to a young 
woman of about 22. I thought he was in liquor’.58 A few days later, Dowson 
commented disapprovingly, ‘the house in which I reside has been a place of 
rendezvous the week of Christmas and this evening’s merriment crowns all the 
rest’.59 When he returned from an evening out, ‘the hall floor was covered with 
spirituous and broken glasses, but’ – significantly – ‘the bucks and bloods were 
fled’.60 In The London Magazine in 1755, ‘the characteristick of the Buck and 
Blood’ included ‘playing the most wild and extravagant pranks that wantonness 
and debauchery can suggest’ while ‘sally[ing] out “flown with insolence and 
wine”’.61 Given that ‘whatever is in violation of all decency and order is an 
exquisite piece of wit’, their antics could involve ‘a tour of the principal bawdy-
houses’, ‘breaking of lamps and skirmishes with watchmen’, ‘insulting…dull 
sober fools’, and ‘a rape on a modest woman’.62 These negative connotations 
coat Dowson’s commentary on the local white creole. While Dowson surveyed 
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the room, ‘Wymms soon came in drunk and apologised for the state of the house 
adding, “it is the ending up of Christmas”’.63 Later, as Dowson lay in bed, ‘a 
drunken rake came and knicked against the ceiling of my chamber and cursed me 
heartily’.64 Dowson’s worst fears of Dalziel came true when he was found to 
‘drink to excess the week through and preaches once on the Sabbath’.65 After a 
month’s residence, Dowson lamented, ‘I am surrounded by persons who fear not 
God’ in a place where ‘wickedness overspreads the islands of the sea’.66 A 
missionary from Bermuda sympathised in a letter, ‘Turks Island is, I believe, a 
very wicked place’.67  
Prince emphasised this ‘wickedness’ with examples of the corrupt 
practices of those who ruled at Turks Islands. For one, she contrasted her own 
feeling self with her new master’s coldness: ‘Mr. D– was usually quite calm. He 
would stand by and give orders to be cruelly whipped, and assist in the 
punishment, without moving a muscle of his face, walking about, and taking 
snuff with the greatest composure’.68 She then narrates a number of punishment 
practices. There was an enslaved person called Ben, caught stealing some rice, 
who was ‘hung up when we came home; with a pool of blood beneath him, and 
our master still licking him’;69 and Sarah, an old woman suffering from ‘several 
bodily infirmities and [who] was not quite right in the head’, who was beaten and 
‘flung…among the prickly-pear bushes, which are covered over with sharp 
venomous prickles’.70 Sarah ‘was so grievously wounded, that her body swelled 
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and festered all over’.71 Sarah died a few days later. The law at Turks Islands did 
not protect these labourers. According to Saunders, before the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century, masters under Bahamian jurisdiction could do much ‘as they 
pleased’.72 Before 1824, there was no restriction on how many lashes could be 
inflicted.73 Prince herself experienced this punishment on multiple occasions: 
Mr. D– has often stripped me naked, hung me up by the wrists, and beat 
me with a cow-skin; with his own hand, till my body was raw with 
gashes. Yet there was nothing very remarkable in this; for it might serve 
as common useage on that horrid island.74 
Testimonies at the end of her narrative confirmed the extent of her scarring. Four 
(white) certified witnesses corroborated that, ‘the whole of the back part of her 
body is distinctly scarred, and, as it were, chequered with the vestiges of severe 
floggings’.75 The fact these practices were questioned and Prince’s editor 
received ‘inquiries…from various quarters respecting the existence of marks of 
severe punishment on Mary Prince’s body’ reveal the disconnect that existed 
between the colonies and the metropole.76 Prince understood this and sought to 
close the gap. 
However, as Paul Farnsworth demonstrates, the inhabitants of Turks 
Islands were in a remarkably remote location.77 Though the salt industry was 
regulated, these regulations safeguarded the trade but offered little protection to 
the enslaved. For legal protection, the islands fell under Bahamian slave codes 
and while Bahamian records generally bespeak of mild punishments, Saunders 
has pointed out ‘probably more cruelty existed than was ever recorded…on the 
Out Islands which were so cut off by bad communications’.78 Indeed, the courts 
of justice were rarely referred to. In 1803, the King’s Agent declared that ‘the 
privilege of resorting to the Courts of Justice at New Providence’ had been 
utilised by the inhabitants of Turks Islands ‘in only one instance within 20 
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years’.79 More cases were heard at Bermuda’s courts of justice, but overall this 
limited courtroom activity was not because crimes and abuse did not exist at 
Turks Islands. It was because the Bahamas and Bermuda Governments were 
located over 500 miles away. Travelling to both entailed time and expense. More 
likely matters simply did not reach court but were resolved in situ between 
wronged parties or by the King’s Agent and his commissioners. However, these 
colonial actors possessed shares in the ponds and consequently a personal 
interest in supporting the status quo. Such poor juridical channels compromised 
the ability of enslaved persons to seek redress while shoring up potentially 
unlawful practices. 
The remote location of Turks Islands and its lack of magisterial oversight 
therefore created a white creole culture that permitted salt gatherers to govern the 
islands’ enslaved population with relative impunity. When coupled with the 
harsh environmental conditions and intense work regimen, it is clear a system of 
domination had developed at Turks Islands that relied on violence to achieve 
maximum productivity. 
 
The internal domestic economy 
 
A corrupt white creole culture ensured that things could be done to enslaved 
persons at Turks Islands, which were not permissible in other colonial settings. 
Yet, there were also things enslaved persons could not do at Turks Islands, which 
impacted daily life. 
Unlike Jamaica and Barbados, there was little land available for domestic 
provisioning. In his study of two plantations in Barbados, Justin Roberts has 
shown how an agricultural technique called ‘cane-holeing’ allowed provisions to 
be intercropped amongst sugar cane fields, challenging ‘the notion that large-
scale provision production had to be abandoned when planters filled their fields 
with sugar’.80 Rather, this ‘full-blown sugar island’ was actually able to meet 
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most of its population’s calorie intake.81 Similarly, in the late seventeenth 
century, Eltis found that Jamaica and Barbados were producing three-quarters of 
their calorie intake, prompting him to argue that ‘if neither of these islands relied 
on food imports, it is unlikely that any other part of the Caribbean did so’.82 Yet 
that is what happened at Turks Islands.  
Time and again visitors commented on the infertility of Turks Islands’ 
soil. When passing through the islands in 1804, Daniel McKinnen observed ‘the 
soil, which is sandy, admits but of little cultivation, and produces only a small 
quantity of Guinea corn’.83 Similarly, Dowson noticed how ‘the soil of these 
islands is remarkably sterile’ and even used it in a rather striking metaphor: 
‘most of the inhabitants of the island seem as barren of moral goodness as the 
soil on which they live’.84 The very existence of salt ponds on these small, flat 
islands meant the soil’s nutritional value was easily exhausted.  
Captain John Lightbourn must have been one of the few salt gatherers 
who could cultivate a few acres of provisions. In 1811, he wrote to his nephew in 
Bermuda: ‘I thank fortune I am feeding my Negroes with Corn and Pumpkins of 
my own raising, and can hold out for three months’.85 However, this language of 
‘holding out’ adequately describes his precarious position. Nothing was secure 
when it came to food. Despite his few acres, Lightbourn regularly reported the 
scarcity of provisions. In November 1806, he wrote, ‘Provisions are very scarce, 
not one Bushel of Corn on the Island for sale and many people not a morsel of 
Bread’.86 And in October 1807, he wrote again, ‘we are likely to perish on these 
Islands. There is not now provision that will feed us three weeks nor any 
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alternative for us. We have frequent deaths’.87 These cyclical crises affected both 
the free and enslaved population. Several of Lightbourn’s friends and relatives 
died from starvation. However, because the enslaved were toiling through the 
heat of the day, their need for sustenance was acute. To be ‘a long time on Short 
Commons’ at ‘a 3rd of [their normal] allowance’ put their health in jeopardy.88 
Prince only ever recalled having guinea corn to eat: for breakfast, lunch and 
dinner. This lack of variation, if sustained, would have produced vitamin 
deficiencies. Coupled with the arduous work, it is little wonder that Turks Islands 
had one of the highest death rates in the Bahamas.89  
 Inadequate domestic provisioning had additional socioeconomic 
implications. Whereas Jamaica could support a provision ground system that 
gave enslaved persons more economic and social autonomy, no provision 
grounds could exist at Turks Islands. Consequently, there was an underdeveloped 
domestic economy and internal marketing system. In Jamaica, Edward Long 
estimated that enslaved people held one fifth of all money in circulation in the 
1770s.90 But in Turks Islands, not only was cash scarce (Lightbourn insisted, ‘we 
are poor, no cash in circulation’91), but also the means of credit – salt – was 
prevented from falling into the hands of the islands’ enslaved population. The 
Royal Regulations affirmed, ‘No Servant or Slave shall be allowed to work for 
themselves in any of the Ponds or Pans’.92 While it was not impossible to obtain 
goods for barter and exchange, these regulatory barriers restricted the enslaved 
person’s purchasing power.  
As a result, enslaved persons in these remote, infertile islands were more 
dependent upon their masters for essential and luxury goods. Farnsworth has 
demonstrated that, within the Bahaman distribution system, Turks Islands lacked 
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regular access to Nassau, the main mercantile hub.93 Merchant vessels rarely 
called at Turks Islands except to collect salt. The result was a limited 
proliferation of goods concentrated into the hands of the slaveholding class. 
Prince reiterates this dependency: in the morning ‘we were given some Indian 
corn boiled in water’, and at night ‘when we returned to the house, our master 
gave us each our allowance of raw Indian corn’.94 Everything Prince ate was 
given from her master. This underdeveloped domestic economy hindered the 
growth of Sunday markets and an internal slave economy that typified 
eighteenth-century Jamaica.    
 At Turks Islands, the lack of arable land was always going to hamper the 
social and economic autonomy of the enslaved population. However, the Head 
Rights System made this considerably more difficult when it prohibited enslaved 
salt rakers from being in possession of the islands’ one tradable commodity: salt. 
In such a harsh saline environment with intense labour conditions, violent 
punishment practices, and limited opportunities for economic and social 




Opportunities to abscond, however, were severely abridged at Turks Islands, 
especially in comparison to the larger, more mountainous Caribbean islands. 
Turks Islands were tiny: Grand Turk was ten square miles and Salt Key was four 
square miles; there was no jungle interior, or any significant interior at all, in 
which to hide. The nearest islands were Caicos Islands, but Cockburn Harbour 
was still almost forty-one kilometres away, wider than the English Channel.  
Moreover, marronage was strictly monitored. The Royal Regulations 
stipulated that ‘No person…shall be allowed a Share for any Servant or Slave, 
after an Absence of forty-eight Hours of such servant or slave’.95 According to 
Bahamian law, an enslaved person was not a runaway until they had been absent 
for ten days.96 At Turks Islands, that time was foreshortened to two days. 
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Exceptions were made for those employed in seafaring activities, but for the 
majority this regulation severely restricted their mobility. While it was common 
for planters in Barbados and Jamaica to tolerate petit marronage as an 
‘institutionalised pressure valve’, the salt gatherers had more to lose.97 After an 
enslaved person was absent for forty-eight hours, their master forfeited their 
share for the rest of the season. No regulation in the sugar islands 
correspondingly caused a planter to give up an equivalent share of his estate for a 
runaway enslaved labourer. This regulation therefore put considerable 
responsibility on the shoulders of slaveholders to deter runaways. Discipline was 
consequently, predictably exacting, and slaveholders could take decisive 
measures: from April 1832 to March 1834, Henshall Stubbs furnished one of his 
own boats to patrol the coasts.98  
 Despite such restrictions, enslaved persons did attempt to flee. In the 
Bahamian archipelago, ‘the majority of slaves running away were from the Turks 
and Caicos Islands’.99 Between 1822 and 1825, ‘of the 142 slaves listed as 
runaways, 128 absconded from Turks Island’.100 Saunders attributes this to the 
prevalence of the gang system, which allowed enslaved persons to congregate in 
larger numbers, and to the relative proximity of nearby Saint Domingue, which 
was evermore attractive after its independence in 1804.101 In the slave registers, 
traces of these runaways can be found. In 1834, William Adams recorded that 
two enslaved persons, David and Isaac, had ‘eloped the 3rd March 1832 in a 
pilot boat for St Domingue’.102 Benjamin Coverly reported that Joe ‘eloped to St 
Domingo in 1832’.103 Finally, Saint George Duncan Tucker reported that Romeo 
had ‘eloped to St Domingo in 1832’.104 In total, ten enslaved persons were 
recorded as runaways who had not returned before the Slave Register of Returns 
in July 1834.105  
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This was a relatively small number. But it does reveal marronage was 
influenced by sex, colour and country of origin: all were male, black creoles, 
excepting one male, mulatto creole. This pattern resonates with other parts of the 
British Caribbean. For example, in Barbados, Gad Heuman found the majority of 
‘advertised runaways were male, creole, coloured and skilled slaves’ who were 
more able to pass as free in urban environments.106 In Turks Islands, runaways 
also tended to be from skilled professions: the majority exited the islands by boat 
and needed adequate knowledge of seafaring.  
Advertisements for runaways in local newspapers reveal this tendency. 
On 7 March 1794, Wade Stubbs posted a bulletin for ‘two Negro Men’ who 
‘carried with them an open Sail Boat, drawing about 2 Feet Water, Bermuda 
Built, Plank and Timbers all Cedar, sailed only with a Shoulder of Mutton 
Sail’.107 The same slaveholder also reported the single largest slave escape within 
the Bahamas when ‘on the night of the 9th of September’ 1800, fourteen 
enslaved persons fled ‘in a small one mast boat’.108 This largely familial group 
included Harry, ‘a short young man’ who was ‘a good boatman, and has worked 
some time at the sail making business’.109 Without Harry’s expertise, it is 
unlikely all fourteen could have successfully escaped together. In truth, while 
flight by boat was commonly reported across the Caribbean, at Turks Islands it 
was the only practical choice. Enslaved pilots, mariners and seamen had the best 
chance of escape, given their privileged access and skillset.  
 However, even for a skilled seaman, sailing free of Turks Islands was 
challenging. As Pusey reflected, ‘the entire islands are of Coralline Formation 
and there are many dangerous reefs over which several vessels bound from north 
through the passage southward are wrecked’.110 Sailing away from these islands 
could be treacherous, especially as runaways could only realistically flee at night. 
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Even a successful escape may not prove permanent. On 12 November 1770, 
King’s Agent Andrew Symmer reported to the Secretary of State that ‘Sundry 
Negroes…made their Escapes from these islands, to the adjacent French & 
Spanish Settlements on the neighbouring island of St Domingo’.111 
‘Accordingly’, Symmer ‘repeatedly wrote to the French and Spanish Governors 
of the Northern Department of that Island’ and, after threatening the Governors 
with an embargo on their salt trade, ‘the Negroes were delivered up to my Orders 
by the Count of Choiseul, and are since arrived here which will put a Stop to 
such Desertions for the future’.112 In this instance, the runaways successfully 
made it as far as Hispaniola before being returned.  
Moreover, regulations made it challenging for runaways to obtain 
suitable vessels. Both in 1774 and 1781, the regulations stipulated that ‘No Salt 
Raker possessing any boat, shall leave his Sails on board such Boat in the Night 
Time, on pain of being excluded the Benefit of the Ponds for that Year’.113 While 
determined runaways could still acquire boats, this regulation reduced their 
chances. Given its hefty penalties it is unlikely salt gatherers would knowingly 
fail to comply. In fact, fleeing slavery at Turks Islands was very difficult – both 
because of the nature of its small, flat island environment and the Head Rights 
System’s regulations that were in place. Prince’s narrative does not refer to any 
incidents of escape. 
Salt island slavery therefore posed particular challenges. In this 
environment, salt was an agent with disproportionate influence over the body of 
the enslaved: not only did it corrode and infect salt rakers’ skin but the risks of 
losing a crop through rain created a notoriously intense work regimen. Such an 
exploitative system of domination was supported through the Head Rights 
System that sought maximum productivity and offered few protections to the 
enslaved salt labourers. It permitted salt gatherers much leniency and autonomy 
over their enslaved population. When it did comment on slavery – for example, 
when it prohibited enslaved persons from raking salt on their own account or 
when it restricted permissible petit marronage to a maximum of forty-eight hours 
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– the Head Rights System only served to shore up salt-gatherer hegemony. At the 
same time, the islands’ geography put the enslaved salt rakers at a disadvantage: 
they could not grow crops at Turks Islands nor develop a sense of communal 
identity through an internal marketing system nor easily flee the islands in a bid 
to escape. These were specific challenges to Turks Islands, emanating from its 
saline environment and management structure, which radically undercut the 
ability of the salt raker to gain any sort of purchase on socioeconomic autonomy.  
Prince’s History is a singular account, but it was emblematic of the many 
who toiled under a scorching sun in the salt ponds of the Caribbean. When Prince 
returned to Bermuda she was relieved: ‘I was joyful, for I was sick, sick of 
Turk’s Island’.114 And though she ‘had more than enough to do – but still, it was 
not so very bad as Turk’s Island’.115 That place had become a marker of cruelty 
on her existential horizon. The islands’ system of domination would shift in 
freedom, but her descriptions of salt production and its labour practices would 
continue to find relevance. 
 
Salt labour in freedom 
 
In a recent analysis of Caribbean historiography, Christer Petley has called 
attention to historians who investigate the transformations and continuities that 
occurred between slavery and freedom.116 Often, emancipation (1838) becomes 
the end date for scholarly work in slavery studies, but there is a need to resist this 
chronology and explore how systems of domination continued. Within studies 
that have done this, Howard Johnson has argued still too much attention has been 
given to plantation societies.117 The rest of this chapter speaks from within that 
historiographical context. To this point, it has demonstrated that salt rakers faced 
distinct challenges in salt island slavery, but it now asks the question, did these 
labour relations significantly change in freedom? Was the newly freed peasantry 
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able to acquire shares in the ponds on an equal basis to their former masters? Or 
were innovative strategies of control erected to prevent this? 
Following the conclusion of the apprenticeship system in 1838, the 
conditions of salt raking changed little. Contemporaries recognised that it 
remained an objectionable form of labour. Governor John Gregory stated in 
1852,  
It must be borne in mind that the labour of salt raking is most distasteful 
to the Negro; as well as to the White Man, involving the most painful 
Exposure of the Face to the Sun & Mosquitoes and the most distressing 
Effects upon the feet from constant immersion in brine.118 
In this passage, Governor Gregory called attention to bodily infirmities that 
Prince related to twenty years before. Due to the nature of salt, constant 
immersion in brine caused ‘the most distressing Effect upon the feet’ while glare 
instigated ‘the most painful Exposure of the Face’. These arduous conditions fed 
persistent racial attitudes, which existed in slavery and continued in freedom. For 
example, Francis Eve, a magistrate who produced a report in 1842 on the newly 
freed peasantry, commented that the ‘Africans, recently liberated,…are the best 
persons to work the Salt Ponds – I doubt if Europeans could stand the Heat of the 
Weather, or if they would at all answer for Salt Pond Labourers’.119 Like 
Governor Gregory, Eve believed these conditions were not conducive to 
European labour. The heat was too strong, the brine was too corrosive, and the 
sun was too powerful for European bodies to (have to) endure. The effects of 
working with salt had not changed. Consequently, there must have been powerful 
incentives for the newly freed to remain harvesting this commodity.  
 Eve’s report provides insight on this point as it details the socioeconomic 
status of the freed peasantry. While providing information on the current 
relations between the new peasantry and old proprietors as well as ‘the progress 
of the labourers in establishing themselves as freeholders’, Eve stated ‘in these 
Islands, there is no Tenancy on estates. Very few of the Proprietors and none of 
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the Peasantry are freeholders’.120 As in the slavery period, land on Turks Islands 
remained Crown land and could not be bought, sold or otherwise alienated. 
However, significantly, the freed people ‘having a proportionate part, or a share, 
in the Salt Ponds Annually have become attached to the soil’.121 In one sentence, 
the continuance of the Head Rights System, from slavery to freedom, was clearly 
revealed. Quite uniquely in the Caribbean, the Head Rights System safeguarded 
the right of all British subjects to have equal access to pond shares. By law, the 
freed peasantry were permitted to enter the ponds on the same terms as their 
former masters. In the sugar-producing islands, freedmen who reclaimed 
agricultural fields could often be described (and treated) as squatters, but this was 
not so at Turks Islands. As the apprenticeship system ended, the law enabled 
rather than hindered their ability to become salt gatherers. Though the work 
remained arduous, the Head Rights System provided an immediate opportunity 
for self-sustainability. Many took it. To become financially viable, ‘many of the 
male labourers…unite and work shares in the ponds together’.122 As Eve 
reflected, ‘very few, if indeed any, have left these Islands to locate elsewhere’ 
and ‘they are altogether independent of their former masters’.123  
 Without slavery in place, a more traditional division of labour also 
occurred. Though historically the salt ponds had a preponderance of male black 
labourers, Eve noted that ‘since Emancipation…the Creole females…do not 
work in the Salt Ponds’.124 They either ‘hire themselves for work of a domestic 
nature’ or ‘employ themselves at their homes’.125 This trend was not singular to 
the salt islands. It was witnessed across the Caribbean in post-emancipation 
societies. According to Barbara Bush, slavery had pushed ‘an alien division of 
labour’ upon the enslaved woman ‘which negated and undermined the traditional 
African division of labour’.126 This changed during emancipation as many freed 
women ‘reverted to a subordinate position within the black family’ and withdrew 












plantations ‘because almost without exception they had constituted the bulk of 
the field labour force during the latter years of slavery’.128 In Turks Islands, there 
was a similar withdrawal of women. Like sugar harvesting, this suggests salt 
raking was physically arduous and that, as a female occupation, the wider 
community objected to it. In the wake of emancipation, more traditional gender 
roles were re-established. 
 Hence, while the Head Rights System remained in force, the freed 
peasantry could partake equally with their former masters and internally manage 
a division of labour that suited their community’s preferences. Though the 
intense nature of salt production did not change, the right to work on one’s own 
account significantly ameliorated that fact. 
 
The enclosure of the ponds  
 
However, in the 1840s, the system would change. Across the Caribbean, colonies 
were struggling financially as labourers deserted their former masters’ estates. 
The prospect of a subsistence peasantry, with an ever-increasing subdivision of 
land, put London officials ill at ease. This was no less true for the salt islands, as 
it was for the sugar islands. There the Bahamian Governor warned of ‘the 
difficulty…arising from the increased sub-division of interest in the Ponds’.129 
Pressures mounted. Governors were encouraged to implement strategies to boost 
capital investment and ensure each colony’s future prosperity. In Turks Islands, 
the Board of Trade believed the Head Rights System could no longer continue in 
its present form.  
In December 1841, the Board of Trade compiled a report on the current 
and future management of the salt ponds. Its commissioners cast the issue as an 
untenable struggle between labourers and capitalists, which was indefensibly 
obstructing the industrial development of the islands. Their report stated there 
was no ‘fair remedy’ to protect both the ‘more numerous race of labourers’ and 
‘the capitalists’ at the same time, fearing above all ‘the manifest injury 
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which…must result to all classes of the community…from maintaining a system 
of division among a community consisting of capitalists, without a supply of 
labour, and of labourers without capital’.130 Since emancipation, many of the 
freedmen had taken their own shares in the ponds, leaving former masters with 
insufficient labour forces and fewer shares of their own to profit by. This 
situation dissuaded venture capitalists from investing in the ponds and improving 
the islands’ infrastructure while threatening the already-shaken social order.  
These problems mirrored processes that were occurring across the sugar 
islands of the British Caribbean. W A Green has pointed out ‘the abolition of 
slavery shook the planting system’.131 In Jamaica, freedmen increasingly fled the 
plantations and gravitated towards registering freeholds on newly abandoned 
land or squatting on marginal sites with poorer soils.132 Naturally, ‘those who 
had been freed sought to create new ways of life independent of the 
plantation’.133 This often included some part-time work on estates but was 
notably shared with market gardening on provision grounds as well.134 However, 
as Mintz has argued, this caused ‘a sharp decrease in sugar production’.135 
Suddenly, ‘proprietors lost their captive labour force during slack seasons’ and 
were forced to economise and retrench.136 With depleting labour forces, many 
invested in technological innovations to try and compensate but most could not 
avoid reducing their overall acreage and many plantations fell into disuse.  
These deteriorating economic conditions worried metropolitan and 
colonial governments. While smaller islands with higher population densities 
such as Barbados, St Kitts and Antigua had more success in controlling their 
workforce, larger islands with lower population densities found this more 
difficult.137 In response, officials progressively, rigorously and actively sought to 
reverse the trends. Legislation and lawsuits increasingly restricted the 
peasantry’s access to land through the introduction of vagrancy laws that were 
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supported by strengthened systems of police, magistrates and prisons. Moreover, 
large numbers of contracted labourers were successively introduced via the 
coolie trade, which increased overall labour market competition, driving down 
wages and providing a new captive labour force. Primarily from India, in total 
‘nearly 250,000 went to British Guiana, almost 150,000 to Trinidad, and over 
36,000 to Jamaica’, each on five-year contracts.138 Such land policy and labour 
market manipulations reinforced one another and strongly indicated ‘the planter 
class sought to recreate pre-emancipation conditions’ and ‘replace the discipline 
of slavery with the discipline of hunger’.139 Broadly, it did succeed in helping the 
remaining and most resilient estates maintain their operations.  
Such outcomes in the sugar islands informed the Board of Trade’s policy 
interventions in the salt islands. The Board of Trade’s report on the salt ponds 
had a distinctly comparative cast, highlighting how plans undertaken in the sugar 
islands had ‘been adopted purposefully to discourage persons without Capital 
from becoming Landowners’.140 In doing so, it reported that the ‘emancipated 
classes’ were successfully prevented ‘from all becoming at once Proprietors 
instead of continuing satisfied with their present station as labourers’.141 That 
similar policy interventions should be introduced at Turks Islands was the 
obvious, underlying suggestion. But the sugar and salt islands had very different 
economies. In Turks Islands, the Head Rights System legally protected access to 
the ponds as a right. As such, the need for land reform was arguably greater and 
more pressing. The entire system required an overhaul. 
To tackle it, the commissioners recognised they would have to dismantle 
the Head Rights System’s core economic principle of free and unrestrained 
access. This legally protected the right of all British subjects, including the 
freedmen, to become participants of the ponds’ inclusive commons. Such a 
‘problem’ had to be confronted from three different angles. First, the 
commissioners foresaw ‘no other way of solving this difficulty than by declining 
in future to give away a share of the Ponds to any person whatever’ rendering the 
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ponds no longer ‘open access’.142 Second, ‘by fixing such a price to be paid for 
the use of the shares’, the commissioners intended to ‘effectually prevent their 
falling into the hands of persons without capital, and at the same time place the 
acquisition of them within probable reach of the industrious of all classes’.143 As 
a result, the shares would no longer be free but sold at a price that was 
deliberately and prohibitively expensive for those with reduced purchasing 
power. Finally, whereas the pond shares were formerly renewed annually, the 
commissioners proposed that in future they should be sold on twenty-one year 
leases with the opportunity for renewal without exposure to competition. In all, it 
was a staggering reorganisation of the ponds’ political economy. From open to 
private access; from free to priced shares; from annual to twenty-one year leases: 
all anticipated the enclosure of the ponds and their concentration into fewer, 
wealthier hands. Finally, in 1845, the Bahamian Assembly legislated, and an Act 
was passed which implemented virtually all of the commissioners’ proposals. 
The Head Rights System, a system that had functioned uniquely in the British 
Caribbean for almost a century, was overturned. It was a deliberate manoeuvre to 
control land access. 
 
The ‘proletarianisation’ of the peasantry 
 
With the introduction of twenty-one year leases, the lower classes of Turks 
Islands were pushed off the ponds as proprietors and welcomed back as wage 
labourers. As shares became concentrated into fewer hands, the need for wage 
labour grew. To re-attract the dispossessed peasantry, initially high wages had to 
be offered. This was predicted early. In 1835, Governor Blayney Balfour already 
anticipated that labourers in the salt islands would have to be induced to work 
through high wages.144 Similarly, in 1852, Governor Gregory attested, ‘No man 
will voluntary submit to it [salt raking], Except under the stimulus of very high 
wages’.145 The working conditions were simply too arduous, too unpleasant, to 
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also benefited from the fact a freedman had few alternative options available. 
Agriculture on these tiny islands was minimal. Inhabitants could migrate 
altogether, or they could work on the ponds.  
 Old patterns of dependency began to re-emerge. As ‘periods of prolonged 
drought in the salt-producing islands hindered the cultivation of food crops, 
labourers usually depended on shops operated by their employers for basic 
foodstuffs’.146 In slavery, Prince was reliant on her master to give her food. This 
did not drastically change in freedom. Wage labourers continued to be dependent 
on their employers for sustenance. But they were arguably more vulnerable 
because should rain fall, they could be thrown out of employment. As late as 
1897, Pusey was still commenting that ‘as soon as winter sets in and rain is the 
result, the salt pond operations suddenly cease and the labourer has to skip here 
and there for a living’.147 In those instances when wages failed, labourers had no 
choice but ‘to seek credit from the resident merchant’, who was often their 
employer.148 In Turks Islands, ‘the roles of employer, landlord or entrepreneur 
and of supplier of subsistence and production loans’ were usually combined.149  
Out of this situation, credit and truck systems emerged, which had their 
roots in practices ‘used in connection with the free Africans during slavery’.150 
Then, liberated Africans were apprenticed to a salt gatherer, allegedly to learn a 
trade, and received their wages in kind rather than cash. For Johnson, this 
‘provides the clearest evidence for the continuation into freedom of practices 
which had been developed during the period of slavery’ and signified a form of 
‘intensified labour coercion’.151 Salt wage labourers were able to obtain 
provisions and clothing (called ‘truck’) during their periods of unemployment, 
but they paid for it using ‘credit’ drawn off future wages. In theory, this provided 
a safety net during hard times and meant that cash, a rare commodity on the 
islands, need not be exchanged. In reality, it forced salt labourers into a chronic 
form of debt-peonage in relation to their employer/merchant/creditors. Because 
salt labourers were not always able to pay off their debts in bad salt seasons, they 
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became tied to the salt ponds and indebted to the more powerful classes of Turks 
Island society. This reliance ‘gave proprietors…a control of labour’ and in the 
absence of slavery, it ‘recreated in freedom a dependent labour force’.152  
Employer/merchant/creditors used these systems to secure a captive 
consumer base and pawn sub-quality goods. Employees were often given paper 
tokens, which could only be used at specific stores.153 Their employers owned 
these stores and charged exorbitant prices for basic provisions, undercutting and 
offsetting the benefit of any ‘high wage’. In 1847, a stipendiary magistrate for 
the area of Turks Islands and Inagua commented on the extortion prevalent 
within the credit and truck system: 
The truck system is much in vogue here & nothing but a Savings Bank 
can remedy the many evils attendant upon it. Every leaseholder is a 
Shopkeeper and every labourer pays weekly 100 per cent on the prime 
cost in the United States of America for the necessaries of life.154 
The quality of provisions could also be shocking. One observer chillingly 
remarked in 1889 that ‘not only rancid pork and No. 3 flour, but will further say 
putrid pork and No. 4 flour, flour that scarce be stomached, and at an enormous 
price had been given to the poor labourers’.155 So unfair and rigged was the 
system, that he called it a ‘partisan warfare of slavery…I mean to say that the 
labourers were bound; yes bound to their employers, as slaves were to their 
masters’.156 When Prince reflected on freedom (‘to be free is very sweet’) it is 
doubtful she had in mind such exploitative labour practices. 
These credit and truck systems flourished at Turks Islands and allowed 
saltpan holders to manipulate the work force. Salt labourers effectively became 
stuck. Unable to become proprietors, they were forced into eating sub-standard 
goods while locked in a relentless embrace with debt-peonage. In effect, they 
were no longer free to leave. For Johnson, this represented ‘a modified form of 
slavery’ and provided evidence that a monopoly of credit, rather than land, kept 
the elite classes in positions of power within post-emancipation Bahamian 
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society.157 In arguing this, he challenged O Nigel Bolland’s insistence that 
historians ‘study the interrelationship of the control of land and the control of 
labour as two aspects of a system of domination which persisted long after 
slavery was declared illegal’.158 Instead, Johnson suggested land policy 
interventions were not important to the Bahamian experience. This chapter 
would suggest a revision for Turks Islands is required. At Turks Islands, land 
policy interventions were extremely significant in shaping the newly freed 
peasantry’s ability to achieve social and economic autonomy. The Head Rights 
System, if it had continued, would have allowed all freed persons to equally 
partake in the ponds on a proportional basis to their former masters. In infertile 
Turks Islands, this was the only feasible way to create an independent livelihood 
and between 1838 and 1845 it was possible. However, the Head Rights System 
did not continue. It was deliberately dismantled. The ponds, formerly an 
inclusive commons, were enclosed and privatised. Seen from this perspective, 
the enclosure of the ponds and the credit and truck systems – a control of land 





From slavery and into freedom, labour on the saltpans was always ‘unfree’ in 
some way. This coercion was implicit because salt was inherently unpleasant to 
work with and its profitability necessitated an intense form of production. Both 
in slavery and in freedom, the experience of salt raking was visceral. Bodily 
injuries on the saltpans were particular to its production. Blindness, pickled 
limbs, salt blisters and sleep deprivation, coupled with meagre diets, all signalled 
this was an unhealthy environment in which to live and work. Moreover, due to 
the short salt season and risk of rainfall, labourers were consistently pushed to 
their limits in order to minimise risk and boost profitability. Given a viable 
alternative, it is hard to imagine a salt labourer would willingly choose this 
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profession. For the salt industry to flourish – for the few – those in power had to 
introduce coercive systems of domination. 
During Prince’s time at Turks Islands, a form of salt island slavery 
matured that shaped the lives of salt rakers in distinctive ways. The Head Rights 
System was underpinned by principles that geared the saltpans towards 
maximum productivity but offered little in terms of protection for the industry’s 
captive labourers. When it did intervene, it tried to block the development of any 
autonomy amongst enslaved people. While marronage was already difficult on 
these tiny, remote islands, the Head Rights System’s definition reduced petit 
marronage to an unprecedented degree, curtailing any temporary release from 
this pressurised system. Moreover, developing social and economic self-
sufficiency was similarly obstructed as enslaved people were prohibited from 
accumulating salt – the one commodity available with which to barter and trade. 
With no internal marketing system, the enslaved salt rakers toiled round the 
clock for their masters: there was little release and little opportunity for 
community development. Moreover, in its silence, the Head Rights System 
granted salt gatherers an inordinate amount of control over the work regimen, 
punishment practices, and provisioning regimes of the islands’ enslaved 
labourers. Beyond the pale of magisterial oversight, and with a white creole 
culture known for excess, the treatment of enslaved salt rakers largely depended 
on the character of the individual salt gatherer.  
 In freedom, systems of domination shifted but they did not end. After a 
brief experiment with universal access to the ponds, those in power sought a 
radical change in their management. The Head Rights System, which had 
prevailed over Turks Islands for almost a century, was deliberately dismantled. 
One of the last great commons of the British Caribbean was suddenly no more. It 
was an act of privatisation that forced shares back into fewer, wealthier, whiter 
hands. At the same time, powerful credit and truck systems were implemented 
that kept the newly freed labourers in a state of debt-peonage, tying them closer 
to the saltpans and making it harder for them to leave. The brief period between 
1838 and 1845, which had permitted the new peasantry to join the ponds on 
equal terms to their former masters, was precisely that: brief. Such drastic land 
and labour restructuring belies the truth: that systems of domination shifted and 
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Chapter 7: ‘Essential…for commanding the Navigation of those 





Throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, France and Britain vied 
with each other for naval supremacy.1 The Caribbean, being of naval and 
commercial importance to both these empires, was often a site of struggle. From 
1756 to 1802, it experienced more years of conflict than peace. The Seven Years’ 
War, American Revolutionary War, and French Revolutionary Wars all travelled 
to and reverberated around this space. As international warfare ebbed and 
flowed, Turks Islands did not remain isolated or unscathed. This chapter seeks to 
demonstrate that, as Out Islands of the Bahamas, Turks Islands were some of the 
most precariously placed within the British Caribbean. Yet, in the context of 
mercantilist empire, Turks Islands were also located at a significant watery 
crossroads: the Windward Passage. This chapter will argue that, despite their 
vulnerabilities, Turks Islands were able to secure critical military resources 
because of their emerging importance to British mercantilism.  
To achieve this, the chapter is divided into three parts. It begins by 
explaining the strategic importance of Turks Islands to the geopolitical interests 
of Britain and France in the eighteenth century. It will focus on the French attack 
on Turks Islands in 1764, which sparked a frenzied debate between the colonial 
governments involved. A decisive outcome of the attack was the unprecedented 
creation of a new commission for Turks Islands, which had sweeping 
consequences for the islands in question, particularly because as Out Islands 
these were highly vulnerable. The second part of this chapter will seek to address 
that Out Island vulnerability through an investigation of the natural and human 
factors inhibiting the region’s overall defensibility. The final part will then 
explain why, despite these limitations, Turks Islands’ officials were relatively 
successful compared to other Out Islands in securing small but critical military 
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resources in a period when decision-makers overwhelmingly sent Britain’s 
troops, sailors, guns and ships elsewhere. 
This chapter is rooted in a conception of the ocean that sees it as a 
contested and ‘uniquely constructed space’.2 By this, it is understood that the 
world-ocean has never been a mere ‘transport surface’ or an unmanaged, neutral 
zone.3 For Philip Steinberg, this makes the ocean not simply a space used by 
society, but a place of society and he demonstrates how historically the 
development of modern capitalism has required, implemented and been shaped 
by a particular spatiality of the world-ocean.4 Of great relevance to Turks Islands 
is his spatial analysis of ‘merchant capitalism’ or mercantilism.5 When European 
powers began to explore the Atlantic in the fifteenth century, they travelled with 
a conception of the ocean based on Mediterranean understandings of 
stewardship.6 Stewardship was rooted in the idea that while dominium could not 
be extended into the deep sea (i.e. the ocean could not be owned in a sovereign, 
territorial sense), imperium could be.7 Because of this, the ocean could act as a 
‘force-field’, a place where state power was projected, social forces interacted 
and maritime battles played out.8 The sea was ‘non-possessible’ as it resisted 
incorporation into a landed polity but parts of it could be controlled to shepherd 
resources.9 In the era of mercantilism, the idea of controlling ‘channelled 
circulation’ was fundamental.10 
This is because mercantilists assumed economic resources were finite.11 
As a result, mercantilists sought to minimise imports and maximise exports, in 
order to accumulate specie within an empire’s borders. Such a ‘static conception 
of the total economic resources in the world’ assumed trade was a mutually 
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exclusive, zero-sum game.12 Accordingly, ‘each mercantilist state developed a 
set of policies built round the control of trade…and because trade was primarily 
a marine affair, mercantilist states put a high premium on exercising social power 
at sea’.13 As European empires gravitated towards siphoning off and 
encapsulating valuable commercial routes, discrete oceanic corridors became 
contested and militarised places. 
For Lauren Benton, this created maritime empires patterned with areas of 
partial, shared or quasi-sovereignty.14 While ‘empires did lay claim to vast 
stretches of territory’, in practice they were internally variegated and had a 
quality of ‘lumpiness’ to them.15 Effective control was often limited to enclaves, 
outposts, rivers, islands and discrete ocean corridors, where ‘legal authority 
produced irregular and only roughly concentric zones of control around them’.16 
As such, European empires expanded in ‘a maritime world in which authority 
was…limited in practice to the control of sea lanes rather than extensive ocean 
zones’ and where ‘enclaves were strung like beads along interconnected 
corridors’.17 Imperial authority was not monolithic but decidedly patchy, 
contouring around channels of trade. 
When applied to the Caribbean’s passages, both Steinberg and Benton 
shed light on how valuable these became as resources of connection – umbilical 
chords linking wealthy sugar-producing islands with metropolitan ports. These 
resources of connection were anything but unmanaged, unregulated or just there. 
They were jostled for, sites of tension and jealously guarded. In this tussle, 
islands situated nearby were apt to become watery enclaves, growing in 
importance and distinctiveness, from which empires could project their imperium 
seawards. As this chapter will show, Turks Islands would become such a watery 
enclave at the end of the Bahamian archipelago, emerging as a place of 
geopolitical significance that was distinct from its Out Island neighbours. In the 
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process, Turks Islands provide a valuable case study for illuminating a socially 
constructed Caribbean Sea. 
 
The strategic importance of Turks Islands  
 
In the mid-eighteenth century, European empires broadly adhered to mercantilist 
economic practices. In the development of French mercantilism, Jean-Baptist 
Colbert proved a pivotal figure. He was appointed Minister of Finance in 1661 
and first Minister of the Navy in 1669. Under his tutelage, tariffs were introduced 
on imported manufactured goods, French merchants were encouraged to invest in 
France’s colonial trade and, critically, the French navy was dramatically 
expanded.18 On his appointment, France had only twenty-five ships of the line, 
but when he departed in 1683, this number had increased to 250.19 While the 
French navy did not frequently risk confrontation with the English navy, it was 
tasked with promoting French commerce and disrupting that of its rivals.20 
Throughout the eighteenth century, whenever inter-imperial conflicts arose in the 
Caribbean, the French would follow a policy of guerre de course: ‘commerce 
raiding as a naval strategy’.21 In a mercantilist world of finite resources, 
attacking a rival’s merchant shipping made cogent sense. In the zero-sum game 
of trade, France gained for itself what it took away from others.  
It is therefore worth noting British mercantilism did not exist in a 
vacuum, but was repeatedly colliding with a similarly aggressive and competitive 
French mercantilism. Both empires sought control over trade in a Caribbean that 
was increasingly crowded with competing powers. In this setting, mercantilism 
stoked inter-imperial tensions and overlapping trade routes became watery sites 
of contention. As Benton attests, ‘competing sovereign claims over intersecting 
corridors of sea space’ produced ‘a system of maritime regulation featuring 
persistent militarisation of ocean space’.22 Here warfare would not perform like 
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an ‘independent variable’ but was often a direct result of mercantilism’s 
competitive edge – an expression of increasing rivalry between Britain and 
France.23  
This was exemplified during the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) that 
played out in multiple colonial theatres. In its aftermath, France suffered 
humiliating defeat. Following British concern over French territorial aggression, 
it was forced to give up its North American colonies. France was left to tend to 
its most valuable possession in the Caribbean: Saint Domingue. Protecting its 
trade became a priority, particularly for Etienne Francois, the Duke of Choiseul 
and France’s new Minister of the Navy.24 However, to protect its trade France 
needed to extend imperium over the resource of connection that channelled 
circulation between the colony and metropolitan France: the Windward Passage.  
There lay a problem. At the northern entrance of the passage were Turks 
Islands and by the mid-eighteenth century these were populated with British 
subjects on an annual basis from March to November. Salt had drawn seafaring 
Bermudians to these desolate, but strategic islands. Unpopulated, they possessed 
little threat to the French. However, once populated, Turks Islands had the 
potential to radiate authority over this nearby channel and threatened to bring 
British interests into these waters. French mercantilists eyed these islands 
nervously. They would have known any provocation with Britain at this time was 
risky. Yet, in 1764, Turks Islands also did not have any effective local 
government, were completely unprotected and seemingly marginal to British 
imperial concerns. It seemed a risk worth taking. 
 
The French attack on Turks Islands  
 
On 1 June 1764, while Bermudians and their enslaved labourers were raking salt, 
a 64-gun French man-of-war with several other armed vessels appeared on the 
horizon and, ‘with Drums beating’, ‘landed a number of men’.25 The scenes at 
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Salt Key and Grand Turk were violent. One salt gatherer described how the 
invading forces ‘burnt and destroyed all the Hutts, likewise the Corn which they 
had for subsistence…[T]hey left nothing that was of Service to the English 
unburnt’.26 Those who could ran to take shelter ‘amongst the bushes’.27 The less 
fortunate were seized as the French forces carried off ‘fourteen sail of vessels 
with every person they could get hold of’ to Cape Francois, granting no time for 
belongings to be gathered.28 As a last act, the French erected several pillars 
before apparently quitting the islands. As word of the attack reached Jamaica and 
New Providence, alarm was raised. A series of urgent correspondence was 
transacted between Governor Shirley of the Bahamas, Admiral Burnaby of the 
Jamaica Station and Governor D’Estaing of Saint Domingue. After repeated 
exchanges, during which both Governors appealed to superiors in Europe for 
guidance, significant diplomatic pressure was applied from the highest sources of 
authority. In November, the French Court disavowed the proceedings and the 
French King ordered his Governor to evacuate all French subjects from Turks 
Islands, restore them to their original state, and indemnify those who had 
sustained damages in the raid.29 Admiral Burnaby sent a frigate to Turks Islands 
to supervise while the Jamaican Government made sure the Bermudians were 
compensated. The following year, the salt gatherers returned and resumed their 
modest undertaking. 
 Lasting only a few months, this event could easily be interpreted as trivial 
to imperial concerns. Doing so underestimates the ramifications it had for the 
region’s geopolitical security. In the correspondence that followed, British 
imperial and colonial actors profusely debated the meaning of this audacious 
raid. Was this a pre-meditated attempt at dispossession? If so, would it happen 
again? To draw conclusions, several aspects of the attack were vigorously 
discussed.  
First, the pillars were studied. According to Patricia Seed, when French 
colonists initially explored and claimed spaces of the New World, marks of 
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possession were often constructed.30 If the discovery took them by surprise, 
marks were created from any local material that could be found. The pillars 
assembled at Turks Islands differed fundamentally in this respect. As Governor 
D’Estaing admitted, a French frigate had been deliberately sent to carry ‘Stone 
and Lime’ to Turks Islands.31 Once assembled, the pillars bore inscriptions and 
decorations including a marble frontispiece, iron lettering and an engraved fleur 
de lys. This materiality, design and construction suggested a planned project. By 
1764, Turks Islands were no longer undiscovered territory. The pillars warned of 
an altogether more aggressive attempt, at a time of peace, to possess the islands 
for the French by knowingly dispossessing them from the British.  
Governor D’Estaing did offer a counter-narrative. He was adamant the 
pillars were not marks of possession but lighthouses intended for the benefit of 
all maritime powers. Andrew Symmer reported this following a conversation 
with the Governor at Port au Prince, shortly after the attack. Far from desiring 
any misunderstanding between the two governments, the French Governor stated 
the frigate carried up materials merely,  
…to erect two Lighthouses, one on the North Key and the other on the 
South, on which he would suffer no Coat of arms, or mark of Possession 
to be affixed, only a Latin Inscription, that these Lighthouses were 
Erected for the common benefit of all Trading Nations.32 
That Latin inscription was from Cicero: ‘in nothing are men more like gods than 
when they save their fellow men’.33 With this inscription and without a coat of 
arms, knowing these seas were full of ‘sunken rocks’, Governor D’Estaing 
painted the event as a philanthropic act for the mutual benefit of all sailors.34 
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 Their construction, however, suggested otherwise. Following the attack, 
Governor Shirley sent an Army officer, Lieutenant Brown, to Saint Domingue 
with a letter of complaint. Upon failing to gain an audience with the French 
Governor, Brown returned to New Providence via Turks Islands with Captain 
Weller who had also been sent to Saint Domingue by Admiral Burnaby. When 
Weller was likewise denied an audience, he persuaded Brown to accompany him 
to Turks Islands and help him execute his final orders ‘to knock down whatever 
marks of possession he should find they had erected’.35 As both officers landed, 
these pillars appeared suspicious. For one their decorations were highly 
suggestive. Though Governor D’Estaing urged Governor Shirley to ‘look upon 
the Fleur de Lys set upon the Top of the Phare, only as simple decoration’, that 
symbol’s historical significance and connection with the French Court was hard 
to ignore.36 Moreover, the two pillars identified both bore inscriptions, ‘Phare de 
Stainville’ and ‘Phare de Choiseul’, implying an uncomfortable French 
patronage of the land itself. Further intelligence confirmed these fears.37 ‘On the 
29th day of September’, Brown reported, ‘upon my asking Monsieur Geoffrey, 
the Gentleman who was dispatched by the Count d’Estaing to your Excellency, 
who the before mentioned Stainville was, he told me, it was a former name or 
Title of the Duke of Choiseul the present Minister of France’.38 That the Minister 
of France had pillars erected in his name on British territory undermined 
Governor D’Estaing’s argument that these were simply functional. 
Their topographical position was even more incriminating. In the case of 
the Phare de Choiseul, Brown’s certification made clear its terrestrial position 
made no sense if it was intended to function as a lighthouse: ‘the Phare de 
Choiseuile was overlooked by the land in such manner that it could be of no use 
to Pilots or mariners coming in there from the sea either by night or day, to serve 
as a Lighthouse or Land Mark’.39 This roused deep suspicions amongst the 
British officials concerned. How could a pillar with ‘no place for lights’, upon 
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‘Low ground’ and overlooked by land realistically function as a lighthouse?40 
For Governor Shirley, there was no doubt. The pillars, at the time of 
construction, were ‘doubtless’ meant ‘as a Mark of French Possession’.41  
 Secondly, intelligence reached Governor Shirley that while the French 
were at Turks Islands the salt gatherers ‘were prevailed on…to sign some 
Instrument or paper, wherein they have promised to be faithful subjects to the 
King of France’.42 In attracting British subjects to Turks Islands, salt had 
transformed them from just a cluster of deserted, unimportant islands into a 
serious threat to French shipping. However, as sworn French subjects, the threat 
these gatherers posed was defused. The diplomatic sparring that followed this 
instrument was symptomatic of the narratives Governors Shirley and D’Estaing 
spun to out-manoeuvre each other politically. According to Governor D’Estaing, 
the French had merely acquiesced to the islanders’ ‘request to be admitted into 
the Number of His Most Christian Majesty’s Subjects, or those of his Catholic 
Majesty’.43 It was ‘an Instance of Indulgence’, which matched his philanthropic 
defence of the pillars as ‘lighthouses’.44 It did not appear to Governor Shirley in 
this light. He looked upon the instrument as an oppressive attempt to ‘break’ the 
inhabitants’ ‘Allegiance to their Natural Sovereign’.45 Persons who had watched 
their belongings burnt, who had hid ‘in the Woods’ and who ‘were forced to 
surrender themselves Prisoners to prevent their being starved’, could hardly have 
made free decisions.46 Consequently, Governor Shirley excused the islanders for 
signing ‘a Paper in French’ which they did ‘not know the Contents of’ under 
circumstances of extreme duress.47 However, he required them to sign a counter-
declaration attesting to their re-allegiance to the British King.48 This instrument 
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and counter-instrument demonstrate the salt gatherers’ subject-hood was highly 
contested in the act of possession. While the pillars were interpreted to mean 
dominion over the land, the instrument threatened possession of its people.  
 The character of the salt gatherers was another focal point in these 
discussions. The question revolved around whether or not these people were 
peaceable settlers or lawless pirates. Benton’s analysis of the writings of 
Alberico Gentili, an Italian jurist writing in the 1580s, sheds light on this topic. 
According to Benton, ‘Gentili defined piracy as any taking not authorised by the 
sovereign. Takings at sea were merely analogous to robbery on land’.49 Of 
salience to Turks Islands was the ‘further implication…that any sovereign could 
extend the jurisdiction of its municipal law to foreign lands by asserting the 
existence of “pirates” there – or the absence of a controlling polity’.50 In 1764, 
Governor D’Estaing utilised this legal discourse in his defence: ‘some time ago 
two or three French Vessels had run ashore upon those Islands; that the people 
who were at that time settled on the place had drove the French from their 
Vessels and seized upon their Cargoes, which they carried off’.51 When the 
crews reported this ‘robbery’ back at the Cape, the French Governor ‘ordered up 
the Brilliant Man of War, and two Frigates with orders, that in case there was 
any Person with a Commission from his Britannick Majesty, they should commit 
no Violence, but only make complaint’.52 However, ‘finding no Person at the 
place Commissioned from his Britannick Majesty, he looked upon the Settlers in 
a Light not much differing from Pirates’.53 As pirates, there could be no 
objection to their removal to Cape Francois. 
However, when Symmer presented Governor D’Estaing with his 
commission to settle the islands after the attack, this legal discourse constricted 
how the Governor could react. His surprise was evident. Here was proof that a 
British official was on, or would soon be on, the islands with a commission for 
that purpose. As such, the inhabitants could no longer be legally defined as 
pirates, attached as they were to a sovereign: ‘The Count D’Estaing told your 
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Memorialist, that although in his opinion Spain had the best Right to them [Turks 
Islands], he gave up all his Pretensions’.54 Moreover, the Governor ‘released’ all 
the prisoners taken to the Cape ‘on finding the Vessels really belong[ed] to his 
Britannick Majesty’s Subjects’.55  
Finally, broader evidence was mounting that France wanted an enclave in 
the region. By 1764, it was known both French and British interests coveted 
these seas. In 1749 and 1753 (both times of peace), the French had similarly 
raided Turks Islands and Inagua. In 1749, they had landed cattle while erecting 
posts engraved with ‘the continuation of the Possession of Lewis 15th’.56 In its 
aftermath, Symmer reported that the French ‘had actual Surveys made by order 
of Monsieur Rouille of all the Passages amongst the Bahama Islands and by that 
Minister’s Command a Chart was published in the year 1750’ (see Figure 7.1).57 
This map delineated the seas around the Bahamas and demonstrated ‘of what 
consequence the possession of these islands be to the West India Trade’.58  
In September 1764, Brown also recalled his surprise when he was shown a map 
while at the Cape:   
I contracted a very Intimate Acquaintance with a Gentleman who lodged 
in the same house with me and was one of the Engineers employed by the 
Court of France to make a Plan of the Cape and the Environs…to which 
was annexed a Map of the French Settlements on Hispaniola 
distinguished into thirteen different departments for the several Engineers 
and numbered from 1 to 13, in which Map I was told by the 
aforementioned Gentlemen that No. 9 was his district and I saw the Island 
of Heneago [Inagua] taken in with that of the Cape.59 
In this passage, Brown emphasised that not only did the Court of France, under 
its Ministry of the Navy, sanction this project but also Inagua was explicitly 
included within the map of French settlements. For Brown, this cartographical  
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Figure 7.1: Map of Saint Domingue denoting its nearby passages including 
Débouquement des Islas Turques (the Turks Islands Passage), 1750. Jacques 
Nicholas Bellin, ‘Reduced map of the island of Santo Domingo and its passages to 
serve the ships of the king. By order of Mr. Rouillé chr. Count of Jouy, & ca. 





representation, unashamedly disclosed by the French engineer, convinced him of 
France’s imperial ambitions for the Bahamas region.  
This concern was matched by intelligence gathered locally that was sent 
to the Secretary of State on the most recent fortifications at Saint Domingue. 
Symmer related,  
Ever since the Peace, the French have been incessantly employed in 
putting their West India Islands in the best Posture, both with Regard to 
defending their Possession in case of being attacked, and to be in a 
Capacity of annoying the British, if a War should suddenly happen.60 
Saint Domingue, ‘the Chief’, presented a specific danger to Jamaica as it was 
‘[n]ow not only capable of defending itself…but in all Probability, in case of a 
War’s breaking out, might ruin Jamaica, before a sufficient Strength could be 
sent from Britain’.61 In particular, the commodious harbour at the Mole by Cape 
Nichola was ‘strongly fortifying, and a considerable Garrison placed there’.62 
With the ‘advantage of its situation’, the Jamaica trade was at risk as ‘all our 
vessels from Jamaica are obliged to beat up as high to windward as Cape Nichola 
in order to secure their Passage thro’ the Crooked Island Channel’.63  
These pillars, instruments of allegiance, repetitive attacks, cartographic 
records and intelligence reports all persuaded prominent British metropolitan and 
colonial figures that France’s invasion of Turks Islands in 1764 was anything but 
an isolated, opportunistic event. Though these attacks were unsuccessful, their 
temporal proximity and occurrence in times of peace raised significant concerns 
over a French ‘grand design’ for the region. The advantages France could accrue 
were obvious. Admiral Burnaby warned, Turks Islands ‘consists of a Number of 
Keys, the Northernmost and Southernmost being the chief and lies in the Tract 
through which the French Ships usually pass from Hispaniola to Europe, and is 
therefore of great Consequence’.64 When populated with British subjects, Turks 
Islands presented a real threat to French shipping. Conversely, if populated with 
French subjects, Turks Islands would become an asset to French mercantilist 
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strategy. Governor Shirley went even further. Noting the easternmost Bahamas 
contained ‘some of the most essential islands for commanding the Navigation of 
those Seas’, he argued, should the French gain a foothold there, the Out Islands 
would fall like dominoes, and ‘in a very short time’ the French would ‘make 
themselves Masters of all the Bahama Islands’.65 He warned this was ‘the real 
Scheme of the French in their Seizure of Turks Islands…to possess themselves in 
the end (if they can compass it) of all the Bahama Islands’.66 In that event, the 
sea passages shepherding the Floridian and Canadian trades would also be in 
jeopardy. Different threads of Britain’s mercantilist patchwork were therefore 
quickly woven together. Repossessing Turks Islands became synonymous with 
commanding the Windward Passage, countering French fortifications at the Mole 
and safeguarding the wider geopolitical security of the Bahamian archipelago. 
The sum British correspondence in and around 1764 reveals the real, rippling 
anxiety over maintaining Turks Islands’ possession. It demonstrates how an 
attack that could have been dealt with as an isolated event was reinterpreted as a 
much broader threat on the channelled circulation that Steinberg argues 
underpinned Britain’s mercantile success. Though Turks Islands were tiny, their 
salt ponds had attracted large numbers of British subjects to populate them, 
which had transformed the islands into important nodes capable of projecting 
power over this amphibious region. Here the sea was anything but a neutral 
space. It was a managed place where, as Benton attests, maritime powers 
increasingly paid attention ‘to strategic points, especially islands, along maritime 
corridors of control’.67 
This was a turning point in the administrative and military organisation of 
the islands. British officials agreed security in this area had been compromised. 
They sought a two-fold solution. First, the Jamaica and Leeward Island Stations 
were ordered to send naval vessels on annual, routine visits to each of Britain’s 
Caribbean possessions to check and prevent any current or future foreign 
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encroachments.68 Second, in accordance with British ideas on possession that 
centred around notions of property, development, and ‘the intent to remain’, 
Governor Shirley and Symmer persuaded Westminster officials to consider the 
permanent settlement of the Out Islands as a means for securing their title.69 
Bolstering the salt industry would draw more Bermudians into this trade, 
cementing British possession. Though Symmer had been granted a provisional 
commission, on 14 March 1766 he was officially appointed the first Turks 
Islands King’s Agent.70 The King’s Agent would have wide powers to protect, 
aid and defend the trade of the islands and those who resorted there to rake salt.71 
Its creation sent an unambiguous and authoritative message out into the 
surrounding neighbourhood of powers. Whereas previously French imperialists 
may have judged these islands as marginal to British concerns and amenable to 
French incorporation, the geopolitical climate had now demonstrably shifted.  
 
The vulnerability of the Bahamas 
 
From thereon, Turks Islands would become one of Benton’s ‘anomalous legal 
spaces’ of empire – a unique watery enclave of quasi-sovereignty that put the 
islands at an advantage within an otherwise persistently vulnerable Bahamian 
archipelago.72 The second part of this chapter seeks to demonstrate and explain 
that vulnerability as it tracks a course through the American and French 
Revolutionary Wars. 
The American Revolutionary War ushered in a period of great instability 
for the Bahamas, as diplomatic protocols were suspended and privateers re-
infested its waters. On 3 March 1776, an invading rebel force of ‘about three 
hundred Marines and Rifle Men’ attacked Nassau with a design to seize its 
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gunpowder and munitions stores.73 The invading force landed east of the town 
and after two days both Fort Montagu and Fort Nassau had fallen into their 
hands, leaving the town unprotected and its inhabitants in a state of capitulation. 
The success of this raid reflected Nassau’s inadequate land and sea defences as 
well as the lack of military personnel. Prior to the invasion, ‘the Company of the 
fourteenth Regiment was removed from hence, and the Savage Sloop of War 
recalled from this Station’.74 This left the island ‘in a defenceless State’, without 
garrison troops to man the forts and the only remaining ship of war unfit to 
engage in defensive manoeuvres.75 Governor Browne ‘had not even a sick man 
left behind’ and had to rely on mustering the militia, but ‘few…were furnished 
with more than common Fowling Pieces’.76 After Fort Montagu was abandoned, 
the practicality of defending Fort Nassau was assessed. Governor Browne 
consulted his Council and ‘the majority…were of the opinion that as most of the 
Gun Carriages were defective, and as different kinds of Shot and other material 
Stores were wanting, it was not defensible’.77 With the prospect of effective 
resistance dwindling, the gunpowder stored within the fort was shipped off the 
island while the ailing naval vessel was put to sea to prevent it falling into enemy 
hands.78 Without gunpowder, effective ordinance or a ship of war, the remaining 
ill-equipped militiamen deserted. Nassau fell and after two weeks of occupation 
the American forces departed, having stripped the town of its remaining stores. 
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In the aftermath, the town’s defence, governance and finances were left in 
tatters. Thomas Atwood, an aid to the Governor, despaired, ‘they 
have…dismantled our Forts and possessed themselves of every serviceable Part 
of the Cannon, Shot and Stores’.79 Recognising the threat of more invasions, the 
Assembly passed a law for ‘appointing Commissioners to put the Forts Nassau 
and Montague in a defensible State’.80 But ‘as no new Fund was provided for 
defraying the Expence’ President Brown was ‘doubtful whether anything can be 
done’.81 Over a year later, he reported, 
Nothing has been done to them [the Forts]…so that the port is in a 
manner open to any enemy; and as none of His Majesty’s Vessels have 
been here since the Schooner St John left…the Armed Vessels of the 
Rebellious Colonies have often ventured amongst these islands.82 
By 1778, the economic repercussions of the war were strangulating the public 
purse and the Assembly was unable to put ‘His Majesty’s Forts and the Island in 
general in the best posture of defence’.83 Consequently, on 27 January 1778, 
Nassau was attacked again. A ‘party of marines’ from an American ship of war 
landed and ‘marched silently to Fort Nassau and took Possession of it’.84 Upon 
threatening to fire on the town, the inhabitants capitulated, and after seizing 
several ships, the ‘Americans…spiked up the Guns, destroyed the little Powder 
that was in the Fort, and sailed with their Prizes’.85 Nassau’s need for a 
detachment of soldiers or a sloop of war was evident. 
However, when troops were sent, they were often in such a state of ill 
health that their capability was much reduced. As J R McNeill has convincingly 
argued, from the late eighteenth century Caribbean ports were conducive to the 
																																																								
79 Ibid, pp. 364-365. 
80 ‘President Brown to the Secretary of State’, 2 May 1776, in John Brown, Montefort 
Browne, George Germain et al, ‘The Taking of the Bahamas by the Continental Navy in 
1776’, The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 49 No. 4 (1925), p. 
351. 
81 Ibid. 
82 ‘President Brown to the Secretary of State’, 10 May 1776, in John Brown, Montefort 
Browne, George Germain et al, ‘The Taking of the Bahamas by the Continental Navy in 
1776’, The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 49 No. 4 (1925), p. 
359. 
83 The National Archives, Address of the Bahamas Assembly, 1778, CO 23/24/35. 
84 The National Archives, Governor Gambier to the Secretary of State, 25 February 




spread of pathogenic forces, particularly yellow fever and malaria. Differential 
immunity ensured these diseases were ‘partisan’, making incoming British 
soldiers and sailors tragically vulnerable.86 In April 1782, Governor Maxwell 
complained of the arrival of reinforcements who were by his description 170 
invalids.87 In September 1797, during the French Revolutionary Wars, the state 
of the troops sent to the Bahamas was even worse. President Hunt lamented, 
‘The Condition of the 32nd Regiment in Garrison here is wretched beyond 
description’.88 This put the colony at expense it could ill-afford building 
hospitals while several inhabitants lost their lives to yellow fever, including the 
Governor’s. By the close of the eighteenth century, the problem of securing 
Nassau’s defence had rippled down the ages. 
If Nassau struggled to defend itself, the problem of defending the Out 
Islands was severe. As Geoffrey Ward states, throughout the eighteenth century, 
France subscribed to guerre de course in its conflicts with Britain.89 By 
disrupting the flow of mercantilism, these attacks on commerce ‘became a 
practical means of forcing an opponent to come to terms’.90 In the 1790s, guerre 
de course was extensively deployed in the Bahamas as privateers sought to 
project French imperium into these seas. Memorials to the Governor from 
pleading planters and merchants in the Out Islands were numerous. In July 1794, 
a memorial deplored the ‘depredations of the French Privateers among the 
Islands to Windward’.91 In particular the subscribers mentioned a recent ‘arrival 
of another Schooner from Charleston called the Naibonnoise carrying 12 Guns 
and fifty Men’.92 An instrument of protest sworn to by William Elliot and John 
Bullard brings to life what guerre de course meant in Bahamian waters. These 
two men were the captain and first mate of the Bahamian vessel, Adventure, 
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which had sailed from New Providence with a cargo ‘loaded with provisions and 
other supplies for Crooked Island and the Caicos’.93 Ten days into their journey, 
at three o’clock in the afternoon, their fortunes turned: ‘a schooner [the 
Naibonnoise]…under English Colours’ bore down on them and on coming up 
‘fired a shot at the Adventure and hoisted the National Flag of France’.94 
Outnumbered, the Bahamian crew were detained until ‘eleven o’clock at night 
when they put’ Elliot and Bullard ‘in the Adventure’s Boat about ten or eleven 
miles from the shore, and dismissed them, after plundering every thing but the 
Cloathes on their backs’.95 On board Adventure were seven enslaved persons, but 
only five were reported alive upon capture and they were seized along with the 
cargo. For these enslaved persons, their lives were more uncertain than ever; for 
the owner of Adventure and its cargo, this was an acute financial loss; for the 
Crooked and Caicos Islanders, their food supply did not arrive. This singular 
event was often repeated, in various forms, across the seaways of the exposed 
and vulnerable Out Islands. It was French naval mercantilism in offensive action.  
Planters and merchants demanded protection but Governors struggled to 
oblige. In July 1793, Governor Dunmore wrote to the Secretary of State,  
I can assure you that on the Out Islands, they have neither Arms, 
Ammunition or Accoutrements of any kind; I have distributed among 
them what could possibly be spared, and there are not now above four 
hundred Stand of Arms in His Majesty’s Magazines, and it would require 
at least Two Thousand Stand with Ammunition for the different Islands.96 
Here Governor Dunmore revealed the gross discrepancy between the needs of 
the Out Islands and the availability of resources in New Providence. It discloses 
a colonial hierarchy whereby Nassau, as the colony’s trading hub, was 
prioritised. The overall picture was of a provincial government unable to 
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Administering an elongated archipelago  
 
This was partly due to the challenge of administrating an elongated archipelago 
like the Bahamas. Governors were keen to point this out. To perform his duties 
in 1781, Governor Maxwell mused that visiting the Out Islands ‘will necessarily 
call the Governor often from the seat of Government’.97 The reality of this 
sparked an on-going debate around funds available for the service. These funds 
were restricted to an annuity of £700 annually and were applied indiscriminately 
across the British Caribbean, despite the colonies’ varied topographies. In 
practice, the allowance, quite literally, did not go far enough. Governor Dunmore 
reported in April 1790 that he had to cut his tour short because of a lack of funds. 
While he was able to transmit ‘a State of these Islands, so far as my own 
observation goes, of those I have visited’, he was ‘for the present deprived of the 
means of visiting any more of these Islands, as My Lord Commissioners of His 
Majesty’s Treasury complained much of the expense’.98 Without visiting all the 
inhabited and habitable islands himself, the Governor had to rely on second- and 
third-hand accounts to report on the state of the colony’s defences. 
Frustrated, he tried to explain to the Treasury the geographical features of 
the Bahamas, which made hiring suitable vessels comparatively more expensive: 
The extent of this Government be at least 400 Leagues and all the Islands 
that are settled being to Windward of this place requires a Vessel of some 
size to beat up that Distance in those Seas, and a larger one than those 
employed by the Governors of the West India Islands, who have but short 
trips to make and that but seldom.99 
The scale and nature of the Bahamian archipelago demanded special 
consideration. The Bahamas archipelago consisted of over 700 islands within ‘a 
dangerous sea’ full of hazardous reefs and sand bars.100 Moreover, because of the 
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direction of trade winds, sailing southeast along the archipelago was a daunting 
undertaking. On the rare occasion a Governor did visit Turks Islands, it could 
take him six weeks to make the trip.101 Such wind conditions, treacherous reefs, 
and extensive distances, all conspired to make navigating around the Bahamas a 
cumbersome, expensive enterprise. Moreover, by 1812, the annuity was stopped 
altogether.102 Subsequently, Governors would need to rely on boats from His 
Majesty’s visiting ships, which were seldom on the station, or borrow from 
individuals whose small vessels were designed for wrecking and turtling.103  
As a result, Bahamian Governors often failed to visit islands under their 
jurisdiction, and the links between them remained poor. This was not conducive 
to centralised management in peacetime let alone during war. Together, these 
examples indicate the real challenge of effecting good government over an 
elongated archipelago that was ‘extensive, numerous, desolate and detached’.104  
 
The hierarchical deployment of military resources  
 
However, the archipelagic environment alone cannot explain the Bahamas’ 
persistent vulnerability, as with adequate resources this could have been 
mitigated. It is necessary to understand why the Bahamas did not receive 
sufficient military resources to combat these geographical challenges.  
In the British Caribbean, the defence of colonies rested primarily not on 
garrisons and forts but on naval vessels. As one Secretary of State indicated, ‘it is 
upon the Superiority of the Fleets of Great Britain that the Defence and Security 
of her Colonies ever have, and ever must principally depend’.105 As Britain’s 
imperial possessions stretched across the Atlantic, defending ‘every Bay and 
Creek’ with fortified land defences ‘where it is possible an Enemy may land’ was 
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simply unfeasible.106 Preference was to invest in a mobile navy that could be 
deployed as, when, and where needed, responding flexibly to events. While this 
made sense on an imperial level, it could put individual islands at risk.  
This was apparent during the French Revolutionary Wars when large 
expeditionary forces were sent to specific islands and seaways of the Caribbean. 
At that time, as Michael Duffy has shown, the Caribbean was by no means an 
inconsequential sideshow to a European war.107 Britain’s decision to engage in 
the Caribbean rested on mercantilism’s strong association between naval power 
and commerce. A Secretary of State reflected, ‘navigation and commerce are 
inseparably connected, and that nation must be the most powerful maritime state 
which possesses the most extensive commerce’.108 Underpinning this logic was 
‘the belief that the navy could deliver victory’ which, for James Davey, ‘had 
been a cornerstone of British strategy since at least the 1730s’.109 Such rationale 
propelled large expeditions to the Caribbean but in their geographic specificity, 
they reveal a bias towards protecting the sugar trade that, in turn, proffered 
enhanced defence for certain islands. The title of Duffy’s book, Soldiers, Sugar 
and Seapower, is telling in this respect. While recognising other commodities’ 
contribution, the investments and profits in the sugar trade were central to 
Duffy’s depiction of the Caribbean as ‘a precarious money-box’.110 According to 
Christer Petley and John Mcleer, ‘the sugar islands of the Caribbean remained 
the most important colonial possessions within the British empire until after the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars’ and as a result the protection of those islands were 
‘a key priority for British statesmen’.111 With prominent leaders attaching more 
importance to Britain’s sugar colonies during the war, it is unsurprising they 
received better protection. Because the Bahamas lacked inherent economic value 
in and of themselves, they were inescapably placed lower down the colonial 
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hierarchy; a hierarchy that informed a geographically specific deployment of 
military resources that contoured around the sugar trade. 
This protective bias is notable in the erratic naval support the Bahamas 
received during the 1790s. In the first instance, many inhabitants argued they 
needed more than one sloop of war in the Bahamas at all times. Petitions on the 
subject were common. In April 1795, inhabitants of Crooked Island appealed to 
the Governor expressing this concern. At the time, HMS Scorpion was on the 
station, but according to the subscribers, ‘she has such a range, that it is out of 
her power to grant a sufficient protection to the commerce of Great Britain in this 
Channel’.112 Rather than overstretch the Scorpion’s ‘force-field’ capacities and 
compromise the security of the whole, they suggested a further sloop of war 
should be stationed in the eastern region for their protection. Governors tended to 
agree. In May 1797, Governor Forbes wrote to the Secretary of State on the 
colony’s estimated naval requirements underscoring the ‘necessity’ of there 
being not one or two but three sloops of war on the Bahamas station.113 He 
recommended that each sloop cruise a particular passage: one ‘among the 
Windward Islands of the Bahamas and the Crooked Passage’, ‘another off the 
Coast of Cuba and through the Old Bahamas Straits’, and ‘a third should remain 
in our [Nassau’s] Harbour’.114 The only way the Bahamas could be protected 
effectively was through control of its sea passages. 
Yet, in reality, the Bahamas were often without a single sloop of war. On 
6 September 1777, a year after the American attack on Nassau in 1776, Governor 
Browne reported he had written to both Jamaica and New York seeking aid, but 
‘none of His Majesty’s Ships or Vessels have yet come hither’.115 As a result, 
‘armed vessels of the Rebels’ continued to ‘infest these islands’.116 In June 1793, 
Governor Dunmore testified to ‘the apprehension’ amongst the inhabitants 
‘created by what they think a want of attention to their safety, in not a single 
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sloop of war being sent here for their protection’.117 These complaints form a 
portion of a much larger source base, but they suggest a growing discontent 
emerging between the civil establishment and the Admiralty over the colony’s 
sea defences. As Sian Williams explains, the ‘visible presence in Caribbean 
waters of these [naval] ships…demonstrated to local colonists Britain’s 
significant investment in their protection’.118 Conversely, their absence was an 
ominous sign. 
Without adequate naval protection, the geographical obstacles inherent 
within the Bahamian archipelago became insurmountable problems. These 
factors had a dynamic relationship with each other that was mutually reinforcing. 
As a result, the Out Islands were some of the most precariously placed in the 
British Caribbean. Nassau could not provide for their adequate protection. In a 
mercantilist construction of ocean-space, it resolutely failed to project any sort of 
‘force-field’ over this amphibious region. As the easternmost islands of this 
chain, Turks Islands were acutely vulnerable, but they benefited from the fact 
they did not have to rely on Nassau for protection. They could and would project 
their own ‘force-field’. 
 
The defence of Turks Islands 
 
When Turks Islands were granted a King’s Agent in the aftermath of the French 
attack in 1764, their position within the British Empire changed. No longer an 
inconsequential margin of the Bahamas, these most out of ‘Out Islands’ began to 
perform like one of Benton’s ‘enclaves’ standing sentry at the northern entrance 
of the Windward Passage where ‘layers of [British] authority thickened’.119 The 
British Government’s intention for these islands was clear. In their pursuit of 
salt, Bermudian salt gatherers had inadvertently changed these once deserted 
islands into potentially strategic nodes. With the protection of a King’s Agent, 
their wealth and population would only increase, helping Turks Islands act as an 
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authoritative centre from which a ‘force-field’ could be projected out over the 
nearby Windward Passage. By default, the islands would also emerge as an 
anomalous legal space, in which the King’s Agent had discretionary powers to 
implement imperial orders, utilise his diplomatic influence and corral the islands’ 
growing internal resources for their defence. In an archipelago dogged by 
vulnerability, Turks Islands would become a small watery enclave with political 
and economic leverage. This was seen most noticeably during the French 
Revolutionary Wars.  
In 1789, Alexander Murray was appointed King’s Agent.120 For Turks 
Islands, the King’s Agent was a lifeline for their defence and placed them in an 
advantageous position amongst the Out Islands. Unlike neighbouring Caicos 
Islands or Crooked Island, Turks Islands had an official on the spot designated 
for their exclusive protection that was granted authority by the King. In the 
1790s, although Turks Islands were prey to multiple depredations from 
privateers, the position and policies of the King’s Agent largely protected them 
from the ruin and total abandonment witnessed on other islands.  
For one, the position of King’s Agent conferred direct access to the 
Secretary of State and Bahamas Governor. This access provided an open, and 
expected, channel of communication through which the King’s Agent was 
required to methodically report on the state of the islands under his command. 
His position ensured that doors to influential decision-makers were open. 
Moreover, it was a position of trust. This trust engendered great responsibility 
but it was also highly empowering. Magisterial recognition for the King’s Agent 
rippled down the colonial governance structure, as neighbouring Governors and 
visiting Commanders of the Admiralty learned from the King’s example to 
address his Agent with the respect his position conferred. It drove the Secretary 
of State to insist the Bahamas Governor make the King’s Agent a permanent 
member of his Council so that he could benefit from the latter’s insights.121 Most 
importantly, it ensured ministers in London never disregarded the advice and 
warnings of the King’s Agent when his despatches landed on their desks. Not 
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many London ministers could boast of the specialist knowledge in salt 
production that the King’s Agent espoused. This combination of improved access 
to power while being in a position of trust helped the King’s Agent acquire a 
level of influence other Out Island residents lacked. 
Secondly, the King’s Agent was able to take independent steps on the 
spot to improve the islands’ sea defences at critical moments. In September 
1794, Murray reported to the Secretary of State that ‘some time ago’ the 
Bahamian Governor had been obliged to recall from Turks Islands the 
detachment of the 47th Regiment sent for their protection.122 ‘Since which time’, 
Murray lamented, ‘we have been under constant apprehension from the Enemy’s 
privateers; but lately they have been much more alarming than usual, as they 
have taken a number of Vessels belonging to the Bahama Islands just leeward of 
us’.123 At this time Murray may have been referring to nearby Long Island and 
Crooked Island whose inhabitants were reportedly cut off from the rest of the 
Bahamas by French privateers.124 But whereas those Out Islanders had no 
authority or leverage to raise sea defences, Murray was able to take direct 
ameliorative action. In response to mounting security concerns, Murray ‘thought 
it necessary…to hire an Armed Vessel on the Government’s Account’.125 This 
vessel, the armed cutter Victory, was fitted with ten barrage guns, three pounders 
and manned by fifteen men including their captain, Archibald Graham.126 It was 
for the sole protection of Turks Islands and it began its employment on 7 
September 1794. This was the same day Murray wrote to the Secretary of State 
informing him of these plans. In fact, the Duke of Portland did not receive 
Murray’s despatch until three months after Victory had formally commenced its 
activities.127 That this arrangement could be orchestrated on the spot, without 
needing prior approval from London, is testimony to the authority Murray’s 
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position commanded. There was no doubt, in Graham or Murray’s mind, that the 
Treasury would retrospectively honour these payments.   
It helped the Bahamas Governor supported Murray’s actions. When 
Murray drew on the Treasury for the first payment of Victory, he did so with the 
‘advice and approbation of the Governor General of the Bahama Islands’.128 In 
so doing, the King’s Agent was able to take confident steps to improve the 
islands’ defences, knowing he had the support of the local Governor should 
disagreements with the metropolitan government arise. This was important 
because it was an expense the metropolitan government did not approve of. As 
early as September 1795, the Secretary of State was reprimanding Governor 
Dunmore for ‘the very large amount of expences already incurred by your 
Lordship’s Orders for the service denominated by your Lordship “The 
Department of Gallies and other Armed Vessels etc”’.129 Governor Dunmore was 
ordered to discontinue their employment with immediate effect and Murray was 
sent a copy of the same despatch for his ‘future guidance and direction with 
respect to the vessel [Victory] in Question’.130 The minister wanted Victory, and 
any other armed vessels, discharged.  
But this did not happen. Bills for Victory continued to arrive at the 
Treasury until 1799 when it was no longer fit for service. In its stead, Murray 
hired the armed schooner Admiral Duncan. This was a much larger vessel. 
Admiral Duncan had ‘Ten Double Three Pounders and two six Pounders for 
Chase Guns, Thirty men and Twenty Stand of small arms’.131 Unsurprisingly, the 
Bahamas Governor reported ‘the expense to Government on this occasion is very 
considerably increased’, but since the situation in nearby Saint Domingue was 
increasingly volatile, Governor Dowdeswell approved of its hiring.132 The 
Secretary of State learned of this four months after Admiral Duncan began its 
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hire and immediately called for its discharge.133	However, like his predecessors, 
Governor Dowdeswell found imperative reasons to keep the armed vessel 
employed.134 This direct refutation of ministerial orders reveals how far Turks 
Islands had come: no longer overlooked Out Islands lacking intrinsic jurisdiction, 
they were an authoritative centre in which armed vessels could be hired on the 
spot and subsequently charged to the Treasury in London. 
 Moreover, evidence suggests the presence of these armed vessels worked. 
When Murray was called to defend his actions, he insisted the employment of 
Victory had been ‘absolutely necessary’ and attended with ‘good 
consequence’.135 He related a case concerning the ‘capture of one of the Enemy’s 
privateers by His Majesty’s Sloop of War, the Scorpion’.136 Upon an 
examination of the privateer’s logbook, its original intent was revealed. It had 
planned to join forces with another privateer to ‘cut out all the British Vessels’ at 
Turks Islands.137 However, they were put off, deterred by ‘the protection 
afforded by the appearance of [an] Armed Vessel and a small Battery on 
shore’.138 The efficacy of this deterrence was the reason why Out Islanders 
regularly appealed to the Governor and Admiralty for vessels to cruise the region 
for their joint security. They understood the need for British armed vessels to 
combat France’s guerre de course. However, they were often disappointed. The 
fact Turks Islands had an armed vessel for its exclusive protection was therefore 
quite extraordinary.  
Thirdly, the King’s Agent was able to marshal internal resources to 
safeguard the islands’ security. By the late 1790s, the wealth of the salt industry 
had vastly increased, aided by the formal protection of the King’s Agent. When 
Murray began his superintendence in 1790, there were ‘only from 500 to 600 
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people, inhabiting some miserable Huts on a sandy uncultivated Desert’.139 
Accordingly, Crown revenue from salt was about £400 annually, while the 
amount of bushels produced averaged 350,000.140 Eleven years later, Murray 
could boast the population had increased to 1,300.141 Crown revenue had 
increased ten-fold and the amount of salt produced had almost doubled.142 These 
figures suggest Turks Islands had become a more prosperous and populous 
watery enclave whose population not only had a greater stake in the islands’ 
protection but could also contribute more towards their defence. In 1796, when 
ordnance supplies were obtained from Jamaica the inhabitants agreed to pay for 
the erection of a water battery to house them.143 It was sworn by oath that the salt 
gatherers would ‘bind’ themselves ‘to pay the sum of two Dollars (when called 
upon) for each such Slave…[they] may receive in his Majesty’s Ponds towards 
liquidating the public debts’.144 Work began immediately on the erection of 
batteries and by 1799 there were three protecting the principle landing places.145 
In 1803, Murray estimated the inhabitants had defrayed ‘upwards of 27,000 
Dollars…among themselves by general assessment, which Sum they expended in 
the execution of Forts, buying canon, Labour etc’.146 This capacity to raise 
revenue from the inhabitants was a real advantage for Turks Islands’ defence. 
The King’s Agent was also able to encourage loyal behaviour from the 
inhabitants through the introduction of wartime regulations. In 1795, he 
successfully persuaded the white inhabitants to sign an agreed set of directives 
that would govern their conduct for the duration of the French Revolutionary 
Wars. In previous decades, the islands had often been abandoned quickly in 
response to foreign incursions. The regulations were therefore designed ‘as an 
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encouragement to Individuals to stay and defend the same’.147 In their operation, 
they employed the proverbial carrot and stick. As pond shares were the resource 
to be coveted at Turks Islands, these were the bargaining chips. The first article 
promised an extra share for every white man who swore he would not ‘quit the 
island should the War continue’ during the salt season. At the same time he 
committed himself to any necessary guard duties and his enslaved to any labour 
the defensive fortifications required.148 However, the penalty of not conforming 
to the first article was revealed in the second. If a white man should ‘quit the 
Island in the hour of danger’, he would forego the right to any shares the 
following salt season.149 Similarly, the third article decreed that if any 
slaveholder denied the use of his enslaved for the defence of the islands, the pond 
shares attached to those enslaved persons would be forfeited. These regulations 
were kept in place until the termination of the French Revolutionary Wars in 
1802. They reveal how pond shares were manipulated to become powerful tools 
for enforcing a sense of duty amongst the inhabitants, meeting the islands’ labour 
requirements and deterring their abandonment during attacks.  
Finally, Murray was able to raise an effective militia on the islands. In 
July 1790, through his ‘influence on the inhabitants’, Murray raised three 
companies consisting of two white companies and one black company ‘without 
Government being at any expense’.150 In total, this encapsulated 150 men.151 
They ‘were all regularly disciplined and trained to arms, taking nightly their tour 
of duty at the different Batteries’.152 In theory and in practice, they swore to do 
their duty. As Murray related, in 1797,  
The Vengeance, a French Ship of War of 50 Guns, came for the express 
purpose of capturing or destroying the property in Turks Islands but from 
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the Resistance made by the embodied Companies and the State of the 
Batteries she was compelled to steer off.153 
Murray went on to testify that ‘several other attempts have been made from St 
Domingo but owing to the regular discipline of the Inhabitants they universally 
proved abortive’.154  
Accordingly, these companies and batteries were successful in projecting 
a ‘force-field’ from the land over the sea to repel enemy invasions. In the 1790s, 
the men who manned and funded these defensive measures owed their presence 
and wealth at Turks Islands to the salt industry. Without salt, the population and 
prosperity of these islands would never have been significant. As it was, these 
manned companies and publicly funded batteries, alongside wartime regulations 
and armed vessels, ensured the islands were never successfully attacked during 
the 1790s. 
This is not to argue Turks Islands were invulnerable after 1766. During 
the late eighteenth century they were attacked on several occasions. For example, 
in 1778, ‘A French Vessel of War made an Attack on Turks Islands…and kept 
up a continual Fire on the Town upwards of Six Hours’.155 A day later, when 
most of the inhabitants had already abandoned the islands, a second vessel 
arrived and ‘landed about Sixty Marines’, plundered the town and seized a 
Bermuda sloop before departing.156 In 1781, a ‘small Fleet from the Cape’ again 
attacked Turks Islands and ‘carried off all the Salt’.157 Finally, in February 1783, 
three French ships of war armed with 150 soldiers landed and temporarily took 
control of the islands.158 These disruptive attacks indicate how, like other Out 
Islands, Turks Islands could at times be overtly vulnerable. However, after 1766 
their relative vulnerability was consistently less and by the French Revolutionary 
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Wars the balance had decidedly shifted. In these late years of the eighteenth 
century, Turks Islands had become an authoritative centre, a watery enclave, 




During the mid-eighteenth century, Turks Islands emerged as a point of interest 
for French mercantilism. In an era when resources were considered finite and 
trade was a zero-sum game, maintaining control of channelled circulation 
through commanding discrete ocean corridors was key. As a result, ocean-space 
was militarised and islands located next to these waterways were often drawn 
into the fray, becoming local centres of authority from which an empire could 
project its imperium or ‘force-field’ seawards. For this reason, in the aftermath of 
the Seven Years’ War France sought to improve the security of its Saint-
Domingue sugar trade by reinforcing its presence along the Windward Passage. 
At its northern entrance lay Turks Islands. Uninhabited, these were not 
necessarily a threat, though their hazardous reefs would always be minded. 
However, the annual gathering of seafaring Bermudians at Turks Islands posed 
an increasing hazard to French shipping. The French attack of 1764 was 
therefore a calculated risk to incorporate these islands into the French Empire, in 
order to better command and channel French trade.  
 However, French mercantilism did not exist in a vacuum; in attacking 
Turks Islands it antagonised a similarly aggressive and competitive British 
mercantilism. In the aftermath, French belligerence inadvertently propelled 
Turks Islands onto a trajectory French imperialists would have least preferred. 
The British Government decided its geopolitical security in this region had been 
intolerably compromised and took an unprecedented step. Turks Islands were 
awarded a unique legal status under the administration of a King’s Agent, whose 
work would bolster the salt trade, settlement and protection of these islands. 
 From thereon, Turks Islands became one of Benton’s enclaves of empire 
– an anomalous legal space in which local authority thickened and from which 
Steinberg’s ‘force-field’ could be projected seawards over the Windward 
Passage. Strengthening imperial authority at Turks Islands in this way was 
necessary because the Bahamas region as a whole was and would remain 
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vulnerable. Through a combination of innate geographical challenges and 
contrasting naval priorities, the Out Islands were some of the most precariously 
placed within the British Caribbean. However, the appointment of a King’s 
Agent, his policies, and the subsequent development of Turks Islands, all helped 
to enrich and protect these islands from future foreign encroachment. Though 
they would never be invulnerable nor receive the same level of protection as the 
sugar islands, Turks Islands did benefit from enhanced military defences. This 
put them at a demonstrative advantage within the Bahamian archipelago.  
 In telling this story, this chapter has raised two points about the spatiality 
of European mercantilism. First, it has highlighted the tension that could exist 
between metropolitan and provincial governments over the hierarchical 
distribution of military resources within an empire that prioritised the protection 
of sugar islands. During the French Revolutionary Wars, the theatre of war drove 
expeditionary forces to certain areas of the Caribbean that de-prioritised others. 
Protecting the sugar trade of the British Empire, and seizing that of her enemies, 
made strategic sense. But it could and did leave individual islands at risk. In 
these war-torn years, the uneven patchwork of mercantilist empire was starkly 
revealed. The British Empire was not a monolithic empire based on territorial 
possession but a variegated, lumpy empire seeking command of specific strategic 
zones, informed by matters of trade.  
 Second, this chapter has demonstrated the value of using Turks Islands as 
a case study for illuminating a socially constructed Caribbean Sea. In this 
increasingly crowded inter-imperial region, the ocean was anything but an 
unregulated, unmanaged space. Rather, overlapping and transecting sea-lanes 
became highly contested places as British and French mercantile interests jostled 
for their command. Here warfare was not ‘an independent variable’ but a direct 
result of mercantilism’s competitive edge. The French attack on Turks Islands in 
1764 should be viewed in this light. Sitting at the watery crossroads of the 
Windward Passage, Turks Islands were valuable for their potential to project 
imperium over this nearby passage. While the French recognised this and sought 
to capitalise, it was the British who would ultimately benefit. 
 This chapter has narrated a story about the construction of British 
mercantilism at Turks Islands in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
However, there were moments when British mercantilism failed in this sphere. 
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The final chapter of this thesis will address a time in Turks Islands’ history when 
salt crossed imperial boundaries in order for their inhabitants to obtain perhaps 





Chapter 8: Salt and Survival: Provisioning Bermuda and Turks 




Turks Islands were some of the most barren islands of the British Caribbean. 
Unlike the sugar islands, the salt islands were infertile from discovery and could 
provide little by means of a provision ground system. Once drawn into the 
Atlantic world, those who lived in this saline environment relied on inter-island 
networks for food and looked to Bermudian merchants for what they could not 
grow or produce. At the same time, Bermuda’s inhabitants equally depended on 
the sale of salt for their sustenance. Their merchants collected it from Turks 
Islands, carried it to North American markets, and traded it for foodstuffs 
including Indian corn, rice, salted meat and fish. These consumables were taken 
first to Bermuda, where they were partially unloaded, and the remainder 
conveyed to Turks Islands in a supply chain that reflected their entwined history. 
But it was not invulnerable. Like all Caribbean islands, Bermuda and Turks 
Islands were small island territories whose exposure to external shocks only grew 
as their populations expanded: any exterior force that disrupted their provision 
networks could endanger their food security. This chapter will explore that 
vulnerability during a period of intense geopolitical instability and food scarcity: 
the period just before, during and after the American Revolution.  
When faced with food insecurity, John Bohstedt has argued that many 
communities respond by activating a ‘politics of provisions’.1 In a politics of 
provisions, struggles erupt between rulers and ruled over food when shortages 
arise. These struggles can take many different forms. The most extreme is food 
rioting but they can include smuggling, petitioning, and looting. In a politics of 
provisions, it is not often the poorest, most hungry, who protest. It is never solely 
about hunger. Instead, whether or not people are motivated to protest, and 
whether or not they are successful in their efforts, depends on their shared moral 
economy, the customary traditions of a place, the historic relationship local rulers 
																																																								
1 John Bohstedt, ‘Food Riots and the Politics of Provisions in World History’, Institute 
of Development Studies Working Paper, Vol. 2014 No. 444 (May, 2014), pp. 2-31. 
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had with those they ruled, and the types and strength of connections that united 
different sections of society.  
This chapter will use this analytical concept to break down the factors 
that underpinned Bermuda and Turks Islands’ politics of provisions during the 
American revolutionary period. It will argue that food scarcity in these islands 
activated a politics of provisions that repeatedly undercut the mercantile system 
as it saw a salt-provisions trade largely endure. In so doing, Bermudian salt 
traders and salt gatherers won a significant comparative advantage over their 
sugar island brethren: they obtained food more regularly, and in quantity, to 
avoid the worst effects of famine, starvation, and death. While the American 
Revolution has often been classified as a ‘disaster’ for the sugar islands, for the 
salt islands it proved a highly disruptive, but not calamitous, event.2  
In pursuit of this argument, this chapter emphasises colonists as the 
consumers, rather than producers, of goods. As Bertie Mandelblatt has pointed 
out for enslaved persons of the French Caribbean, ‘studying the goods they 
consumed and the patterns of their consumption…generates a different history’.3 
In a similar vein, this chapter recasts Bermudian and Turks Island colonists as 
consumers in the hopes of telling a different history. In this setting, Europe 
recedes into the background while colonial spaces and their interconnections take 
centre stage. This is not purely from an idealistic notion that these spaces have a 
history deserving representation, though that is meaningful. It is also because 
delving into the food chains that linked Britain’s colonial possessions allows us 
to understand how the empire functioned as a whole. Without meeting the 
colonists’ basic nutritional needs, a continuous flow of goods back to Europe 
would have been unviable. As it was, nutritional needs created inter-island food 
chains and sinew populations that were complex, co-dependent, and, at times, 
surprisingly resilient in the face of adversity. The salt-provisions trade of 
Bermuda and Turks Islands provides a fascinating example of one such inter-
island food chain that helped tie the Atlantic world together. 
																																																								
2 John H Parry, ‘American Independence: The View from the West Indies’, Proceedings 
of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Vol. 87 (1975), pp. 14-31. 
3 Bertie Mandelblatt, ‘A Transatlantic Commodity: Irish Salt Beef in the French Atlantic 
World’, History Workshop Journal, Vol. 63 (Spring, 2007), pp. 23. 
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This chapter will be divided into three parts: it will begin with a brief 
examination of the British Atlantic’s provisioning regime prior to the American 
Revolution; it will move to address the food shortages wrought by the American 
Revolution; and it will finish with an in-depth discussion of the politics of 
provisions that emerged in Bermuda and Turks Islands at this time. 
 
British mercantilism and the Atlantic food chain  
 
The British Empire was built on mercantilism, which dictated where its colonists 
could export their products to and from whom they could import. It was a closed 
and cohesive system that aimed to keep British trade, and theoretically its profits, 
circulating within the empire. No organisational structure epitomised 
mercantilism’s incarnation more than the British Caribbean’s sugar plantations. 
According to the Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1663, which provided the 
foundation for this formal economic structure, sugar produced in the colonies 
was for the exclusive importation of Britain and her colonies.4 
However, to be successful and meet metropolitan demand, sugar’s 
arduous and expensive production also required certain economies of scale, 
which increasingly put pressure on planters to make difficult pragmatic decisions 
on how to feed everyone. Though a successful sugar harvest offered tantalising 
yields, owning a plantation was high-risk and attended with spiralling costs. 
Given a viable alternative, many planters believed it did not pay to invest too 
much time and energy in the production of local, unprofitable provisions when 
land devoted to sugar had the potential to yield higher returns. Indeed, the pursuit 
of one tended to obfuscate the success of the other. In the end, the ‘very 
emergence and continued existence’ of the plantation system ‘depended on 
several external factors’, the most critical of which was an external food supply.5  
																																																								
4 Russell R Menard, ‘Plantation Empire: How Sugar and Tobacco Planters Built Their 
Industries and Raised an Empire’, Agricultural History, Vol. 81 No. 3 (Summer, 2007), 
pp. 313-316. 
5 Selwyn H Carrington, ‘The American Revolution and the British West Indies’ 




 From an early period the North American colonies became the ‘bread-
baskets’ of the sugar islands.6 In return for specie and Caribbean goods like 
sugar, molasses and rum, the continental colonies delivered much-needed Indian 
corn, rice, salted meat and fish to the British Caribbean. It cannot be overstated 
how important this relationship was to the growth and persistence of the 
plantation economy. Without it, the spread of cane fields would not have been 
feasible. As Eric Williams has reflected, ‘only the possession of the mainland 
colonies permitted this sugar monopoly of West Indian soil’.7 But it was also a 
transformative process. In the development of plantation agriculture, these were 
‘no longer the same islands’ environmentally or economically.8 As populations 
increased and sugar monoculture predominated, these islands increasingly lost 
food sovereignty and were purposefully restructured to face outwards, in more 
ways than one. While these islands relied on British markets for the sale of sugar 
and their self-aggrandisement, they also became dependent on North American 
products to meet their nutritional needs. 
 While historians have enhanced our understanding of the provisioning 
regimes that criss-crossed the Atlantic world, further analysis within the context 
of saltpan economies is necessary.9 Though the continental colonies sought 
																																																								
6 Ibid, p. 824. 
7 Eric Williams quoted in Ibid. 
8 Laura Hollsten, ‘Controlling Nature and Transforming Landscapes in the Early 
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Irish-American Trade: 1660-1783 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); R C 
Nash, ‘Irish Atlantic Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, The William 
and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 42 No. 3 (Jul., 1985), pp. 329-356; and Mandelblatt, ‘A 
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Trade in Philadelphia’s Pre-revolutionary Economy’, The Pennsylvania Magazine of 
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Quarterly, Vol. 63 No. 3 (Jul., 2006), pp. 551-586. For the effect of the slave diet upon 
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sugar, molasses and rum as high-status goods, salt was an essential item. Like 
sugar, it could not be produced on the continent in any significant quantity. Not 
only were the conditions inhospitable to its creation by solar evaporation, but 
also prior to the American Revolution continental colonists were actively 
discouraged from building salt-works in order to protect production in other parts 
of the empire.10 Consequently, during their colonial period, ‘there was no 
substantial domestic salt-making in the Thirteen Colonies’ and they looked 
abroad to acquire the salt they needed.11 Up and down the eastern seaboard, from 
the fishing industries of New England to the extensive cattle ranges of North 
Carolina, American colonists required vast quantities to preserve fish and meat 
for domestic consumption and overseas exportation. Material culture historians 
Dorothy Volo and James Volo have calculated the quantity of salt needed to 
preserve meat ‘was staggering, often equalling the weight of meat itself’.12 North 
Carolina was particularly greedy, for in ‘no other colony was beef and pork as 
important in the economic life of the people’.13 To meet these needs, they relied 
on Britain for the majority of their salt imports but not for all. In the shortfall, 
Turks Islands were some of the closest, most prolific salt-producing islands 
within reach of their shores. Prior to the American Revolution these islands were 
providing one fifth of North America’s total supply.14 Bermudian salt traders and 
salt gatherers had, not accidentally, invested their efforts in a product that was 
indispensable to their continental neighbours. 
Moreover, by the mid-eighteenth century, neither Bermuda nor Turks 
Islands were, or even could be, self-sufficient in food. Bermuda faced several 
challenges. For one, it was quickly recognised as overcrowded (see Chapter 3). 
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Salt Works and Salt Making on the New Jersey Shore during the American Revolution’, 
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12 Dorothy Volo and James Volo quoted in Ibid. 
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Moreover, after its maritime turn in the 1680s, Bermuda’s economy shifted to 
embrace seafaring activities at the expense of agriculture, which was rebranded 
as low status and demeaning. Governor Richier commented in 1691 that ‘none 
will labour ashore, either on land or in trades’.15 Almost a century later, an 
anonymous reader of the Bermuda Gazette echoed this sentiment: ‘the culture of 
land is a pursuit to which the Bermudians are generally averse’.16 Yet because of 
Bermuda’s population density, this turn to the sea was not foolish as it provided 
the means for islanders to purchase what they could not produce on the spot. 
With approximately 15,000 inhabitants and, at most, 12,000 acres, there was ‘not 
so much as one acre per head for each inhabitant’.17 This combination of 
agricultural neglect and overcrowding ensured Bermuda had to look abroad for 
provisions. To do so it needed something to trade: Turks Island salt. 
 More than Bermuda, Turks Islands were barren. Unlike the sugar islands 
that became gradually less fertile over time, these salt islands could not afford 
provisions from their first settlement. The hot, dry, saline conditions, so perfect 
for salt production, made it almost impossible to grow food. Time and again, 
local officials reported on the general agricultural impotence of the islands. In 
1770, the Bahamas Governor reported: ‘As to their Produce they yield not a 
single Commodity, except Salt, and in barrenness far exceed every other of the 
Bahamas, being not capable of supplying Vegetables of any kind for the 
necessary use of the People’.18 Even obtaining water was a problem. The salt 
gatherers had to travel to the Eastern Caicos in order to obtain fresh water, ‘the 
Water of these islands being so impregnated with Salt, that none, except the most 
indigent ever used it and those that do are obliged to mix it with so great a 
proportion of spirits, that they are seldom or ever cool’ – perhaps accounting for 
why, by the afternoon, Turks Islanders were notorious for being ‘always so 
intoxicated’.19  
																																																								
15 Governor Richier quoted in Ibid, p. 85. 
16 The National Archives, A Bermudian to the Printer of the Bermuda Gazette, 10 April 
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17 The National Archives, William Brimage to the Secretary of State, 1780, CO 37/37 ff. 
73-74. The National Archives, Governor Hamilton to the Secretary of State, 15 June 
1790, CO 37/42/17.  
18 The National Archives, Governor Shirley to the Secretary of State, 21 October 1770, 
CO 23/8 f. 137. 
19 Ibid.   
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 The solution to provisioning Bermuda and Turks Islands lay in each 
other’s strengths: Bermudian merchants had fast-sailing sloops that could carry 
Turks Island salt to market and return with provisions, while the salt gatherers, 
being ‘the meanest rank of Bermudians’, lacked the resources to carry on a 
merchant trade but could produce the item for trade itself.20 From Turks Islands’ 
first settlement, they and Bermuda were heavily, purposefully, co-dependent in 
this way. A Governor described how this relationship worked for Bermuda. In 
1773, he reported, ‘Our chief Trade is going to Turks Islands for Salt’ and ‘with 
the produce from the Salt, we buy and fetch all our corn, flour, salt pork, beef 
and lumber for mast and candles from North and South America’.21 Meanwhile, 
a Bermudian who had spent time working at Turks Islands described how this 
relationship could work for the salt gatherers. He recalled that the salt gatherers 
were ‘very frugal and Industrious’ and lived ‘chiefly on Indian Corn and 
Fish…which was sent them thither, from these Islands [Bermuda], by their 
Wives and Friends’.22 A successful salt season tended to bring joy on both sides 
of this inter-island relationship as it signalled a period of mutual prosperity.  
 As a result of these supply chains for the sugar and the salt islands, an 
extensive provisions trade remained within Britain’s imperial borders. It was 
cohesive, but fragile. As David Nally has pointed out, in times of strain, these 
people would have few safety nets to fall back on.23 In the commodification of 
agribusiness, acute specialisation within different temperate and tropical zones 
instigated a displacement of people to colonies that could not support them on 
their own. As each island lost food sovereignty they became dependent on 
others, while mercantilism dictated that external relationships should be built on 
intra-imperial terms. When this economic system ran smoothly, it was relatively 
effective, but if external shocks disrupted the system’s equilibrium, challenges 
arose. Climatic disasters like hurricanes could temporarily block trade routes and 
create episodic scarcity, but sustained periods of warfare and enduring 
geopolitical shifts could provoke famine. The American Revolution was one 
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such external shock, a litmus test for the durability and flexibility of British 
mercantilism. 
 
The impact of the American Revolution 
 
The impact of the American Revolution on Britain’s sugar islands has been 
widely interpreted as a ‘disaster’, in which the groans of the plantations were 
loud and clear.24 In 1774, the Continental Congress formed an association, which 
encouraged its supporters to follow a policy of non-importation from within the 
British Empire until the British Government revoked certain Acts it believed to 
be unjust. A policy of non-exportation to the same was added in September 1775. 
By the end of the year the British Government had responded, enacting an 
embargo on all commercial intercourse with its rebelling colonies.  
These policies, on both sides, spelt enduring hardship for the Caribbean. 
With the declaration of war in 1776, food prices soared and imports were 
suddenly and drastically curtailed. As Richard Sheridan has demonstrated, a 
crisis of subsistence, particularly slave subsistence, emerged.25 In 1777, the 
Council and Assembly of Barbados addressed the King, 
We have, Sir, near 80,000 black and 12,000 white people daily to 
support. Our ground provisions (the internal resource) have failed for 
want of seasonable rains, the stock of provisions on hand will not last 
many weeks; and we are without hope of future foreign resources.26 
By 1778, the mortality rate of enslaved persons from war-related famine was 
truly disturbing. Governor Burt of St Kitts estimated that, 
From the best information I have been able to collect, the Island of 
Antigua has lost above a thousand Negroes, Montserrat near twelve 
hundred, and some Whites, Nevis three or four Hundred, and This Island 
as many from the Want of Provisions.27 
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25 Sheridan, ‘The crisis of slave subsistence’, pp. 615-641. 
26 Quoted in Ibid, p. 620. 
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The British Government tried to compensate.28 It legislated for Ireland to export 
its provisions directly to the British Caribbean in 1778. At the same time, it 
sought to increase the exportation of provisions from its own ports. However, it 
was an uncertain supply, as the convoy system had largely collapsed, and it did 
not provide enough to make up for the sudden, large shortfalls.29 Reports of food 
shortage and famine continued. Even Jamaica, which benefited from a provision 
ground system and relative diversification of agriculture, was not immune. It 
experienced some of the highest mortality rates in the revolution’s wake. 
Between 1780 and 1787, Jamaica lost around 15,000 lives to famine-related 
disease.30 Prevalent hunger, culminating in starvation and death, was thus a 
widespread experience across the sugar islands of the British Caribbean. The 
American Revolution revealed the ‘flaws’ in each islands’ ‘environmental and 
social systems’, which were unable to adapt to the geopolitical changes taking 
place around them.31  
The salt islands, and those that relied on salt for trade, were also in 
danger. As an extremely small archipelago, Bermuda could not diversify into 
provision planting to meet its population’s needs. Throughout the American 
Revolution the island did experience periods of shortage. On 14 June 1776, 
Governor Bruere reported, naively, that he hoped the Bahamas might be able to 
send a shipment of flour to them soon, ‘otherwise the People here must starve’.32 
In October 1777, he was again writing to London cautioning that they were ‘in 
great want of Provisions, either Indian corn to feed the Negroes or any substitute 
for Bread’.33 Two years later, the Governor reiterated, ‘We have been in the most 
deplorable Situation, for the want of provisions…not a tenth part sufficient hath 
arrived’.34 Finally, in early 1780, Bermudians were ‘all very nigh starving’.35 
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29 Ibid, p. 620. 
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Given Turks Islands relied on Bermuda for their provisions, it is not surprising 
that by 1784 a local newspaper reported that ‘numbers of our [Bermudian] 
inhabitants…are starving at Turks Islands’.36 In the wake of the American 
Revolution, these economically co-dependent islands had also suffered from 
want of food.   
 However, while these islands experienced hunger, and at times death, it 
was not on the scale endured by the sugar islands. This was despite the fact 
Bermuda and Turks Islands were arguably as vulnerable, if not more so. 
Economically, they were heavily co-dependent and separated by the Sargasso 
Sea that became infested with privateers and naval ships as the war progressed. 
Environmentally, both were some of the smallest and most barren islands of the 
Caribbean. Their inability to produce food, particularly at Turks Islands, was 
verging on agricultural impotence, while their reliance on North American 
markets for provisions was at least as strong as the rest of the Caribbean. Yet 
though they experienced food scarcity, their colonial populations did not sustain 
the soaring mortality rates recorded elsewhere. The American Revolution was 
disruptive, but it was not a disaster. 
 
An enduring salt-provisions trade  
 
This was primarily because, unlike the sugar islands, the salt islands were able to 
manipulate their ‘economic and social systems’ and dynamically adjust to the 
shifting geopolitical realities around them.37 The salt-provisions trade that had 
been the lifeline of Bermuda and Turks Islands before the revolution largely 
endured. When war was declared, imperial decrees should have shut this trade 
down or seen it drastically curtailed. This was, generally, not the case.  
This is evident in a series of letters from the Bermuda Governor in this 
period. In October 1776, Governor Bruere wrote to Captain Jordan of the 
Galatea begging for his ship of war to remain on the station. The Governor 
despaired of ‘the Temper of the Inhabitants in respect to this Rebellion, and the 
many fine lies they make under the supposed apprehensions of Starving’ while 
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they carry on ‘a large illicit trade with Salt, to the enemies of Great Britain’.38 A 
year later, in April, Governor Bruere reported that the British navy had taken 
several Bermudian vessels, ‘as they stole a trade without entering or clearing 
their Vessels, with Salt to North America, In exchange for corn etc’.39 Time and 
again, the sheer quantity of salt worried the Governor. In March 1778, he 
pointedly compared the quantity of smuggled salt with that of molasses and rum, 
deeming the latter of pitiful consequence: 
I conceive that large Quantities of Salt, cleared out, from Turks Islands, 
and carried directly from thence to the Rebels, and some Salt brought 
from Turks Islands here, and then by Stealth, carried off again, hath been 
of much more Detriment to His Majesty’s Service, than any small 
Quantities of Rum or Molasses, could be Detrimental to the King’s 
Service or the contractors.40 
In this passage, the British Government’s stance against granting licences for 
molasses and rum was altogether missing the mark in Bermuda. When the 
governorship devolved onto the late Governor’s son in October 1780, 
Lieutenant-Governor Bruere found it ‘in the most alarming situation, not only for 
the Enemy without, but from the disaffection of many of the Inhabitants of Great 
Britain, manifested by…an almost general Trade and Intercourse with the Enemy 
affording immense and essential supplies of Salt’.41 He wrote to London 
specifically asking for official instructions and ‘some check likewise to Turks 
Islands’ to deal with a salt trade that had become so ubiquitous ‘a week scarce 
passes but Vessels return from the Rebells’.42 
 When the Paris Treaty was signed between Britain and the new United 
States on 3 September 1783, the rules governing British trade with the 
Americans had to be agreed. For this, the British Government gave full authority 
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to the Crown to regulate the empire’s American commerce through Orders in 
Council.43 This authority was meant to last six months; in practice, successive 
enabling Acts and Orders in Council continued until 1788. In that year, the 
British Government enacted legislation to formalise the empire’s developing 
trade relationship with the United States, but the original Order in Council 
largely provided the basis of this statute. Proclaimed in 1783, it decreed that 
Britain and her colonies could import American lumber, flour, bread, grain, 
vegetables and livestock and export to the United States rum, sugar, molasses, 
coffee, nuts, ginger and pimento. The importation of American meat, dairy 
produce and fish was prohibited and the trade was ordered to be in British 
vessels manned with British sailors. Though it was not without fierce contention, 
those in power believed this arrangement was consistent with British 
mercantilism and would support a growing British navy.  
At the time, it was hoped the newly settled colonies in Canada and Nova 
Scotia would step in to provide the provisions so desperately needed in the 
British Caribbean. In March 1784, Lieutenant Durnford was sent to survey 
Bermuda in his capacity as an engineer and was patently optimistic. He 
cheerfully stated that the new Loyalist settlers in Nova Scotia ‘will soon be able 
to raise provisions for exportation and furnish lumber for the supply of the West 
India Islands’.44 However, like others, he worried about the time it might take for 
these new settlements to begin an export trade. Unless Nova Scotia and Canada 
could export quickly, he feared it would be difficult ‘to break off that habitual 
connexion which has hitherto subsisted between the American States and the 
West India Islands’.45 He advised the British Government to do all it could to 
offer encouragement to the trade. But his fears proved well founded as Bermuda 
and Turks Islands’ reliance on American provisions continued. 
After the war, the Crown’s prohibition on American vessels carrying 
British goods was at times circumvented at Turks Islands. In October 1784, the 
Bahamian Collector warned his Governor that it was ‘not in his power to prevent 
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foreign vessels from resorting to the out islands’.46 Five months later, the 
Governor wrote to London warning of his inability to check the Out Islands’ 
illicit trade, stating that ‘the quantity of salt raked upon these Islands is 
considerable’ but ‘unless a small Naval force is allowed to protect it, it will be 
impossible to prevent American interlopers’.47 Meanwhile, in Bermuda, 
Governor Brown reported in 1785 of ‘the great success the Bermudians 
employed at Turks Islands have had this season raking salt and the high price it 
has demanded’.48 But he conceded, ‘from want of authority to restrain it, greater 
quantities of salt are carried from thence in American vessels than seems 
consistent with His Majesty’s Order’.49 Finally, an Address of the Council and 
Assembly of Bermuda in 1787 confirmed that while Bermudians were the only 
persons engaged in raking salt, it appeared some American vessels had 
‘continued to lade salt there’.50 This, they verily believed, could be stopped if the 
British Government decreed against it, but there was no denying an illegal and 
direct American trade was at times entertained.51 
 However, in truth, the proportion of Bermudian vessels calling at Turks 
Islands for a salt-run dramatically increased. As Collector Duncan Stewart 
reported in 1787, ‘Before the changes in the Government of America, there were 
four Americans to One British; since that Period the Americans still come, but by 
no means in so great Numbers; the greatest Part is now carried off in Bermudian 
vessels’.52 Bermudian merchants now took the largest market share, but their 
currency was – as it always had been – in American provisions. The Collector’s 
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report elaborates. When questioned as to what the Americans and Bermudians 
brought to Turks Islands in exchange for salt, Stewart commented that the 
Americans ‘brought some provisions, but chiefly Cash’, while the Bermudians 
had ‘some Cash, but chiefly paid for it in Provisions and Dry Goods’.53 This 
pattern was also captured in the above-mentioned Address. It stated that ‘as the 
persons who resort annually to the Turks Islands are in General poor and unable 
to furnish themselves at the Time of their leaving Bermuda with provisions’, they 
instead ‘depend on purchasing occasionally’ and ‘it becomes habitual and 
necessary for every vessel going in Quest of Salt to carry some supply of 
Provisions and Clothing to barter’.54  
An examination of cargo lists confirms this. On 7 July 1788, the sloop 
Queen Charlotte cleared out of Bermuda for Turks Islands carrying a cargo of 
twenty barrels of Indian meal, six barrels of bread, six barrels of peas, two 
barrels of flour, twenty bushels of Indian corn as well as a selection of dry goods 
including two casks of nails, specifically stating ‘all which Goods are for the use 
of the People employed in raking Salt at Turks Islands’.55 In the same month, the 
brigantine Commerce cleared out of Bermuda with ‘100 bushels Corn for the use 
of People employed gathering Salt at Turks Islands’.56 Finally, the Little Ruth 
cleared out with ‘300 Bushels Corn for the use of the People at Turks Islands’.57 
By the late 1780s, the salt-provisions trade between the United States, Bermuda 
and Turks Islands had endured. 
 In the aftermath of revolution, Bermudian merchants were the chief 
conduits through which salt gatherers obtained their food; food these merchants 
continued to source from the United States. By 1788, the optimism Durnford had 
originally felt was gone. From Bermuda he wrote to London with a renewed 
sense of pessimism: ‘The Custom House Laws and Regulations are become a 
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mere Farce and every man carries on such trade as he thinks proper’.58 Save the 
erection of lighthouses or the foundation of Bermuda as a station of war, he 
firmly believed ‘there is nothing…to prevent the Connexion of the Inhabitants of 
these islands with those of America’.59  
  
The politics of provisions 
 
If a flourishing salt-provisions trade gave Bermuda and Turks Islands better 
access to food during this turbulent time, it is important to understand why they 
had more adaptable and dynamic socioeconomic systems. For this, it is necessary 
to delve into the politics of provisions the revolution galvanised. Examined here 
in the context of an illicit salt-provisions trade, a politics of provisions was 
activated that stemmed from four significant factors: the customary tradition of 
smuggling in Bermuda and Turks Islands; the weakness of the Bermuda and the 
Bahamas’ executive function; the inordinate strength of Bermuda’s legislative 
branch and its stance towards the salt-provisions trade; and the American need 
for salt. 
 
 ‘A familiar culture of illegality’ 
 
 As the American Revolution began, Turks Islands and Bermuda greeted it with a 
customary tradition of smuggling. In his study of mid-eighteenth century 
contraband practices in Florida and the Bahamas, Alan Karras describes these 
colonies as ‘frontier posts’ and argues that ‘as a result of their peripheral position 
within the imperial field of vision, imperial representatives in such places had 
significant leeway to negotiate and compromise’.60 In such colonial zones, 
particularly in infant colonies, those in power often tolerated contraband 
practices because they understood it would bolster the islands’ economy and 
encourage further settlement in what were otherwise unappealing places. 
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‘Playing by the rules’, and libelling vessels for violating laws of trade, was 
infrequently endorsed and normally only in exemplary fashion.61 This process 
allowed a ‘familiar culture of illegality’ to flourish that would prove difficult to 
dislodge in times of war, even when ministerial scrutiny became more 
watchful.62 This was apt for Bermuda and Turks Islands.  
As Karras has shown, from 1766, the first King’s Agent openly 
encouraged foreign traders to land all kinds of merchandise at Turks Islands and 
effectively created a de facto, but completely illegal, free port.63 Andrew 
Symmer did this unabashedly, sending reports of incoming and outgoing cargoes 
to the Board of Trade, while he made his case to the British Government that 
Turks Islands should become a legal free port. In Symmer’s view, an infant 
colony with little to recommend it (apart from salt) needed the encouragement of 
a contraband trade to promote individual capital accumulation. Ideally, he 
wished this arrangement to be formalised, but in the meantime, as a fledging 
colony, he believed his actions did not violate the spirit of the Navigation Acts in 
so far as they brought Turks Islands further into the empire’s orbit. While this 
trade persisted unencumbered for several years, in 1770 it earned the 
condemnation of the Bahamas Governor who manoeuvred to ‘consolidate his 
own position by favouring his London superiors over local residents’.64 In effect, 
Governor Shirley decided that the long-term benefits of allowing a clandestine 
trade at the extremities of his jurisdiction no longer exceeded its short-term costs. 
He highlighted Symmer’s abuses to the British Government and the Navigation 
Acts forced its hand. Restrictions were tightened and Symmer reminded that he 
was not an independent official but a subordinate to the Bahamas Governor. In 
1776, the Governor formally decreed that only salt could be exported directly 
from Turks Islands and only provisions could be imported directly within. This 
was perhaps an inevitable outcome, but by then a smuggling trade was engrained 
and, if no longer openly supported, it was tacitly overlooked. 
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Likewise Bermuda had a colourful history of contraband prior to the 
American Revolution, not least because its geography was so favourable. Upon 
Governor Bruere’s arrival to Bermuda in 1765, he wrote: 
I have acquainted your Lordships, in several letters, the dispersed and 
scattered situation I found the Trade in, at my arrival. Every Person 
conducting their Vessels to their Own Doors, to the several Creeks and 
Harbours, all round these Islands under the Countenance of an 
Instruction, that Governor William Popple obtained: that vessels might 
load and unload at the West End provided it was under the Inspection and 
Presence of a Searcher, who I found has been dead some years and no 
one appointed in his Room.65  
Governor Bruere tried to curb these evasive manoeuvres by ordering all vessels 
to enter and clear at the island’s port of entry, St George’s. However, he could 
not prevent the vessels from sailing ‘again to the several different harbours, 
before they take their Departure’ where, he presumed, illegal cargoes were 
loaded.66 By 1772, an absence of soldiers ensured more brazen activities were 
taking place. To illustrate, Governor Bruere shared a case involving several 
inhabitants that forcibly removed a Bermudian sloop from a Customs House 
officer. The sloop had been charged with a breach of the Navigation Acts, but 
after being held for one night, its captain, owner, and several others ‘took some 
Negroes with them on board, and overpowered and forced the Custom House 
Officer, and the few men with him, off the Vessel, and ran away with the Sloop 
to Sea’.67 Without troops, Governor Bruere could do little to prevent such 
occurrences and made an ominous, rather prophetic, prediction: that in the future 
Bermuda ‘may be liable to Insult even from the Gang of Privateers Men, in time 
of War, or even in the Smuggling business [as] the Custom House Officers find 
it very difficult to get the least Assistance’.68 The people’s rebellious spirit 
seemed engrained: ‘From the time of Mr Pitt, being Governor of Bermuda and 
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during both the Mr Popples Governments, it doth appear that these People, have 
been very obstinate, untoward and Refractory’.69  
 
A weak executive function 
 
At the same time, the weak position of Bermuda’s Governors during and after 
the revolution seriously affected the executive’s ability to enact imperial 
directives. Though Governor Bruere encouraged local inhabitants to fit out 
privateers, without a strong military or naval presence many lacked incentive. 
Governor Bruere reflected in January 1775 that when the ‘scandalous’ practices 
of the Bermudians were considered, ‘such irregularities cannot be 
prevented…[T]here are no Soldiers here, the appearance of whom might deter 
them from such wicked or malpractice or a sloop of war to be either stationed or 
to look into Bermuda sometimes’.70 By July, he believed ‘there may be but few 
friends to government here’ and following the notorious gunpowder robbery on 
14 August 1775 he fully despaired of ‘the miserable Situation I am in, without 
any assistance’.71 So desperate was he for military support, he tried to persuade 
the Secretary of State to send over two companies that ‘might be formed 
principally from Chelsea Hospital, and the Out Pensioners, and this Moderate 
Climate, might give longevity to some of the Old Men, who do not march about 
here’.72 He also mused that the islands would make a good place for ‘the Sick 
and wounded of the army’, all in an attempt to put boots on the ground.73  
 Undoubtedly, this poor state of defence was not always the case during 
the war. At times Bermuda did welcome one or two ships of war. In April 1777, 
Governor Bruere reported the arrival of His Majesty’s Galatea and Nautilus, 
which were a boon to the island and his government’s security. The Governor 
reported favourably that ‘these two…have prevented since their Arrival, the 
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coast of Bermuda from being infested with rebel privateers and myself carried 
off’.74 However, the ships of war never stayed long, needing to both restock with 
provisions and follow Admiralty Orders. By October, both ships had left, leaving 
Governor Bruere once again dejected.75 Moreover, France’s entry into the war in 
1778 meant few of His Majesty’s ships of war would thereon be spared to visit 
Bermuda. To compensate, Sir Henry Clinton did send two companies of invalid 
soldiers to the colony. However, ‘pro-American Bermudians worked out 
effective ways to evade shoreside military patrols’ while the soldiers themselves 
tended to focus their efforts on refortifying the East End, leaving the West End 
open to illicit trade.76 Thus although Bermuda gained troops that may have 
deterred an enemy invasion, many were ‘without legs, arms or constitutions’ and 
could not offer the Governor the support that regular ships of war might have 
done in the fight against contraband trade.77  
Moreover, tackling the salt-provisions trade required a multifaceted, 
collaborative approach to address all points of the commodity chain. Upon his 
arrival in October 1780, Lieutenant-Governor Bruere immediately set about 
contacting governors and military and naval officers in different spheres, 
believing that only ‘by a Cooperation against these Rebell Traders in all parts of 
His Majesty’s Possessions an End would be nearly put to the Bermudian 
Malpractices’.78 However, achieving this in wartime when resources were 
overstretched was difficult. If the Bermuda Governor struggled to implement 
imperial orders, he was not alone. In 1779, the Bahamas Governor similarly 
wrote to the Secretary of State despairing, ‘what opposition can I make when I 
have neither Great guns, nor small arms…neither ammunition nor Man of War of 
any kind on this Station’?79 Meanwhile, at Turks Islands, the King’s Agent 
reported that upon his return to the islands after an attack in 1778, he ‘found the 
inhabitants had entered into a secret agreement with…the French Governor of St 
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Domingo’.80 He tried administering the oath of allegiance but ‘afterwards finding 
I had no assistance to support me but from a few Loyal Subjects, they [the 
inhabitants] altered their Conduct, acted in the most Rebellious manner and set 
Government at Defiance’.81 Symmer felt compelled to leave the islands once 
more ‘to the Mercy of a lawless Banditti’.82 He returned to New Providence, 
accepted a position as Judge of the Admiralty, and for a time Turks Islands were 
without an imperial officer – effectively beyond the pale of both the Bahamas 
and Bermuda Governors. 
 
An American-friendly Bermudian legislature 
 
Restricting the salt-provisions trade would have been easier had there been a 
more compliant Bermudian legislature with a less sympathetic stance towards the 
salt-provisions trade. Its tentacles of influence permeated most sectors of 
government administration and, through family connections, the wider populace. 
Without its support, the Governor was an isolated figure. Its stance towards the 
illicit trade was unsurprising considering many members of the Council and 
Assembly were leading merchants of the islands. Both Governor Bruere and 
Lieutenant-Governor Bruere regularly reported the problems elicited by this fact, 
and the disharmony to government it could bring. In July 1777, Governor Bruere 
reported that the Assembly ‘could not help throwing some dirt or dispraise’ on 
the visiting ships of war, ‘as they have lost several of their vessels and cargoes 
taken by the Galatea and Nautilus’; while in June 1784, Lieutenant-Governor 
Bruere complained that the recent seizure of vessels ‘employed in carrying Salt 
etc to the Colonies in rebellion,…belong[ed] to some of the leading Members of 
the Assembly,…[and had] stirred up the malice of a most wicked, powerful and 
dangerous faction’.83 This faction was built through strong familial and social 
ties that linked the Council and Assembly together.  
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In a remarkable list produced by Lieutenant-Governor Bruere, he 
unpacked these connections for his superiors in London.84 The web of 
associations bridging both legislative branches is apparent, with the Tucker 
family forming a common denominator. Of the Council, the following was 
recorded: ‘President Thomas Jones: suspended by the Lieutenant Governor …– 
married to Chief Justice Harvey’s sister, related to the Tuckers’; ‘John Harvey – 
Related and connected with the Tuckers, suspended by the Lieutenant Governor’; 
‘Henry Tucker – Son of the Agent’; ‘John Tudor – nearly related and closely 
connected with the Tuckers’; ‘Francis Forbes – Nephew to the President’; and 
‘Collector Traill – Complained against by the Lt Governor’.85 There were just 
four persons that the Lieutenant Governor deemed unconnected with the Tucker 
family, three of whom were abroad. A similar picture was painted for the 
Assembly, which included members of the Tucker family who were also officers 
of the island’s militia and justices of the peace, while ‘George Bascome – the 
only lawyer in the island (except the Attorney General) [was] married to the 
niece of Henry Tucker, Agent’.86 This Colonial Agent, who resided in London, 
was also recorded as fathering two sons in the American army, one of whom was 
St George Tucker.  
St George Tucker’s biography is an example of the socioeconomic ties 
that bound Bermuda with the American colonies.87 He relocated to Virginia from 
Bermuda in 1772 at a time when the Tuckers were politically powerful but 
financially overstretched. Upon arrival, he quickly rose through the ranks of 
Virginian society and in 1778 he married a well-connected American widow who 
brought to their marriage three large plantations, ‘immediately making Tucker a 
substantial member of the state’s planter elite’.88 While enjoying his new 
sociability, he ‘risked everything in the American Revolution’ by maintaining his 
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Bermudian connections.89 With ‘his Bermudian kin’, he ‘participated in a 
smuggling operation in the Caribbean and the Atlantic Ocean transporting 
desperately needed goods’ that linked these zones together.90 Undoubtedly, then, 
the Tuckers were a known and powerful Bermudian-American family with 
significant political clout and trading interests in both places. Their ability to 
form alliances within the Council and Assembly, cover their clandestine trade, 
and simultaneously reassure London of their loyalty, ensured that governing 
officials who opposed their interests risked political isolation. 
Such a legislature deployed various tactics to protect the salt-provisions 
trade. In September 1778, several leading members of both houses with a ‘great 
number of the inhabitants’ formed ‘a wicked association’ ‘against buying, 
dealing or having intercourse with the owners or agents of privateers and 
resolved that all People offending against such Association should be considered 
as Enemies of this Country’.91 This association tasked its clerk, George 
Bascome, with ‘prosecut[ing] the owners of privateers for capturing any 
Bermudian vessels coming home or going to the colonies in Rebellion’.92 ‘So 
violent’ was this association that privateer Pendock Neale was ‘obliged to take 
armed men on shore with him to protect his person’, while on two occasions 
privateer Bridger Goodrich had to give up the vessels he had captured altogether 
‘on account of the tumultuous rising of the people’.93 Moreover, the association 
tapped into intelligence networks that linked Bermuda with Turks Islands. The 
case of William Honey is illustrative. Honey was a Bermudian master and part 
owner of a sloop called Three Friends. In February 1776, his vessel was 
contracted by HMS Diligence to act as a tender and to cruise off Turks Islands 
‘to prevent Vessels from taking Salt’.94 Honey succeeded in capturing the sloop 
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Curaçao and was finally at Turks Islands ‘for a load of Salt’.95 He escorted the 
Dick Cole to Jamaica as a prize where it was condemned. The following year 
Honey returned to Bermuda. A few days after his arrival, at two o’clock in the 
morning, a neighbour woke up to discover Three Friends was on fire and 
notified Honey. Though the fire was put out, ‘a quantity of combustibles’ was 
found in the binnacle, persuading Honey that it ‘was set on Fire by some 
Malicious person or persons with an intent to destroy her’.96 Subsequently, he 
was ‘advertised by anonymous papers put up in the most public places in a very 
opprobrious and reproachful manner’ while lawsuits ‘commenced against him 
for a supposed conversion of four Negro Men captured on board the sloop Dick-
Cole’.97 He believed George Bascome was behind these actions ‘with an intent to 
detain him on the island’.98 Having pursued Honey’s actions from Turks Islands 
to Bermuda, the association arrested his career as a privateer for two years. 
Leading Council and Assembly members were also adept at ensuring 
their power was not diluted. Upon his inauguration, Lieutenant-Governor Bruere 
initiated an ambitious plan to reorganise his Council. With assent from London, 
he made new appointments across the Council, including Robert Traill as 
Collector. Unsurprisingly, given his family’s trading concerns, a new Collector 
piqued Colonial Agent Henry Tucker’s interest. In London, he made a point of 
seeking out the new Collector’s son to gauge the father’s character. He reported 
wryly that after a conversation with the young Traill he found he ‘is truly on the 
other side’ of Lieutenant-Governor Bruere’s ‘party’ and that he would try ‘to 
persuade his father that it was his interest to join the People…and he was sure he 
would do it’.99 Though Lieutenant-Governor Bruere had high expectations for 
Collector Traill, his optimism proved premature. Having intercepted the Colonial 
Agent’s letters, Lieutenant-Governor Bruere castigated his schemes ‘to set at 
variance the Governor, Lt Governor, military and Crown Officers’.100 But by 
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they have partly succeeded with the Custom House and the Attorney General’.101 
He urged the British Government ‘to watch the Custom House and Inhabitants as 
the latter will do everything to bring the former to their faction’.102 In the early 
1780s, Collector Traill wrote salutary remarks to London reassuring ministers 
that the Bermudians were ‘no friends to the Americans’ while making 
emoluments off the sale of British registers in the American trade.103 He was 
suspended from office in 1785 for embezzlement of tax funds.104  
For those who did try to enact imperial directives, their days in office 
could be numbered.105 In October 1781, Lieutenant-Governor Bruere appointed 
Paul Bascome Searcher of the West End of Bermuda. Bascome kept this post 
until February 1783, during which time he ‘seized several vessels and carried 
their tryals through the Court of Admiralty’, using part of his prize money to fit 
out a vessel with armed men.106 Bascome’s diligence proved his downfall. When 
Governor Brown took over from Lieutenant-Governor Bruere in 1782, leading 
members of the Assembly wasted no time advising him to suspend Bascome. 
They complained of ‘the seizures made by him uniformly wear the mark of a 
design to vex and harass the Trade of these islands, or of personal spleen or 
Malice’.107 Governor Brown acquiesced to their request. Bascome was 
suspended, without a reason or a hearing. Letters to the Secretary of State reveal 
the want of evidence. Governor Brown admitted, ‘I have no proof of the reality 
of the accusations brought against him’.108 His only object was to maintain a 
harmonious connection with the Assembly; ‘to consult what is prudent to the 
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and intimidation, the legislative branch ensured the executive had neither the 
civil support nor the resources to clamp down on the salt-provisions trade. 
 
An American need for salt 
 
The most important encouragement to Bermuda and Turks Islands’ salt-
provisions trade, however, came from the needs of the rebellious colonies. 
Unlike sugar, molasses and rum, salt was essential within their food economy. 
Since previously it could be imported relatively cheaply, domestic production 
within the thirteen colonies was almost entirely absent prior to the outbreak of 
war.110 When the Continental Congress implemented its policy of non-
importation from the British Empire on 1 December 1774, the onset of salt 
famine was rapid and widespread. By 1775, many patriots feared that unless 
alternatives were found, the boycott would likely fail.111 As panic set in, ordinary 
citizens hoarded salt, facilitating further price rises. In Virginia, before the war, a 
bushel of salt cost approximately two shillings.112 By 1776, it cost thirteen. In a 
letter from the provincial council of North Carolina to the Continental Congress, 
the desperation was palatable: ‘It is impossible for us to describe the distressed 
situation of this state for the want of salt, the inhabitants in general say only let 
them have that article and they will fight’.113 Salt shortages like this were 
prevalent across all southern colonies.   
  The Continental Congress understood the risk. In July 1775, it called on a 
committee ‘to inquire into the cheapest and easiest methods of making salt in the 
colonies’.114 By the end of the year, it advised each colony to ‘immediately 
promote by sufficient public encouragement, the making of salt’.115 Pamphlets 
describing how to make salt proliferated and William Brownrigg’s The Art of 
Making Common Salt resurfaced on this side of the Atlantic.116 In October 1776, 
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Samuel Ashe wrote from Cape Fear to the provincial council of North Carolina 
that ‘the Humour of Salt boiling seems to be taking place here…every Old Wife 
is now scouring her pint pot for the necessary operation’.117 Yet these cottage 
industries could not tackle a national shortage. Taking their direction from the 
Continental Congress, several provincial governments began a series of state-
sponsored salt works, which attracted large government investments. In 
Philadelphia, the provincial government invested in a local merchant to erect the 
state-sponsored Pennsylvanian Salt Works on the New Jersey shore.118 However, 
for various reasons, this attempt was a failure. After three years of production, 
the Pennsylvanian Salt Works was sold and its government funding ended.119 In 
that time, only twenty bushels of salt had been produced on its premises, one-
thirtieth of what had originally been promised in a year.120  
 Importing foreign salt was the only viable option. In hindsight, the 
Continental Congress regretted its blanket ban on the importation of British 
goods. By late 1775, it had amended its stance. On 29 December, the Continental 
Congress permitted the provincial councils of Virginia, North Carolina and 
Maryland to export agricultural commodities to friendly ports abroad in return 
for salt, in order to relieve those ‘now suffering great distress from want of that 
necessary article’.121 Virginia’s General Assembly moved to grant licences that 
permitted any merchant entering the colony with salt to legally export Virginian 
tobacco, corn and other agricultural goods.122 Simultaneously, the provincial 
government embarked on a project of state importation, acquiring a fleet of 
vessels to traverse the Atlantic in search of this commodity.123 Though salt was 
acquired from several different places, ‘it was upon Bermuda which Virginia 
relied heavily to supply her needs’, primarily trading it for corn.124 North 
Carolina also used Bermuda as its main conduit for salt, trading it for rice.125 
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These salt-provision networks between Bermuda and the North American 
colonies ensured the former acquired food while the latter could preserve it. 
 The implication of this for the revolution was significant. In a secret 
despatch from Lord North to General Howe on 28 October 1777, Lord North 
expressed the British Government’s pressing concern for how George 
Washington’s army was being supplied with, amongst other items, salt. Focusing 
his attention on European exports, but also relevant for Bermuda and Turks 
Islands, he reported, 
News has been received at Paris of the great distress of the Rebels for 
want of European commodities (particularly Cloaths & Salt) and it is 
believed by many people there, that the Rebellion is over unless a large 
and speedy supply is sent immediately to America.126 
With this in mind, Lord North prevailed on General Howe to do all he could to 
intercept vessels that were carrying these commodities to the rebels. In Bermuda, 
government officials similarly warned the harmful effects this trade had on 
Britain’s war effort. In 1780, William Brimage argued,  
The Southern Colonies must have returned from Revolt, had they not 
been in a great measure supplied with the Grand Article of Salt and many 
other necessaries by these people, [that] from such conduct are exempted 
in all Congress Marine Commissions.127 
So basic and critical was salt to the morale and strength of the American war 
effort, he urged, ‘I wish permission to say that were the Salt Islands locked up, as 
also this [island], am of Opinion the Southern Colonies would subdue 
themselves’.128 Without salt, many American leaders feared the physical energy 
of the Continental Army would drain while its morale was sapped, as food 
availability for mobile forces inevitably declined. Such bleak prospects were a 
powerful motivator, and pressed the Continental Congress to alter its non-
importation policy towards Bermudian salt traders. Unlike other commodities, 
salt was therefore legally permitted entry and Bermudian vessels carrying it were 
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safe from American privateers and naval vessels. This was a concession never 
granted to those who carried sugar, molasses and rum. While it was in operation, 
this policy placed Bermudian salt traders in a profoundly advantageous position. 
During the last two years of the war, this commercial advantage did 
temper, as the policy itself was rescinded. This was for two main reasons. First, 
once France entered the war, harassment of Turks Islands greatly increased. This 
began in August 1778 when several French privateers attacked Turks Islands.129 
By May 1780, Governor Maxwell reported that French privateers ‘have more 
than once come in force and frightened the Inhabitants’.130 Repeated predations 
encouraged the King’s Agent to journey to London that summer to try and secure 
an agreement for the improved defence of the islands. While he was there, he 
stated that from ‘very recent accounts…they [Turks Islands] have been so much 
harassed by the French privateers, that part of the inhabitants have abandoned 
those Islands’.131 While these depredations and losses were not definitive, they 
undercut the profitability of the salt trade while increasing its risk. With less salt 
to trade, Bermudians were less welcome in American ports.132  
At the same time, the revolution brought fleeing Loyalists to Bermuda 
who began to fit out privateers once Lieutenant-Governor Bruere arrived and 
offered them his complete support.133 These privateers indiscriminately targeted 
American and Bermudian shipping in their pursuit of prize goods. Though by 
mid-1780 no Bermudian had yet registered a vessel as a privateer, the next two 
years saw a change. As the salt-provisions trade became less certain and Britain’s 
control of the seas more assured, many Bermudians grew to envy wealthy 
Loyalist privateers like Goodrich. By April 1783, seventeen Bermudian vessels 
were privateers and in the previous year 130 prizes had been brought into 
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Bermuda’s port.134 Of these, Goodrich’s Experiment proved the most successful, 
but several Bermudians were also benefactors.  
Understandably, a reduction in the salt trade combined with an increase 
in privateers outfitting from Bermuda ruffled feathers in Philadelphia. The 
Continental Congress perceived a change in the colony’s utility and allegiance. 
In March 1781, it withdrew its previous concession and banned trade with 
Bermuda.135 This change is notable, but it should not be over-emphasised. 
Several states including North Carolina circumvented these prohibitions and 
continued to welcome any Bermudians who entered their ports with salt – so 
desperate were they for the commodity. Nor does it detract from Bermuda’s 
unusual and privileged access to American markets prior to March 1781. 
Moreover, as this chapter has shown, any hiatus in the salt-provisions trade 
between North America, Bermuda and Turks Islands was temporary. In the 




‘Disaster’ as a category of analysis has a complex history. As Jonathon Bergman 
has reflected, ‘disaster is one of those extraordinary phenomena that is 
ubiquitous yet indescribable’.136 Historical interpretations of disasters have 
varied widely ‘from supernatural occurrence to earthly force…finally yielding to 
its present day configuration as a social event’.137 As a historical geographer, 
Bergman seeks to denaturalise so-called ‘natural’ disasters like hurricanes and 
earthquakes by demonstrating how these events immediately come to inhabit a 
social, human world and become disastrous only when a society’s economic and 
social systems fail to plan or respond effectively. While this chapter has not dealt 
with a ‘natural’ disaster, it too has found this last configuration useful for the 
way it evaluates the resilience of socioeconomic systems. In interrogating the 
nuanced effects of disasters, historians can compare and contrast the structural 
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weaknesses and vulnerabilities of disparate societies. In the end, what makes an 
event a ‘disaster’ says more about the socioeconomic systems in place, than it 
does about the event itself.  
 In the sugar islands of the British Caribbean, the American Revolution 
was a disaster in this sense of the term. Their plantation economies and 
prominent position within the British Empire meant their experience of 
revolution would be severe. By the mid-eighteenth century, these islands were 
monocultures that prioritised profits and agribusiness above agricultural self-
sufficiency. As they lost food sovereignty, they became the jewels of the British 
imperial crown, but in their meteoric rise vulnerabilities were sown into their 
economic and political structures. As war with the thirteen colonies dawned, 
Britain moved fast to protect and ring-fence these wealthier sugar economies as 
the empire preserved what it understood to be the key to its success: a mercantile 
economic system based around sugar. Naval warships, soldiers and privateers 
patrolled their coastlines and seaways regularly. Opportunity for an extensive 
contraband trade was consequently limited.  
At the same time, these islands faced a more hostile continental 
neighbour in what was their traditional provisions provider. During the 
revolution, the rebellious colonies did not need sugar, molasses and rum. Though 
undoubtedly many American colonists wanted these products, nonetheless they 
were not essential to their survival. As such, the Continental Congress rigorously 
pursued a policy of non-importation as a way to bring Britain to the negotiating 
table, meaning there was no guarantee that British vessels carrying sugar, 
molasses or rum would ever pass American privateers and naval vessels 
unharmed. Even without the British blockade, an illicit sugar-provisions trade 
was high-risk. This did not mean that the sugar islands’ reliance on the 
continental colonies for food subsided or that viable alternatives were found. It 
meant that in the shortfall there was widespread famine. The sugar islands’ 
economic and social systems could not dynamically adjust.  
For the salt islands, the American Revolution was highly disruptive but 
not disastrous, primarily because their economic and social systems were 
dynamic. Both during and after the war, a largely flourishing salt-provisions 
trade permitted Bermuda and Turks Islands better access to food. Though highly 
vulnerable as small, co-dependent and infertile islands, they possessed several 
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advantages that made their economies more resilient. Unlike the sugar islands, 
they had a product that was in high demand in North America and for which 
notable exceptions were made to encourage its importation throughout most of 
the revolution. They also had joint histories of smuggling that meant engaging in 
a clandestine trade was, if not routine, certainly familiar upon the onset of war. 
Moreover, the Bahamas and Bermuda Governors approached this illicit trade in 
decidedly weak positions, not least because in Bermuda there was a powerful 
Assembly and Council whose own actions towards the salt-provisions trade were 
nonchalant at best. Their merchant backgrounds, widespread family connections, 
and socioeconomic ties with America made them an insurmountable obstacle to 
the executive function at this time.  
Under these conditions, it was ferociously difficult for a Governor, 
however good his intention, to follow imperial decree. Taken together, these 
factors gave the salt islands a comparative advantage over the sugar islands 
despite their shared vulnerabilities as small island territories. Unlike the sugar 
islands, Bermuda and Turks Islands’ politics of provisions allowed them to 
ignore imperial orders and shun the legal system in which they were embedded. 
As a result, during the American revolutionary period, British mercantilism often 
failed to keep their salt-provisions trade within its imperial borders. 
This period (1775-1789) would mark the beginning of the end of the salt-
provisions trade between Bermuda and Turks Islands. Though salt gathering 
would remain an important economic pursuit for many Bermudians, the 1790s 
saw a recalibration in Bermuda’s island economy.138 For one, the United States 
Congress passed the Tonnage Act in 1789 that priced many Bermudian 
merchants out of the carrying trade, as British vessels were suddenly forced to 
pay fifty cents per ton upon entry to the United States when American vessels 
paid six. More significantly, Bermuda’s role in the Atlantic was changing. As 
Britain grappled with a new Atlantic order following the American Revolution, it 
became clear Bermuda would no longer be of marginal concern. The loss of the 
North American colonies left Bermuda as the only British port between Canada 
and the Caribbean. Its capture by a hostile nation during war was too great a risk. 
During the French Revolutionary Wars, the Admiralty sent hydrographers and 
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surveyors to map the island’s waters and began purchasing real estate. 
Bermuda’s garrison was increased to a full regiment. By 1812, His Majesty’s 
Naval Dockyard was under construction and in 1818 the Admiralty relocated its 
North Atlantic Station there entirely.  
This process brought hundreds of jobs to Bermuda and secured a 
newfound loyalty to the Crown. With increased employment, cash in circulation, 
and troops stationed at all corners, Bermudians finally revoked their habitual 
smuggling practices. In the French Revolutionary Wars and War of 1812, Turks 
Islands would frequently welcome illicit cargoes of provisions but these would 
come from visiting American vessels, not usually Bermudian merchants. Put 
simply, a salt-provisions run from the United States to Bermuda and Turks 
Islands was no longer a profitable venture in peacetime or worth the risk in war. 
While socioeconomic links remained, Bermuda and Turks Islands would grow 
less dependent on each other for food as the 1790s progressed.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has provided a briny counterpoint to the sucro-centric model of 
Caribbean historiography in order to demonstrate that the plantation model of 
Caribbean development cannot fully explicate the region’s diverse economic, 
social, political and environmental processes. It has achieved this through a cis-
Atlantic history of the principal salt islands of the British Caribbean – Turks 
Islands – from their first discovery by Bermudian seafarers to a generation 
beyond emancipation. It has explored a variety of historical themes at different 
analytical levels to argue that the history of Turks Islands, and their position 
within the British Atlantic world, cannot be fully understood without paying 
serious attention to the commodity they produced.  
 
Summary of findings 
 
This case was first made in Chapters 3 and 4 that approached Turks Islands’ 
shores from a regional, inter-island perspective to analyse issues of settlement 
and sovereignty. The settlement of Turks Islands followed an unusual pattern 
within the British Caribbean. Unlike the sugar islands which were characterised 
relatively quickly by terrestrial, fixed and permanent settlement patterns, 
settlement of Turks Islands was more transient, migratory and maritime in 
nature. On the sugar islands, the substantial up-front costs involved in 
constructing, maintaining and securing a plantation, as well as the possibility of 
staggering crop-cycles throughout the year, encouraged the development of 
landed populations. In contrast, the barren saline environment, the shorter length 
of the salt season, the lower up-front costs in salt raking, and the strong 
socioeconomic links between Bermuda and the salt gatherers, all dissuaded 
permanent, terrestrial habitation. However, as the salt industry grew more 
profitable, and the Bahamas more financially overstretched, Bahamas Governors 
increasingly tried to extend jurisdiction to and claim salt taxes within these 
islands. In the fraught diplomatic battle that ensued, the salt gatherers were 
adamant that Turks Islands were independent of the Bahamas. When this dispute 
was belatedly brought to the British Government, London ministers were baffled. 
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In the end, early-modern conceptions of space, and legal arguments surrounding 
Britain’s historic claims to these islands, played decisive roles in the debate’s 
resolution. In 1803, de facto Bermudian rule gave way to de jure Bahamian 
sovereignty and a more traditional settlement pattern began to emerge. Yet, for 
over a century, the maritime, migratory and transient settlement patterns of Turks 
Islands – preferred by Bermudians and informed by salt’s seasonal rhythms – 
offered a remarkably different blueprint for settlement within the British 
Caribbean. 
 Chapters 5 and 6 then zoomed in at a local level to assess the political 
economy and labour systems that matured around salt. From the mid-eighteenth 
century, a fairly singular economic system developed at Turks Islands. In an era 
when privatisation might have been expected, the Head Rights System stood out 
as a shared resource system based on collective ownership. Its most notable 
features were in contrast to the privately owned sugar plantations. However, this 
‘creole commons’ was not an archaic leftover. As Chapter 5 argued, the Head 
Rights System was a creative, adaptive and innovative hybrid – neither 
completely of the Old World nor entirely of the New but a synthesis, drawing on 
English, Bermudian and Turks Island influences. It enjoyed longevity, but, in 
1845, it was dismantled. Chapter 6 charted that change while it investigated the 
experiences of those who laboured on the ponds in slavery and in freedom. It 
argued that labour in the salt industry was always unfree in some way primarily 
because working with salt was an intense and debilitating form of labour. It also 
demonstrated that there were aspects of salt island slavery that distinctly shaped 
enslaved labour. Not only was the Head Rights System silent in offering 
enslaved persons protection, it also barred them from raking salt on their own 
account and limited permissible petit marronage to an unprecedented degree. At 
the same time, environmental conditions did not favour the enslaved salt raker. 
The lack of a mountainous interior, or any interior at all, restricted opportunities 
to escape while soil infertility precluded the development of a provision ground 
system. Together, these features made it particularly challenging for salt rakers to 
develop meaningful spheres of socioeconomic autonomy. In freedom, these 
systems of domination changed but they did not end. Through a combination of 
land and labour manipulations, the salt ponds were enclosed and privatised, 
while the salt rakers were brought back as wage labourers. Chapters 5 and 6 
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therefore charted the rise and fall of a singular economic system within the 
British Caribbean in order to explain how systems of domination and profitable 
salt extraction persisted in freedom. 
 Finally, Chapters 7 and 8 panned out for an Atlantic perspective, 
assessing the position of Turks Islands within the British Atlantic world through 
an analysis of their defence and provisioning. Chapter 7 argued that, as Out 
Islands of the Bahamian archipelago, Turks Islands were some of the most 
precariously placed within the British Caribbean. However, following a French 
attack in 1764, British imperial and colonial actors decided that geopolitical 
security in this region had been compromised. In line with British mercantilism, 
which saw value in shepherding trade along discrete ocean corridors, Turks 
Islands were elevated to a position of prominence due to their expanding salt-
gathering population and location near the entrance of the Windward Passage. In 
order to protect British use of this sea-lane, Turks Islands were transformed into 
a watery enclave of empire and awarded a King’s Agent in order to encourage 
further development. From thereon, Turks Islands were able to secure small but 
critical military resources to protect their salt trade and project a ‘force-field’ 
over the nearby Windward Passage. While Chapter 7 tracked the strengthening 
of British mercantilism at Turks Islands, Chapter 8 explored its failure during a 
period of instability: the American Revolution. It argued that while the American 
Revolution proved a disaster for the sugar islands, it did not have the same 
consequences for the salt islands. The war activated a politics of provisions in 
Bermuda and Turks Islands that allowed them to undercut British mercantilism, 
as the pressing need for salt across North America ensured their salt-provisions 
trade largely endured. As a result, these co-dependent islands obtained food more 
regularly, and in sufficient quantity, to avoid the worst effects of famine. 
Chapters 7 and 8 therefore unpacked a story about the construction and failure of 
British mercantilism at Turks Islands, in which their salt-gathering population 
proved both an asset and liability.   
In its effort to move beyond the plantation and follow a sinew population 
of Bermudian salt gatherers, merchants and enslaved salt rakers into an 
alternative space of slavery, this thesis has achieved its aim of diversifying our 
understanding of Caribbean processes and societies. That diversity is important 
because it demonstrates the plasticity and complexity of an entangled British 
 
	 256 
Atlantic that needed both salt and sugar, amongst other commodities, to sustain 
its economies and unequal societies. At Turks Islands, the discovery of salt drew 
thousands of free and enslaved persons to their shores; it saw millions of salt 
bushels exported to preserve Atlantic food chains; and it wove a poignant and 
rich inter-island history between Turks Islands and Bermuda. This trajectory was 
unusual, often in contrast to the sugar islands, but that did not mean their 
histories were separate. Here the salt industry did not compete with the sugar 
industry. It complemented, supported and literally fed into it. In delving into the 
history of salt’s production and trade, this thesis furthers the work of Caribbean 
and Atlantic historians who shine a light on the ancillary industries of the sugar 
plantation complex – in order to understand how deep-rooted, far-flung and 
hidden these subsidiary supports really were. 
 
Turks Islands and Bermuda’s maritime economy 
 
While this thesis has found value in using salt as a counterpoint to sugar, a rich 
inter-island history between Bermuda and Turks Islands has also unfurled. At the 
turn of the nineteenth century, salt was coveted in the British Atlantic world. For 
Captain John Lightbourn, a Bermudian salt gatherer, salt was his livelihood. It 
prompted him to straddle business and family commitments across two colonies, 
and live on an island that offered little in terms of agriculture, or even water. As 
the years progressed, a commitment to salt encouraged Lightbourn to create two 
lives, two homes, in Bermuda and Turks Islands. When he died at Turks Islands 
in 1819, his will reflected that fact.1 As his first wife had already died in 
Bermuda, he left his Bermudian house, outhouses, land and real estate to their 
son Robert, gave lifetime access to a bedroom in the main house to their daughter 
Hannah, and divided any residues of the estate between all three of their children 
– Robert, Hannah and William. Over in Turks Islands, he left his house, 
furniture, outhouses, land, seven enslaved persons and £400 Bermuda currency 
to his second wife and named his Bermudian sons and two friends at Turks 
Islands trustees of his two illegitimate children there. His will was a lasting 
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testament to the evolution of a family that had branched out across Turks Islands 
and Bermuda, all because of the value ascribed to a small, white crystal. 
 Such inter-island connections had a long history dating from when 
Bermudian seafarers first discovered Turks Islands in the 1660s. Their apparent 
endurance in 1819 raises an important question about the transplantation of 
colonial societies. When a colony pursues secondary settlement and incorporates 
further places into its sphere of influence, certain processes and features will 
transfer across but not all. Local permutations will often speak back in their own 
vernacular. Within the confines of this thesis, this begs the question: to what 
extent should we consider Turks Islands an extension of Bermuda’s maritime 
economy, bearing a similar likeness with its other maritime activities? In other 
words, what moved and did not move between Bermuda and Turks Islands? And 
was there a palatable change over time, with an emergent Turks Island identity 
beginning to form? 
 When considering the integration of the Atlantic, historians of merchant 
networks and commodities have increasingly argued that trade and private 
enterprise were more important in facilitating this process than metropolitan 
investment or imperial decrees. This thesis has similarly found that, at least prior 
to 1764, investment from London or instructions from state officials were of 
secondary importance to the incorporation of Turks Islands within the British 
Atlantic world (Chapters 3 and 4). Instead, Bermudian salt gatherers and 
merchants were instrumental. Though Turks Islands were tiny, flat, and barren, 
their extensive salinas made them valuable to those who had the determination to 
nurture them. While Bermudian salt gatherers and their enslaved companies 
provided the necessary labour, incoming Bermuda sloops supported their efforts 
by bringing foodstuffs and manufactures in exchange for the raked salt. It was 
this repetitive, cyclical movement of people, provisions and salt between 
Bermuda and Turks Islands that meaningfully drew the latter into the British 
imperial network.  
Moreover, in this remote location, there was little oversight from the 
Bermuda or Bahamas Government. In practice, the Bermudian salt gatherers had 
an inordinate amount of control over Turks Island affairs. It was from their 
consensual customary practices, informed by salt’s seasonal rhythms, that the 
Head Rights System likely evolved (Chapter 5). Its tendency towards collective 
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ownership suited the salt gatherers’ migratory and maritime lifestyles and 
mirrored Bermudian practices in other watery commons, including wrecking, 
whaling, and privateering, where profits were similarly shared.2 Moreover, when 
the Head Rights System was formally encoded in 1767, the salt gatherers elected 
commissioners from amongst themselves to join the King’s Agent in governing 
and settling local disputes. Given the lack of magisterial courts, this gave these 
transient inhabitants significant leverage over how the islands were run. That 
personal power increased dramatically within the islands’ form of slavery 
(Chapter 6). Considering that 83 per cent of the population at Grand Turk were 
still classified as free or enslaved Bermudians in 1801, it seems evident that 
white Bermudians were influential and powerful figures at Turks Islands, 
shaping how the islands were internally managed and externally integrated into 
the British Atlantic world.3  
Migrations to Turks Islands also significantly impacted Bermuda’s island 
society. In the late seventeenth century, Bermuda had been considered 
overcrowded. Salt gathering offered an outlet in which to employ the island’s 
‘meanest rank of [white] Bermudians’ as well as the island’s underemployed 
enslaved persons.4 Many households in Bermuda relied on hiring-out their 
enslaved persons for their main source of income. As those who left for Turks 
Islands were predominantly male, the salt industry contributed to the sense that 
eighteenth-century Bermuda was a society of women.5 In the absence of their 
husbands, brothers and fathers, white Bermudian women grew more 
socioeconomically independent.6 Over winter, Bermudian salt gatherers would 
return to Bermuda, using those months to reconnect with family, settle business 
affairs, buy provisions for the following salt season and pay taxes to the 
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Bermuda Government. These contributions to Bermuda’s maritime economy 
were strengthened by the fact Turks Island salt also provided Bermudian 
transatlantic merchants with a sustainable and largely predictable staple with 
which to trade and obtain valuable provisions for their countrymen back home. 
This became particularly important during the American Revolution when the 
perseverance of the salt-provisions trade meant Bermudians avoided the high 
rates of famine experienced elsewhere (Chapter 8). Yet, the importance of Turks 
Islands to Bermuda’s maritime economy is perhaps most clearly expressed in the 
vehement protests and mobilisations of the Bermuda legislature whenever the 
Bahamas Government threatened to extend its jurisdiction over Turks Islands 
(Chapters 3 and 4). Land-poor Bermudians may have exploited a number of 
watery commons throughout the Caribbean, but salt gathering was their most 
sustainable, systematic and coveted offshore venture. 
However, there were aspects of Turks Islands’ society and development 
that had little to do with Bermuda and did not transfer across. After 1764, the 
imperial government would have more influence over Turks Islands’ Atlantic 
integration than historians of merchant networks would lead us to believe 
(Chapter 7). Following the French attack on Turks Islands, the British 
Government created a new position within the empire called the Turks Islands 
King’s Agent, which secured international recognition for British sovereignty 
over Turks Islands. Thereafter, this official worked with his superiors and the salt 
gatherers to improve the islands’ defence and introduce an official set of pond 
regulations. This created institutional stability and the conditions needed for a 
more systematic salt industry to mature. After 1766, more and more white 
Bermudians were drawn into an increasingly dependable industry and 
subsequently felt more confident to employ their enslaved labourers. 
The British Government intervened in 1764 partly because it understood 
how valuable salt was to its navy, northern cod fisheries, American colonies and 
Caribbean sugar plantations (Chapter 5). Salt was one of the few colonial 
products not to be enumerated. It could be shipped directly from foreign to 
colonial ports because Britain could not meet the rapacious demand for this item 
within its colonies. Protecting Turks Islands in 1764, which promised to be a 
valuable source of salt, was prudent imperial policy. However, London ministers 
also intervened because Bermuda’s salt gatherers and their enslaved salt rakers 
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populated islands that were strategically situated next to the Windward Passage, 
making them valuable to British mercantilism and the protection of Jamaica’s 
sugar trade (Chapter 7). The resultant synergy – between salt’s importance and 
the islands’ strategic significance – encouraged the British Government to 
intervene. As such, while Bermudian salt gatherers worked continuously to bring 
Turks Islands into their merchant networks, imperial actors did at times exercise 
a capacity to smooth the way.  
This is important because within Bermuda’s historiography, there is the 
assumption that prior to the relocation of the Admiralty’s North Atlantic Station, 
Bermudians were by and large left to themselves and considered an annoyance to 
London ministers. While Michael Jarvis has questioned this by demonstrating the 
importance of Bermuda’s maritime activities for connecting the Atlantic’s 
intercolonial trade, this thesis offers a further caveat: at Turks Islands, 
Bermudians were more important to British imperial designs than they are 
usually given credit for. The British Government’s cooperation in facilitating the 
protection and industry of the Bermudian salt gatherers demonstrates that fact. 
Such imperial interventions set Turks Islands apart from Bermuda’s other, less 
regulated, watery commons. 
A further divergence is the fact the proximate environment was a real 
agent in Turks Islands’ history. Taking inspiration from oceanic histories, the 
impacts of the Atlantic Ocean on Turks Island processes have not been taken for 
granted in this thesis. For one, the ocean shaped how Turks Islands were settled. 
Seafarers from Bermuda arrived on Turks Islands’ shores from across the 
Sargasso Sea. Its favourable trade winds helped sustain the annual migrations 
that led to these islands becoming co-dependent and transformed by their 
socioeconomic relationship (Chapters 3 and 4). In contrast, the difficulty of 
sailing against trade winds and navigating the hazardous reefs between New 
Providence and Turks Islands consistently negated the integration of the latter 
within the Bahamas Government. Moreover, conceptions of ocean space shaped 
Turks Islands’ trajectory. While early-modern conceptions of ocean space 
became important in the geographical arguments that, with or without intention, 
served to legitimise Bahamian claims to Turks Islands (Chapter 3), the spatiality 
of British mercantilism revealed a socially constructed Caribbean Sea that 
prioritised certain sea-lanes and helped transform the islands from a vulnerable, 
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unregulated, and unclaimed commons to a watery enclave of empire (Chapter 7). 
Most significantly, it was out of the ocean that Turks Islands’ saline environment 
was born.  
More than any other factor, salt has shaped the history related within this 
thesis. As discussed above, salt significantly contributed to Bermuda’s maritime 
economy. However, in its materiality, salt was also something new, causing 
Turks Islands’ society to diverge from Bermuda’s. First, salt raking took place in 
a fixed location. Unlike other watery commons that moved around, salt gathering 
relied on specific environmental conditions that regularly brought populations to 
specific saline islands. The annual assembling of Bermudians at these sites not 
only changed how Britain viewed Turks Islands within its mercantilist strategy, it 
also sowed vulnerabilities. Prior to 1764, French privateers and pirates could 
predict when and where vulnerable Bermudian salt gatherers and their vessels 
would amass. This vulnerability was most apparent during the French attack on 
Turks Islands in 1764, which prompted the British Government to reactively 
assert sovereignty over Turks Islands (Chapter 7). But such territorial 
sovereignty was only possible because these maritime commons were 
concentrated on specific islands and, unlike fish, turtles, wrecks or privateers, 
they did not move around. 
Moreover, harvesting salt presented its own challenges. While white 
Bermudians initially raked salt, once the islands were more secure a system of 
salt island slavery began to replace that labour. This shift from free to enslaved 
labour was seen across Bermuda’s maritime activities, but there were notable 
differences at Turks Islands. Salt island slavery had characteristics it did not 
share with Bermuda’s maritime slavery. Whereas Bermuda’s maritime slavery 
tended to be less violent, less hierarchical, more autonomous and more skilled, 
labour on the salt islands was more regimented, more monotonous and more 
supervised. It was low skilled and low-tech, involving gang labour and larger 
concentrations of enslaved persons. Here a predominantly male white creole 
culture emerged that was known for excess and its power to punish with 
impunity. In its intensity and propensity towards violence, salt island slavery 
was, in fact, much more like sugar plantation slavery than it was Bermudian 
maritime slavery. In her History, Mary Prince alluded to this dissonance between 
slavery in Bermuda and Turks Islands, as much as her own inter-island history 
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testified to their enduring connection. After ten years of salt raking she returned 
to Bermuda with her master, but upon witnessing his aggression towards her 
resurface, she protested: ‘Sir, this is not Turk’s Islands!’7 
This raises a question. Either Turks Islands’ slavery was an inexplicable 
aberration or it was somehow connected to, even representative of, Bermuda’s 
slavery system despite its lack of familial resemblance. During the eighteenth 
century, the Turks Islands were a sub-colony, or secondary settlement, of 
Bermuda and predominantly comprised of its sojourning and seafaring 
countrymen. These men moved from Bermuda to Turks Islands, and back again. 
Yet, Bermuda’s form of maritime slavery did not move with them. This non-
transfer makes sense only when the nature of Turks Islands’ environment and 
salt production is considered. As this thesis has shown, Turks Islands’ harsh 
environmental conditions, the materiality of salt, and the unique demands of its 
production, drove an intense form of labour that desensitised Bermudian 
slaveholders in this remote location (Chapter 6). In this setting, Bermudian 
maritime slavery evolved. For historians of slavery, this thesis demonstrates the 
institution could rapidly change across colonial spaces, even when they were as 
intimately connected as Turks Islands and Bermuda. It urges them, and 
commodity historians more broadly, to thoughtfully consider the materiality and 
agency of commodities in affecting the structure and intensity of labour systems. 
Salt’s seasonality and the industry’s low start-up costs also shaped the 
Head Rights System that matured around salt (Chapter 5). For one, fear that rain 
would come and ‘melt’ the salt or weaken the brine ponds was always a factor of 
concern. These islands were very small and any event of rain near harvest time 
would likely destroy a significant portion of a salt harvest. In these 
circumstances, holding a quantity of the ponds in common was good insurance. 
Second, salt could not be produced all year round. This seasonality helped shape 
the annual pattern of maritime migration that saw the majority of inhabitants 
leave the salt islands over winter. Maintaining the ponds as private property in 
these conditions would have been difficult. Third, the average salt gatherer 
required minimal capital for his venture, while the profits to be made were 
																																																								
7 Mary Prince, The History of Mary Prince: A West Indian Slave. Related by herself with 
a Supplement by the Editor. To which is added, the Narrative of Asa-Asa. A captured 
African (ed. by Thomas Pringle, London: Westley and A H Davis, 1831), p. 13. 
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modest. In salt raking, the sun and wind performed most of the work. Enslaved 
labour was still the largest cost but the skills required were low and the 
workforce could be moved. This combination of low-risk and low-reward suited 
a shared resource system in which the transaction costs of enclosing the ponds 
and monitoring behaviour, especially in the winter dead months, would have 
exceeded the moderate benefits to be gained by the individual. All these features 
of salt production supported the migratory settlement and Head Rights System 
that typified Turks Islands.  
Yet it was the revenue potential in salt taxation that definitively changed 
the position of Turks Islands within Bermuda’s maritime economy. Following 
the American Revolution, the Bahamas were plunged into a financial crisis that 
only worsened during the French Revolutionary Wars; while at Turks Islands, 
the wealth of the salt industry, the enduring salt-provisions trade, and the success 
of their land and sea defences, allowed these islands to navigate the shifting 
geopolitical climate more safely (Chapters 7 and 8). As the Bahamas 
Government searched for a new source of income, it challenged Bermudian 
hegemony over Turks Islands, passing legislation to extend political 
representation to Turks Islands in 1799 and to tax the salt trade in 1802 (Chapters 
3 and 4). The fractious intra-colonial crisis that ensued brought the issue to 
Britain where the Bermuda Government failed to convince London ministers of 
its right to Turks Islands. As Bahamian jurisdiction and salt taxation were 
extended to Turks Islands, an era of more permanent, terrestrial settlement was 
inaugurated. This would, over time, disengage Turks Islands from Bermuda’s 
maritime economy.  
Consequently, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a more 
independent Turks Island society was beginning to emerge and diverge from its 
Bermudian roots. Salt production had evolved. In the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, this was an ad-hoc, opportunistic and risky enterprise, 
carried out by white male crewmembers offloaded from passing merchant 
vessels. These transient, sinew populations were noticeably a part of Bermuda’s 
maritime economy and likely engaged in a variety of maritime activities. At this 
time, salt gathering was more like beach combing – an opportunistic and chancy 
venture – and salt gatherers annually returned to Bermuda where their families, 
friends and countrymen lived. However, from the mid-eighteenth century, salt 
 
	 264 
production become a more systematic, structured and protected industry, with a 
specific form of slavery under the watchful eye of the King’s Agent and his 
Royal Regulations. At this point, salt raking blurred the line between terrestrial 
and aquatic pursuits. While salt raking could never be described as agricultural, 
Turks Islands’ salt industry began to resemble something that was more 
‘terraqueous’.8 Institutional stability and enhanced protection drew more 
Bermudians to invest their time, enslaved labour and capital in the ponds. As the 
salinas’ size and salt season were limited, profits relied on increasing 
productivity. Channels, sluices, gates, warehouses, wharfs and more durable 
dwellings were all constructed to manipulate the saline environment. Over time, 
we therefore witness a sea change: salt raking became less maritime and mobile 
as the nineteenth century progressed and increasingly the remit of those who, like 
Lightbourn, lived permanently on the islands. While socioeconomic connections 
between Bermuda and Turks Islands endured, their hey-day would remain in the 




Across this thesis two further methodological and historiographical points have 
emerged. As they are in dialogue with key aspects of Caribbean, oceanic and 
commodity history, they are worth underscoring. First, this thesis has utilised a 
flexible methodology, incorporating aspects of a trans-, sub-, and infra-Atlantic 
history within a predominantly cis-Atlantic approach because of its conviction 
that all these perspectives and thematic investigations have been necessary to 
achieve the thesis aim: to diversify our understanding of Caribbean processes by 
focusing on societies that matured around salt. It has allowed for a wide and 
varied exploration of salt’s contribution to Turks Islands’ settlement, 
development and position within the British Atlantic world. Moreover, it has 
responded to the need within Caribbean historiography for more regional and 
Atlantic analyses of some of the most marginalised islands of the British 
Caribbean. In this thesis, Bermuda and Turks Islands have shared a unique and 
rich inter-island history, while the Bahamas, Saint Domingue, Jamaica, and the 
																																																								
8 Alison Bashford, ‘Terraqueous histories’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 60 No. 2 (Jun., 
2017), pp. 253-272. 
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North American colonies have also been gathered into the analysis. This specific 
clustering of colonies is particular to this history. It would not have emerged in 
the same way through a history that had focused on sugar, coffee, chocolate, 
indigo or tobacco, or even in a history of Turks Islands that had not looked 
outwards as well as inwards. In so doing, this thesis has demonstrated there is 
fruitfulness in research that not only looks beyond the plantation, but also 
remains sensitive to scale.  
Second, through tracing the rich inter-island histories of Bermuda and 
Turks Islands, this thesis has often (though not always) de-centred Europe. It has 
found the self-directed and self-organised kith and kinship networks of 
Bermuda’s merchant fleet were predominantly responsible for drawing 
uninhabited Turks Islands into the British Empire. At times, the British 
Government would act decisively for Turks Islands’ protection and development: 
appointing the islands a King’s Agent, sanctioning the Head Rights System and 
ruling Turks Islands were a part of the Bahamas. However, these interventions 
were often reactive and only ever a part of the story. Moreover, within the time 
period of this study, the most important trading relationships for Turks Islands 
were with Bermuda and the North American mainland, underscoring the fact 
colonists were not only producers of goods but consumers as well. Salt was in 
demand in the colonies because it was needed to preserve animal proteins that 
fed Caribbean and American populations. Such food chains could and did help 
tie the Atlantic together, sometimes in ways metropolitan actors least preferred. 
As a result, this thesis has found common ground with Atlantic histories that 





Appendix A: Chronology of Events 
 
1609 Settlement of Bermuda. 
 
1651 The first Navigation Act is passed to enact mercantilist principles 
within the British Empire. 
 
1660s Maritime Bermudians first discover the salt ponds of Turks 
Islands. 
 
1676 Governor John Heydon of Bermuda caps importation of new 
enslaved persons into the islands. From then on, Bermuda 
develops a naturally increasing creole enslaved population. 
 
1684 Bermuda is returned to Crown rule after the Somer Islands 
Company’s charter is revoked. This marks the start of Bermuda’s 
maritime revolution and its turn away from agriculture towards the 
sea. Salt raking activities at Turks Islands increase. 
 
1756-1763 The Seven Years’ War. 
 
1764 French attack on Turks Islands. 
 
1766 Andrew Symmer is appointed the first Turks Islands King’s 
Agent. 
 
1767 The Head Rights System is encoded in unofficial regulations. With 
regulations and Crown protection guaranteed, more Bermudians 
are drawn into the salt trade and there is an increased use of 
enslaved labour on the ponds.  
 
1768 The Secretary of State reprimands King’s Agent Symmer’s 
attempt to restrict access to the salt ponds and reaffirms that access 
must be free and unrestrained to all British subjects. 
 
1774 With the help of the King’s Agent, the Bahamas Government 
passes ‘An Act for the better regulating and Government of the 
Salt Ponds at the Turks Islands’. This encodes the Head Rights 
System in official regulations. 
 
1775-1783 American Revolutionary War. 
 
1775 The Continental Congress permits the provincial councils of 
Virginia, North Carolina and Maryland to export commodities to 
friendly ports, including Bermuda, in return for salt. 
 
1776 Nassau is attacked by American rebel forces. 
 
 Governor Shirley of the Bahamas decrees only salt can be 
exported directly from Turks Islands and only provisions can be 
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imported directly within. This signals the end of a period when 
Turks Islands effectively operated as an illegal free port. 
 
1778 Nassau is attacked for the second time by American rebel forces. 
 
Leading members of the Bermudian legislature form an 
association against privateers. 
 
1781 The King and his Privy Council sign the Royal Regulations. 
 
In March, the Continental Congress withdraws its concession to 
permit safe entry to Bermudian salt traders and bans trade with 
Bermuda. Illegal smuggling continues with several states. 
 
1783 The British Government grants lands for the resettlement of 
refugee Loyalists in the Bahamas. The Bahamas experience a 
financial and administrative crisis in the wake of a doubling 
population, a reversal in the ethnic make-up of its society and 
escalating fortification costs. 
 
 In February, three French vessels of war attack Turks Islands and 
seize possession until the end of the American Revolutionary War. 
 
1786 John Dunmore is appointed Governor of the Bahamas (he is 
recalled in 1796). 
 
1789   Alexander Murray is appointed Turks Islands King’s Agent. 
 
1790 Surveys of Turks Islands are produced for Governor Dunmore. 
 
King’s Agent Murray raises a militia at Turks Islands. 
 
1792-1802 French Revolutionary Wars. 
 
1792 Governor Dunmore sends a detachment of troops to Turks Islands 
to press inhabitants to conform to Bahamian tax laws. 
 
1794 King’s Agent Murray hires the armed cutter Victory to patrol 
Turks Islands. 
 
1799 The Bahamas legislature passes an Act on political representation 
that allows Turks Islands to elect a representative to its Assembly. 
It gains Royal Assent. 
 
 King’s Agent Murray hires the armed schooner Admiral Duncan 
to patrol Turks Islands. 
 





1802 The Bahamas Assembly passes an Act to implement a colonial tax 
on salt to include Turks Islands, which are now the most 
successful salt-producing islands of the Bahamian archipelago. 
 
Mary Prince arrives at Turks Islands and becomes a salt raker for 
approximately ten years before she returns to Bermuda. 
 
1803 The Attorney and Solicitor General rule Turks Islands are a part of 
the Bahamas. This signals a trend towards more permanent, 
terrestrial and traditional settlement patterns. 
 
1806 Captain John Lightbourn is known to be living at Turks Islands 
(until his death in 1819). 
 
1812-1815 The War of 1812. 
 
1818 The Admiralty relocates its North Atlantic Station to Bermuda’s 
Royal Naval Dockyard. 
 
1834 Slavery is abolished across the British Empire and the 
apprenticeship system begins. 
 
1838 The apprenticeship system ends across the British Empire and full 
emancipation is announced. 
 
1845 The Head Rights System is dismantled, the ponds are enclosed and 
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